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Abstract 
 
During collaboration, people communicate using verbal and non-verbal cues, 
including gaze cues. Spoken language is usually the primary medium of 
communication in these interactions, yet despite this co-occurrence of speech and 
gaze cueing, most experiments have used paradigms without language. Furthermore, 
previous research has shown that myriad social factors influence behaviour during 
interactions, yet most studies investigating responses to gaze have been conducted in 
a lab, far removed from any natural interaction. It was the aim of this thesis to 
investigate the relationship between language and gaze cue utilisation in natural 
collaborations. For this reason, the initial study was largely observational, allowing 
for spontaneous natural language and gaze. Participants were found to rarely look at 
their partners, but to do so strategically, with listeners looking more at speakers when 
the latter were of higher social status. Eye movement behaviour also varied with the 
type of language used in instructions, so in a second study, a more controlled (but still 
real-world) paradigm was used to investigate the effect of language type on gaze 
utilisation. Participants used gaze cues flexibly, by seeking and following gaze more 
when the cues were accompanied by distinct featural verbal information compared to 
overlapping spatial verbal information. The remaining three studies built on these 
findings to investigate the relationship between language and gaze using a much more 
controlled paradigm. Gaze and language cues were reduced to equivalent artificial 
stimuli and the reliability of each cue was manipulated. Even in this artificial 
paradigm, language was preferred when cues were equally reliable, supporting the 
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idea that gaze cues are supportive to language. Typical gaze cueing effects were still 
found, however the size of these effects was modulated by gaze cue reliability. 
Combined, the studies in this thesis show that although gaze cues may automatically 
and quickly affect attention, their use in natural communication is mediated by the 
form and content of concurrent spoken language. 
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
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When collaborating with another we primarily use spoken language to communicate. 
However, this is often facilitated by non-verbal cues. Arguably the most well 
researched of these cues is the cue provided by the gaze of another. These gaze cues 
are unique in that unlike other non-verbal cues they can directly inform a listener as to 
the focus of a speaker’s attention. 
Researchers across a wide range of disciplines have investigated gaze cues, including 
cognitive, social and developmental psychologists, evolutionary biologists, 
psycholinguists and computer scientists. A common finding amongst researchers is 
that humans have a tendency to follow the gaze cues of another (Emery, 2000). Some 
evolutionary psychologists have theorised that the unique contrast visible in the 
human eye has evolved so that we can easily detect where others are looking 
(Tomasello, Hare, Lehmann & Call, 2007). Behavioural experiments have shown that 
people are highly skilled at detecting eye movements of others and are sensitive to 
small changes in gaze directions (Anderson, Risko & Kingstone, 2011). 
There has long been evidence that our ability to follow the gaze of another arises in 
infancy (Scaife & Bruner, 1975). In infants, this behaviour has been interpreted as an 
example of joint attention between infant and adult. These findings challenged 
Piaget’s (1972) concept of the egocentric child and would later be important to 
informing key concepts and theories in child development, such as Theory of Mind 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995).  
The present thesis investigates the relationship between spoken language and gaze 
cues in natural social interactions. As research on gaze cue utilisation is widespread 
across several disciplines and has been used to address numerous diverse questions, it 
is beyond the scope of this review chapter to provide a comprehensive overview of 
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this literature. Instead, this chapter focuses on research findings necessary to inform a 
thorough investigation of the interaction between language and gaze cues in natural 
interactions. Specifically, discussion focuses on gaze behaviour in real-world 
interactions, the attentional effects of gaze cue stimuli and, crucially, previous work 
investigating gaze cues and language together. Reviewing this literature together lays 
the groundwork for the exploration of the relationships between gaze cues and 
language presented in this thesis.   
 
Early work on gaze and social interaction 
 
Throughout the nineteen-sixties and –seventies, before reliable portable eye-tracking 
systems were developed, social psychologists and anthropologists used a variety of 
methods to investigate how gaze was used in natural social interactions (Argyle & 
Cook, 1976). These studies used coarse measures relative to those recorded with eye-
trackers and so could not be used to measure the precise timings of eye contact or 
gaze following events accurately. However, the findings of these social gaze studies 
can still provide insight into gaze behaviour during natural communication. The work 
detailed below explores the things people can infer from the gaze behaviour of 
another, as well as a spectrum of social factors that modulate the eye movement 
behaviour of individuals in a social interaction. Collectively, these studies highlight a 
number of the fundamental principles of gaze behaviour during social interactions and 
these principles have been used to help inform and interpret the studies in the present 
thesis. 
	   4	  
When viewing the faces of others, people are able to assess emotional state as well as 
infer personality traits. Tomkins and McCarter (1964) presented participants with 
images of faces simulating emotional expressions. Participants identified the majority 
of these correctly, and those that were incorrectly identified were commonly 
misidentified across participants, showing a shared and astute ability of participants to 
identify the emotional state of others. Kleck and Nuessle (1968) asked participants to 
make judgments about people interacting in custom-made films in which actors 
looked at each other (mutual gaze) either 15% or 80% of the time. When there was 
low mutual gaze, participants used negative attributes to describe the actors, such as 
“cold”, “defensive” or “submissive”. High mutual gaze resulted in the use of much 
more positive words, such as “friendly”, “natural” and “sincere”. A similar study, 
using a real interactor rather than a filmed duo, investigated this effect quantitatively 
(Mehrabian, 1968). Participants viewing an interactor rated how much they thought 
he liked the person with whom he was interacting. Likeability scores were found to 
increase with the amount of eye contact provided in the interaction. These early 
studies show that when viewing others, people use the facial expressions and gaze 
behaviour of those others to make inferences about their personality and mood. 
Early research investigating gaze behaviour during real interactions found a negative 
correlation between proximity and the amount of eye contact during a conversation 
(Argyle & Dean, 1965). In this study a confederate and participant sat at 90° to each 
other around a square table and discussed images on a Thematic Apperception Test 
(TAT) card. The confederate gazed at the participant’s eyes throughout these 
conversations and between conversations the proximity of the confederate to the 
participant was varied. Two observers behind a one-way screen used stopwatches to 
time the participants’ glances toward the confederate, providing a measure of mutual 
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gaze. The experimenters found that the closer the confederate, the shorter the total eye 
contact time between the interactors. Argyle and Dean argue that this is due to the 
role eye contact and proximity play in intimacy. The combination of close proximity 
to another and a high level of mutual gaze is characteristic of an intimate social 
interaction, so in this experimental interaction with a stranger, participants avoid 
mutual gaze. However, when the confederate is less proximal mutual gaze is less 
intimate, therefore the participants do not need to suppress glances to the confederate. 
In the same paper, Argyle and Dean report the findings of a “perceptual experiment”: 
Participants were brought into a room with an inanimate object on display and 
instructed to stand “as close as is comfortable to see well”. After this they were 
presented with three different displays, one after the other: 1) a cardboard cutout of 
the lead experimenter’s face, looking at the participant, 2) the lead experimenter, 
looking at the participant and 3) the lead experimenter with his eyes closed. For each 
display participants positioned themselves as they did for the initial display. The 
authors found that there was no significant difference in the distance participants 
positioned themselves from the closed-eyes researcher and the cardboard cutout. 
However, they were found to stand significantly farther away from the researcher 
when he was looking them in the eye. These studies show that our proximity to 
another person affects the extent to which we engage in mutual gaze with that person, 
suggesting that our gaze orienting behaviour can be modulated by the context of the 
social interaction in which we are involved. 
As well as the proximity to another, the amount of mutual gaze in an interaction can 
be influenced by the non-verbal signals and social perceptions of another. Efran 
(1968) conducted a study in which college Freshman participants talked with two 
confederates, who were either both Seniors, both Freshman or one of each. One 
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confederate always smiled more and was more approving of the participant’s 
comments than the other. The participants were found to look more at the approving 
confederate overall, suggesting that people engage in more eye contact with those 
people they feel positive towards, supporting earlier findings from similar studies 
(Efran & Broughton, 1966; Mehrabian, 1968). Other studies have also shown that just 
as people look more at those giving positive signals, they will decrease the extent of 
mutual gaze when involved in negative interactions, such as those in which difficult 
topics are discussed (Exline & Winters, 1966) or those in which the other interactor is 
highly critical (Modigliani, 1971). 
The level of approval of the confederate was not the only factor to effect mutual gaze 
in Efran’s (1968) study; increased mutual gaze with the approving confederate was 
not found across all confederate combinations.  When the approving confederate or 
both confederates were Seniors there was a significant effect of the approving signals, 
however when the approving confederate or both confederates were Freshmen, this 
effect was not found to be significant. These results suggest that whether the approval 
of another increases mutual gaze depends on how that person is perceived socially; 
mutual gaze is increased when the approving individual is perceived as having a 
higher social status (a college Senior) compared to equal social status (a Freshman). 
In a review of early work on social status and gaze, Ellyson, Davidio and Fehr (1981) 
reported that the relationship between social status and gaze is more complicated. 
They discussed work by Exline, Ellyson and Long (1975) that found interactors will 
typically look more at another while listening compared to when speaking. Ellyson et 
al (1981) discuss this in light of their research showing that dominant interactors 
(those with a higher social status or expert in a discussion) spend approximately equal 
amounts of time looking when speaking and listening. Therefore, higher social status 
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is associated with a higher look-while-talking to look-while-listening ratio. This may 
be because the dominant individual looks more when speaking to make sure that the 
subordinate is listening, while the subordinate looks more when listening to ensure 
that they understand the dominant individual or to signal to the dominant individual 
that they are listening.  
Cultural differences in gaze behaviour were also explored during this period. Watson 
and Graves (1966) investigated differences in behaviour during social interactions 
between Arab and American students in Colorado. Pairs of either Arab or American 
friends were observed behind a one-way mirror as they conversed for 5 minutes. 
Raters behind the mirror scored each participant minute-by-minute on a number of 
non-verbal metrics, including gaze behaviour measured on a 1-4 scale, with 1 
denoting direct eye contact and 4 denoting no visual contact. Arab students were 
found to have significantly lower scores than the American students, due to increased 
levels of mutual gaze. Similar work investigated differences in social gaze between 
racial sub-groups within the same nation; specifically, mutual gaze differences 
between black and white Americans (LaFrance & Mayo, 1976). In a frame-by-frame 
analysis of a black-black and a black-white conversation, LaFrance and Mayo 
reported that the white participant looked significantly more during listening than the 
black participants. In a second study, multiple dyads (half black, half white) were 
covertly observed in a natural setting by observers who timed mutual gaze events with 
stopwatches. Black pairs were found to spend less time looking when listening than 
the white pairs. The results of these studies should, however, be interpreted cautiously 
as Watson and Graves (1966) gained a small amount of data from a small sample of 
participants and these data were generated from a fairly subjective rating system. 
Furthermore, there is no assurance in the paper that raters were blind to the 
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hypothesis. LaFrance and Mayo (1976) only used three individuals in their frame-by-
frame analysis and their method of timing mutual gaze clearly lacks precision. 
The above experiments focussed on eye contact between individuals, rather than gaze 
cueing or following. Due to the technical limitations of the time, controlling and 
measuring eye contact was a lot easier than attempting to investigate gaze cueing 
utilisation precisely and accurately. However, Milgram, Bickman and Berkowitz 
(1969) were able to investigate gaze following in a large-scale observational study. 
Milgram et al. used groups of one, two, three, five, ten or fifteen confederates who 
were instructed to look at a specific 6th floor window from a spot on a busy New York 
City sidewalk. The researchers analysed film recordings of these events and 
calculated the percentage of pedestrians that followed the gaze cues of the group. 
Approximately 40% of pedestrians looked up when one confederate was looking at 
the window, and this percentage increased as group size increased up to five 
confederates and then plateaued at around 80% for larger groups. These results could 
be explained in terms of low-level orienting of attention; as group size increased, 
more gaze cue stimuli were present, meaning more people were likely to attend to 
these cues and follow them. This explanation would predict that significantly more 
participants would follow the gaze cues of a crowd of fifteen compared to a crowd of 
five, however this was not the case. An alternative explanation would be that 
participants make a top-down assessment of whether or not to look where others are 
looking depending on the perceived usefulness or interest of doing so. It is possible 
that five individuals looking up at one spot is a rare enough occurrence for 
participants to conclude that it is worthwhile to follow their gaze. The addition of 
extra confederates may then have little, if any, additional effect on the participants’ 
decisions. Whether determined by the low level stimuli or the top down decisions of 
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the participants, Milgram et al. (1969) showed that as the number of gaze cues 
directed to a location increases the likelihood that the location will be fixated 
increases. 
The studies detailed in this section show a high degree of flexibility in gaze behaviour 
in human social interactions. People view high levels of mutual gaze positively 
(Kleck & Nuessle, 1968; Mehrabian, 1968) and the extent to which people in an 
interaction engage in mutual gaze increases as the perceived mood of their partner 
increases (Efran, 1968). Conversely, mutual gaze decreases in negative interactions 
(Exline & Winters, 1966; Modigliani, 1971). Physical proximity has been found to 
negatively correlate with mutual gaze (Argyle & Dean, 1965) and the perceptions of 
the social status of the person with whom one is interacting have complex effects on 
how one looks at them (Ellyson et al., 1981). Together, these findings show mutual 
gaze is modulated by the interactors’ physical position, the behaviour of their partner 
and their beliefs about their partner. These findings raise questions about how these 
factors affect communication. Argyle described gaze as “both signal and channel” 
(1988, pp.153) because gaze behaviour is unique amongst non-verbal cues, as the 
organs involved in providing cues are also required to perceive cues. Therefore, the 
more one engages in mutual gaze with their partner, the more opportunity one has to 
perceive their partner’s gaze cues.  
The findings of these early studies provide a foundation for research on social gaze 
using more precise and accurate measures, including experiments focussing on 
directional gaze cues. Although the mostly naturalistic social experiments detailed 
above show evidence for selective gaze utilisation in human interaction, many 
cognitive and developmental studies using more controlled lab-based paradigms, 
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including those using eye trackers, have argued that there is an automatic and innate 
component to the utilisation of gaze cues in social interactions.  
 
The gaze cueing paradigm 
 
The approach to researching gaze cueing in the cognitive science domain has varied 
drastically from the approach of the early social psychologists. The cognitive 
approach has been to use artificial gaze cueing stimuli in highly controlled lab based 
environments to identify small, but significant attentional effects of gaze cues using 
behavioural and eye-movement measures. Much of this research has used the 
framework of Friesen and Kingstone’s (1998) gaze-cueing paradigm and has provided 
a great deal of insight into how we respond to gaze cues, as well as the factors that 
influence these responses.  
Friesen and Kingstone (1998) based their gaze-cueing paradigm on the Posner cueing 
task (1980) and used it to investigate the effect of gaze cues on attention. The 
paradigm involved a target (a letter –“F” or “T”) on the left or right of a display 
screen. In the centre of the screen there was a simple drawing of a face looking left, 
right or centrally, which participants were informed did not predict target location. In 
this experiment, participants were required to detect, localise or identify the target as 
quickly as possible. Reaction time differences between gaze cue conditions were used 
to infer the extent of attention capture. Participants were quicker in all three tasks 
when the cue was directed to the valid location compared to when it was neutral or to 
an invalid location. The cueing effect was found at short stimulus onset asynchronies 
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(SOAs) (105ms), but disappeared at long SOAs (1005ms). This time course, 
combined with the effect occurring despite participants being told to ignore the gaze 
cues, provides strong evidence that participants reflexively followed gaze cue stimuli. 
This suggests that the brain is specialised to cause an attentional shift in the direction 
of a gaze cue. One can speculate in a number of ways as to how this mechanism may 
have arisen, however the prevailing theory is that, like the unique phenotype of the 
human eye (Tomasello et al., 2007), the tendency to follow the gaze of another 
evolved to aid communication and collaboration (Emery, 2000).  
In the same year as the Friesen and Kingstone (1998) paper, Hood, Willen and Driver 
(1998) published striking results using a version of the gaze cueing paradigm with 10-
28 week old infants. The experimenters found that that these infants were quicker to 
look in the direction of a visual probe when they were provided with an artificial gaze 
cue in the congruent direction compared to a cue in the incongruent direction. This 
evidence for a gaze cue effect in children as young as three-months provides strong 
support for an innate and automatic attentional shift in humans caused by directional 
gaze cues.  
One obvious alternative explanation for the results found in the experiments above is 
that participants were responding to simple directional cues embedded in artificial 
gaze stimuli rather than actually responding to the social gaze cue. It may have been 
incidental to performance that these directional cues took the form of a gaze cue; it 
may simply have been that people respond in this way to low-level visual stimuli. To 
explore this issue, Ricciardelli, Bricolo, Aglioti and Chelazzi (2002) carried out a 
series of eye-tracking experiments using the gaze-cueing paradigm with either 
photographs of gaze cueing faces or simple arrow stimuli. Saccade error measures for 
gaze cue stimuli were in line with typical reaction time results for gaze cue paradigm 
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studies; there were more saccade errors when incongruent stimuli were used 
compared to congruent stimuli, but only at short SOAs. However, this effect was not 
found for arrow stimuli, providing support for the hypothesis that people 
automatically orient attention to gazed-at locations.  
The results of Ricciardelli et al. (2002) were not found in all studies investigating the 
differences between gaze cues and other symbolic cues. Tipples (2002) found that the 
distracting effects of arrows were no different from the effects of gaze cues. One 
reason for the discrepancy between the findings in these two studies may be the arrow 
stimuli used. Ricciardelli et al. (2002) created arrows by erasing half of the central 
“X” fixation cross in the centre of the screen, whereas Tipples (2002) used arguably 
far clearer and more typically encountered arrow stimuli. It may be that the lack of an 
attentional orienting effect from arrows in the former study was due to participants 
taking more time to identify the stimuli as arrows. A later study (Kuhn & Benson, 
2007) attempted to replicate the experiments of Ricciardelli et al., again with less 
subtle arrow cues, and found no difference between the effect of arrow and gaze 
stimuli. However, when focussing on the trials that resulted in saccades in the 
incorrect direction, the experimenters found that these saccade latencies were 
significantly quicker than those in the congruent direction for gaze cues trials, but not 
arrow trials. Kuhn and Benson (2007) argued that although arrows and gaze cues 
resulted in the same number of erroneous saccades, the erroneous saccades caused by 
social-biological gaze cues were more reflexive in nature than the erroneous saccades 
caused by social-non-biological arrow cues. This idea that gaze cues elicit a more 
reflexive response than arrow cues is in line with the results of earlier work showing 
that when cueing highly unlikely target locations, gaze cues shifted attention 
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reflexively, whereas arrow cues did not (Friesen, Ristic & Kingstone, 2004; Langdon 
& Smith, 2005).  
Although there are a number of similarities in the behavioural responses to gaze and 
arrow cues, the above experiments highlight some key differences that suggest the use 
of unique brain systems for gaze following. Further evidence for these unique systems 
is found in a pair of papers investigating gaze cueing in split-brain patients. 
Kingstone, Friesen and Gazzaniga (2000) found a slower response time in trials with 
incongruent gaze cues in the left-visual field only, indicating that the reflexive gaze 
following is localised in the right hemisphere. In a later paper, split-brain patients 
carried out the same experiment but with arrows (Ristic, Friesen & Kingstone, 2002). 
Incongruent arrows cues disrupted response time in both the left and right visual 
fields, suggesting that these attentional shifts use different neural systems than those 
caused by gaze cues.  
The neural systems involved in gaze following have been shown to have top down 
influence on how people respond to gaze cues. Ristic and Kingstone (2005) conducted 
a Posner-type gaze cueing task using ambiguous central visual stimuli. These stimuli 
were simple images that could be identified as a strange-looking car or a person in a 
funny hat. A key feature of these stimuli was that they featured a pair of white-filled 
and black-bordered circles, each with a black-filled circle inside (Figure 1.1). The 
smaller black circle was either positioned to the left side or right side of the larger 
white circle. These circles either represented the wheels of the car or the eyes of the 
person in the hat. The experimenters either told the participants that the stimuli 
represented a car or a person.  
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Figure 1.1. A reproduction of the ambiguous central visual stimulus used by Ristic 
and Kingstone (2005). Participants were informed that the stimulus was either a 
strange-looking car or a person in a funny hat. The actual stimulus used can be seen in 
the original paper. 
 
In a third between-subjects condition, participants were provided with schematic faces 
looking to either the left or right instead of the ambiguous stimuli. In all cases 
participants were instructed to ignore the stimuli and to complete the task as quickly 
and accurately as possible. Participants in the schematic face and person-in-hat 
condition displayed the standard gaze cueing paradigm behaviours; they were 
significantly slower to respond when the gaze cues were incongruent to target 
location. However, despite having precisely the same visual characteristics as the 
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stimuli in the person-in-hat condition, there was no cost of incongruent wheel cues to 
target location in the strange-looking-car condition. This evidence strongly suggests 
that the distracting effect that gaze cues have on attention is not simply a bottom-up 
process driven by the physical characteristics of gaze cue stimuli, but rather requires a 
top-down understanding that the stimulus being perceived represents the gaze of 
another.  
It is also possible that the key factor in the distracting effect of the person-in-hat 
stimulus is not that the eye position represents a gaze cue or even a biological cue, but 
that the eye position represents a general spatial cue. The location of the black circle 
within the wheels of the car does not represent a cue, as the position of the wheel in 
its axis has no relation to the direction of the car. Regardless of whether the 
distracting effect of the incongruent person-in-hat stimulus is caused by a distracting 
social cue or a more basic representational spatial cue, it is clear from these results 
that the visual features of a gaze cue stimulus are not sufficient to cause a distracting 
gaze following effect. For this effect to occur, the viewer must recognise the stimulus 
as a cue.   
The potential effects of visual properties of gaze stimuli and higher-level cognitive 
factors have lead some researchers to postulate or explore the possibility that there are 
two or more attentional streams involved in the response to a gaze cue. Rather than 
exploring the difference between gaze cues and social-non-biological arrow cues, 
Downing, Dodds and Bray (2004) inventively compared gaze cue stimuli to a non-
social-biological cue: the human tongue. Participants carried out a typical gaze cueing 
paradigm, either with gaze cues or a tongue pointing left or right. Much like the 
comparisons with arrows, these tongue stimuli had broadly the same effect on 
attention as gaze cue stimuli. One difference found however, was that at very low 
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reliabilities tongue stimuli did not distract participants, but gaze cues at the same 
reliabilities continued to capture attention. This provides evidence that the unique 
characteristics of a gaze cue may not be their automatic cueing effect, but rather the 
gaze cues’ resistance to top-down influence. Specifically, the persistence of the 
attention orienting effect of gaze cues at low reliabilities. It may be the case that the 
reflexive response to gaze cue stimuli may be a general response to spatial cues, 
common to gaze cues, arrows, tongues and other cues, whereas a top down selective 
attentional stream may be unique to gaze cues. 
A number of studies have altered the reliabilities of gaze cue stimuli to find evidence 
for two attentional processes involved in gaze following. Driver et al. (1999) used a 
gaze cueing task similar to that of Friesen and Kingstone (1998), but reduced the 
likelihood of the gaze cue being congruent to 20%, therefore making the best strategy 
in the task to attend to the side not cued by the gaze stimulus. Driver et al. (1999) 
found that even in this situation, incongruent gaze cues slowed reaction time at SOAs 
of 100 ms and 300 ms. However, at an SOA of 700 ms this difference was reversed; 
response time was significantly slower in the congruent condition compared to the 
incongruent condition. A later eye-tracking study (Kuhn & Kingstone, 2009) 
supported this finding: with a gaze cue stimuli reliability of 20%, incongruent trials 
resulted in more saccade errors at short SOAs (0-100 ms), but the reverse was true at 
long SOAs (900 ms). In both studies, there was a benefit to congruent trials at all 
SOAs when gaze cue reliability was at 50%. Using a different paradigm, Hill et al. 
(2010) found that response time in a task with 0% gaze cue accuracy only differed 
from performance in a task with 100% gaze cue accuracy at short SOAs, whereas 
congruent trials were responded to faster than incongruent trials at all SOAs in a task 
in which gaze cue reliability was 50%. All of these studies provide evidence for 
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reflexive and flexible attentional mechanisms involved in gaze following. The task 
disruption at low SOAs when cues are highly unreliable suggests a short-lived and 
automatic attentional shift. The evidence for an adaptive gaze cueing effect at longer 
SOAs for unreliable cues suggests that slower, top-down inhibition occurs when we 
perceive gaze cues to be unreliable.  
The evidence for top-down influence on gaze following has large implications for the 
way in which gaze cueing should be investigated. There is good evidence that gaze 
cue stimuli out of context (Ristic & Kingstone, 2005) or with low perceived reliability 
(Hill et al., 2010) can decrease the extent to which we follow these cues. Given that in 
the real world we can be provided with gaze cues in a wide range of contexts and with 
varying reliabilities, it may be that understanding these top-down effects is more 
important to understanding how we use gaze cues than the low level, short-lived 
attentional shift that is the focus of many lab-based studies. However, some 
experiments using controlled gaze cue paradigms have provided insight into these 
higher-level effects on gaze following.  
There is evidence that participants infer the perspective of the person represented by 
gaze cueing stimuli and that this affects gaze following. Previous research has shown 
that turning gaze-cueing face stimuli upside down supresses the typical gaze cueing 
effect (Langton & Bruce, 1999), however when Bayliss and Tipper (2006) rotated the 
face stimuli to 90° (so that left and right gaze cues were spatially cueing up and 
down) participants were found to have longer response times when the target was in 
the opposite direction to where the face would be cueing, were it upright. These 
results show that participants’ attention was not only shifted to the gazed at location, 
but to where they inferred that the face would be looking. This suggests that the top-
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down interpretation of the meaning of a gaze cue influenced the attentional response 
to gaze cue stimuli at an early stage.  
Further evidence for the influence of gaze cue context comes from Ricciardelli, 
Carcagno, Vallar and Bricolo (2013), who found that incongruent gaze cues lead to 
saccade errors only when the stimuli cued distractors that were potential targets (valid 
distractors). When incongruent cues were directed to either distractors that were not 
potential targets (i.e. distractors that were positioned in locations in which a correct 
target never appeared) or to nothing, these cues did not lead to saccade errors. Once 
again, this shows the surroundings in which a cue is given affects the attentional 
response to gaze cue stimuli, indicating a selective component of gaze following.  
Gaze following in gaze cueing tasks can be affected by the person following the cue, 
as well as the person providing the cue. Bayliss, di Pellegino and Tipper (2005) found 
that the distracting gaze cueing effect was stronger in females than males and that 
effect magnitude was also negatively correlated with scores on the Autism-Spectrum 
Quotient Questionnaire (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Stott, Bolton, & Goodyear, 
2001). Participants carrying out a gaze-cueing task in Italy were shown distracter gaze 
cueing stimuli made from the faces of Italian political figures, including Silvio 
Berlusconi (Liuzza et al., 2011). The gaze of Berlusconi was found to cause 
significantly more interference in the task for right-wing voters (in-group) than left 
wing voters (out-group). These results suggest that people may be more prone to 
following the gaze cues of others with shared beliefs. Reciprocally, people have been 
shown to rate faces as more trustworthy if these faces provided congruent cues rather 
than incongruent cues in a gaze cueing task (Bayliss, Griffiths & Tipper, 2009). The 
studies outlined above show that there are differences in the attentional effects of a 
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gaze cue depending on who is following the cue and what they think of the person 
providing the cue.  
The experiments discussed above highlight the important and diverse insights 
provided by the Posner-type gaze cueing paradigm into how we interpret and respond 
to gaze cues. Replications and variations on the original paradigm (Friesen & 
Kingstone, 1998) have consistently found that gaze cues capture attention even when 
participants know they are uninformative. It is clear from this that there is an 
automatic shift of attention caused by these cues, however whether this shift is caused 
uniquely by gaze cues is another issue. Distracting non-biological (Tipples, 2002) and 
non-social cues (Downing, Dodds & Bray, 2004) have broadly the same reflexive 
effects on attention, suggesting that this phenomenon is common to a broad range of 
representational spatial cues. There is evidence that gaze cues do have unique 
attentional effects, but the differences between gaze cues and other cues are found not 
in the immediate reflexive response to the gaze cue, but in the persistence of gaze 
cues at low likelihoods (Downing, Dodds & Bray, 2004; Friesen, Ristic & Kingstone, 
2004; Langdon & Smith, 2005). Furthermore, the wealth of evidence that gaze 
following in these tasks is influenced by top-down factors, such as the interpretation 
of the meaning of gaze cues (Ristic & Kingstone, 2005; Bayliss & Tipper, 2006) and 
the perception of those providing gaze cues (Liuzza et al., 2011), shows that gaze 
cueing is unique, but that this uniqueness is not manifest in the immediate reflexive 
attentional response.  
One reason that the automatic attentional shift has been the focus of much gaze 
cueing research in cognitive science may be that the gaze-cueing paradigm effectively 
reduces a gaze cue to a simple visual spatial cue. Birmingham and Kingstone (2009) 
likened comparisons between artificial gaze cueing stimuli and arrows to “taking a 
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150-pound person and a 150-pound rock, weighing them, and concluding that they are 
the same” (p. 132). The obvious implication of this statement is that key aspects of a 
natural gaze cue are missing from the artificial stimuli used in the gaze cueing 
paradigm. The artificial cues are isolated from any communicative or social context, 
with which they would almost always be accompanied in the real world. Additionally, 
in the real world, a key aspect of gaze cue utilisation is to identify and orient to an 
informative gaze cue, which is not considered in the gaze cueing paradigm. The 
limitations of the gaze cueing paradigm have lead researchers to investigate social 
attention and gaze following using social scenes and real world paradigms.  
 
Orienting to another’s gaze in social scenes and the real world 
 
During a natural gaze cueing event, the viewer must identify and orient towards the 
eyes of the cueing individual before following the gaze cue. The gaze cueing 
paradigm can inform us about what happens once a gaze cue is witnessed, but it 
cannot offer insight into how we orient towards the gaze cue of another. Studies using 
pictures of people or social scenes as well as real-world studies have been able to 
investigate the extent to which we focus on the eyes of others and the factors that 
influence our gaze orienting behaviour.  
One of the earliest eye movement experiments investigating how people look at 
others was carried out by Buswell (1935), who showed participants, set-up with eye-
tracking apparatus, a print of ‘The Solemn People – Taos Indians’ by Walter Ufer. 
Participants were found to focus mainly on the faces of the figures in the painting, 
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largely ignoring the landscape and bodies of the figures. Yarbus’ (1967) book Eye 
movements and Vision provides a number of examples of eye movement scan paths 
from participants viewing a variety of isolated faces. These face stimuli include 
photographs and drawings of people, sculptures and animals. Common to these scan 
paths is a relatively large amount of time spent fixating the eyes of the face. These 
early eye movement studies suggest that people have a tendency to fixate the faces of 
others, and within these faces, people tend to focus on the eyes. 
Yarbus (1967), however, provided more evidence showing that the extent to which 
participants looked at faces and eyes was influenced by task. Participants viewed Ilya 
Repin’s ‘An Unexpected Visitor’ under a number of different instructions. These 
different instructions varied the scan paths of a participant and consequently the 
relative time spent viewing faces. However, the scan paths presented by Yarbus show 
that the faces of the prominent figures in the painting were fixated in all instruction 
conditions. This suggests that although the task requirements change how we look at a 
scene, the tendency to fixate on faces and eyes is persistent. This may be because 
faces and eyes are often regarded as informative in a wide range of tasks.  
Low-level mechanisms can arguably provided simpler explanations for why people 
orient to the eyes when viewing pictures of faces. Firstly, when viewing scenes, 
people show a central fixation bias regardless of the distribution of visually and 
semantically salient features (Tatler, 2007). Since the eyes are necessarily in the 
centre of an image of the face, a central fixation bias would result in greater total 
fixation time on the eyes. Bindemann, Scheepers and Burton (2009) investigated this 
by monitoring the eye movements of participants when viewing faces at different 
orientations ranging from profile to frontal view. Between 0-250 ms after the 
presentation of the face stimuli, fixations were focussed around the centre of the 
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image, regardless of the orientation of the face. However, after 250 ms fixations were 
centred on the eye in all orientations, showing that the tendency to fixate the eyes 
within a face is not driven by the central fixation bias. A second low-level explanation 
may be able to account for these results. The eye and eyebrow region have been 
shown to be important in holistic face processing (Lai, Li & Wechsler, 2007), so it 
may be that the eyes are fixated more than other facial features in order to process or 
recognise faces. Levy, Foulsham and Kingstone (2013) investigated this by 
inventively removing eyes from the face. The experimenters created computer 
generated characters that were human, humanoids (non-human characters with eyes 
positioned on the face) or monsters (non-human characters with eyes positioned away 
from the face). There was no significant difference found between the character-types 
in terms of how much time was spend fixating the eyes. Furthermore, in all conditions 
the eyes were fixated early and often. Combined these experiments show that neither 
the central fixation bias, nor holistic face processing can fully account for the bias for 
eyes found when participants view images of faces, therefore this bias is likely due to 
the informativeness of the eye gaze of another in social situations.  
The effects of task that Yarbus (1967) found on where a participant looked in a 
painting of people have been found in photographs of social scenes (Smilek, 
Birmingham, Cameron, Bischof & Kingstone, 2006). Later eye-tracking studies 
specifically focussed on whether the explicit (Itier, Villate & Ryan, 2007) or implicit 
(Birmingham, Bischof & Kingstone, 2007) informativeness of gaze cues in a task 
affected the extent to which participants looked at the eyes of others. In Itier et al. 
(2007), participants were asked to either assess the head direction or eye direction of 
face stimuli. Although fixations on the eyes were present in both conditions, there 
were significantly more initial saccades to the eyes in the eye direction condition, 
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suggesting that participants were fixating on the eyes when they were explicitly 
relevant to the task at hand. Birmingham et al. (2007) presented participants with 
images of scenes including people. The participants were either told that they would 
have a memory task after viewing the scenes or they were not told anything. 
Participants in the group that was informed of the memory task were found to spend 
significantly more time fixating the eyes of the people in the scenes. This finding 
shows that when trying to encode a scene into memory, participants fixate on the eyes 
of people in the scene, suggesting that participants consider these to be highly 
informative areas. Together, these experiments show that the extent to which people 
look to the eyes of others is affected by the perceived informativeness of these cues to 
the task.  
The uniqueness of the gaze orienting effect was investigated by Birmingham, Bischof 
and Kingstone (2009) in the same way that Ricciardelli et al. (2002) investigated the 
uniqueness of the gaze following effect: by comparing eye stimuli to arrows. 
Participants were shown pictures of real world scenes featuring arrows, people or 
both. The experimenters found that participants focused on the faces and eyes of the 
people in the scenes and largely ignored the arrows. Therefore, although the gaze 
cueing paradigm has shown arrows and gaze cues to be equivalent cueing stimuli in a 
number of ways (Tipples, 2002; Kuhn & Benson, 2009), the two cues differ greatly in 
the extent to which people spontaneously orient towards them.  
Some eye tracking studies have found that social factors affect the extent to which we 
look at the faces and eyes of others, echoing the much earlier findings of social 
psychologists (e.g., Argyle & Dean, 1965; Exline & Winters, 1966). Birmingham, 
Bischof and Kingstone (2008) found that participants spent proportionally more time 
fixating the eyes of a group of three people in a static scene when they were 
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interacting with each other compared to when they were not. This could be because 
viewing a social interaction elicits gaze orienting behaviour, or it could be more 
simply that eyes are more important to understanding a scene in which a social 
interaction is taking place, compared to when no interaction is taking place. Crosby, 
Monin and Richardson (2008) showed that participants were more likely to look at an 
individual on a monitor if they thought the individual could hear comments that were 
potentially offensive to that individual. Participants were shown a video with four 
front-facing men wearing headphones, separated into quadrants of the screen. Three 
of these discussants were white and one was black. The men in the video each made 
statements about their university’s admissions policy, and one of the white 
discussants made a statement critical of affirmative action in a way that was 
potentially offensive to the black discussant. For half of the participants, the black 
discussant was wearing his headphones and for the rest of the participants, his 
headphones were removed (meaning he could not hear the other discussants). The 
experimenters found that during the potentially offensive statement participants in the 
headphones-on condition spent significantly more time fixating the black discussant 
than those in the headphones off condition. These results show that social factors such 
as beliefs about another individual can affect how others look at them. 
All of the evidence from the lab-based experiments outlined above shows that when 
viewing images of people, participants look to the faces and the eyes of these people, 
suggesting that we are drawn to the faces and eyes of others either innately or due to 
the potential informativeness of the eyes. However, the stimuli used in these 
paradigms have an important distinction from eyes in the real world: The eyes of 
others in the real world can perceive the viewer. Argyle & Dean (1965) found that 
people will look less at a present person than a cardboard cut out of that person and 
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more modern eye-tracking studies have also investigated the effect of social presence. 
Laidlaw, Foulsham, Kuhn and Kingstone (2011) found that participants spent less 
time looking at a present confederate than they spent looking at the same confederate 
viewed on a monitor. This result was suggested to be due to the participants wanting 
to avoid a potential social interaction with a stranger. Gallup, Hale et al. (2012) 
carried out an updated version of the Milgram (1969) crowd experiment (see Early 
work on gaze and social interaction), which included an investigation of the effect of 
the direction in which the pedestrians approached the crowd. Gallup, Hale et al. 
(2012) found that participants walking towards the crowd from behind showed a 
higher propensity to follow the gaze cues than those approaching from in front of the 
crowd. In other words, pedestrians were more likely to follow the gaze cues of the 
crowd when the crowd could not observe their behaviour. In a similar study, Gallup, 
Chong and Couzin (2012) observed the gaze following behaviour of people walking 
past an attractive item in a hallway. They found that people were more likely to 
follow the gaze of somebody walking in front of them than somebody walking 
towards them. These two studies support the suggestion by Laidlaw et al. (2011) that 
people are less likely to look at and follow the gaze of an unknown individual if there 
is a possibility of a social interaction, or simply a possibility of being noticed. It is 
clear that social presence affects the way we orient to and follow gaze cues, therefore 
it is important to continue investigating natural interactions to understand how gaze 
cues are used in the real world. 
The research on gaze orienting behaviour outlined above shows that people are drawn 
to the faces and eyes of others when viewing static scenes. This preference for eyes 
cannot be fully explained by low level factors such as central bias (Bindemann et al., 
2009) or face recognition processes (Levy et al., 2013). Instead, the preference is 
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likely due to the perceived informativeness of the eyes of another. This is supported 
by evidence that changing the informativeness (Itier et al., 2007) or social context 
(Birmingham et al., 2008) of static eye stimuli changes the extent to which people 
fixate the eyes. However, the static stimuli used in these experiments have lacked 
social presence, which has been shown to affect gaze utilisation (Laidlaw et al., 2011; 
Gallup, Hale et al., 2012; Gallup, Chong et al., 2012). Since all natural gaze cues 
people observe in the real world necessarily require social presence, there is a limit to 
what experiments using static images of social scenes can tell us about how we orient 
and follow gaze cues.  
Real world gaze cues also almost always occur alongside spoken language. Like 
spoken language, gaze cues are used to communicate ideas to another. The evidence 
outlined in this section has shown that the informativeness of a gaze cues can effect 
how these cues are utilised. Perhaps the most common factor that affects the 
informativeness of a gaze cue is the language that accompanies the cue. Therefore to 
understand how gaze cues are used in the real world it is important to understand the 
relationship between language and gaze cueing.  
 
Language and gaze cues 
 
An intimate link between the language we hear and where we look has been shown by 
the visual world paradigm (Cooper, 1974). This paradigm involves participants 
listening to spoken language and viewing a scene while their eye movements are 
monitored. Altmann and Kamide (1999) found that not only would participants look 
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at items in a visual scene that corresponded to the words they were currently hearing, 
but that participants would make anticipatory eye movements to items when they 
predicted these items were about to be mentioned. Using a similar paradigm, the link 
between gaze allocation and spoken language has been shown to extend across 
conversants (Richardson, Dale and Kirkham, 2007). Two isolated conversants, 
viewing identical visual stimuli, were found to align their gaze allocation significantly 
more than chance during a conversation about the stimuli represented on the screen. 
These results collectively show that where we look is influenced by what we hear and 
that this allocation of gaze can become aligned with someone with whom we 
converse.  
As well as language influencing the allocation of gaze, the cues provided by gaze 
have been shown to affect language comprehension and production. Clark and Krych 
(2004) used an interaction between participants in a collaborative task to investigate 
the relationship between natural language and non-verbal cues. In their study, two 
builder participants made structures out of building blocks, following the instructions 
of a director. The builder participants were found to use gaze cues, amongst other 
non-verbal cues, to communicate with the director. The directors altered their 
utterances in response to these gaze signals, showing that gaze cues can influence the 
language used in an interaction.  
Hanna and Brennan (2007) conducted a series of experiments specifically 
investigating the use of gaze cues during instructions. In the first experiment, 
participant pairs worked together in an object-matching task. One participant was 
assigned the role of director and the other the role of matcher. In each trial, matchers 
had an array of objects in front of them, lined up from left to right. The directors 
either had a mirrored array or a circular array of the same objects, as well as a non-
	   28	  
verbal schematic, which informed them of the object to which they should direct the 
matcher. Matchers were required to select objects as quickly as possible following 
direction from the director. In experimental trials, there was always a distractor object 
that was very similar to the target object. Monitoring the eye movements of the 
matcher, Hanna and Brennan (2007) found that the matcher would use the director’s 
gaze cues in order to fixate the target object before the point of verbal disambiguation. 
This effect was found to be strongest when the item arrays were mirrored. A second 
experiment repeated this procedure using either mirrored or reversed display (so that, 
from the matcher’s perspective, any item on the left of the matcher’s array would be 
on the right of the director’s display). Although a larger effect was found in the 
mirrored condition, matchers were found to use the gaze cues of directors to identify 
the target before the point of linguistic disambiguation, even when directors were 
using the reversed display. This is good evidence that people use gaze cues to 
facilitate comprehension, but also that people consider the meaning of these cues from 
the speaker’s perspective, rather than simply following a visual cue.  
In addition to gaze cues facilitating communication by solving ambiguities, there is 
also evidence that the gaze of another can be used to infer the definition of unknown 
verbs. Nappa, Wessel, McEldoon, Gleitman and Trueswell (2009) demonstrated this 
by showing three- to five-year-olds drawings of events with two potential 
perspectives (e.g., a rabbit fleeing from an elephant/an elephant chasing a rabbit). A 
video presented above these images showed a speaker providing a gaze cue to one of 
the subjects in the drawing. The speaker described the scene depicted by the drawings 
using a non-word verb (e.g., “blicking”) in a referentially informative (“the rabbit is 
blicking the elephant”) or uninformative sentence (“he is blicking him”). The children 
were then asked to define the non-word. The gaze cues of the speaker were followed 
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in both conditions and in the uninformative condition the children defined the non-
word verb as the action being carried out by the gazed-at character. These findings 
present further evidence that people use the gaze allocation of another to infer the 
intentions of that other during communication.  
A similar set of experiments by Staudte and Crocker (2011) used an adult population 
and showed participants videos of a robot describing the featural and spatial relations 
between a series of visible objects, while providing gaze cues. In one experiment, the 
robot made mistakes in its descriptions that could have been corrected in two different 
ways. The experimenters found that participants would correct in the way that was 
congruent with the gaze cue, suggesting that they were inferring meaning from the 
robot’s gaze and assuming that the robot meant to refer to the object to which it 
allocated its gaze. 
Another, arguably more parsimonious, explanation of the results of Nappa et al 
(2007) and Staudte and Crocker (2011) is that the bias for the gazed-at items is not 
due to the participants making inferences about the speaker’s intentions, but rather 
that the bias is due to gaze cues orienting attention to the gazed-at location (Staudte, 
Crocker, Heloir, & Kipp, 2014). This attentional shift may have primed the 
participants to respond to questions with the cued item as the salient object in their 
working memory, leading the children in Nappa et al.’s (2009) task and the adults in 
Staudte and Crocker’s (2011) task to treat the gazed-at target as the object of the 
sentence.  
Nappa and Arnold (2014) addressed this possibility with a series of experiments using 
videos showing the first author gazing or gazing and pointing at one of two characters 
(toys) or a neutral central object. In the first experiment, while viewing these videos 
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participants heard short stories about the characters in which the final sentence was 
ambiguous, such as “Puppy is having some pizza with Panda Bear. He wants the 
pepperoni slice” (Nappa & Arnold, 2014, p. 64). Participants were asked questions 
about these stories after each trial. In experimental trials, the question was always 
about the identity of the actor (“He”) in the final sentence. When the gaze and 
pointing cues were neutral, participants showed a tendency to identify the actor as the 
first character mentioned in the previous sentence (N1). However, when gaze was 
allocated to the second character (N2), significantly more participants identified the 
actor as the second character and this effect increased when pointing cues were 
involved. These results are in line with those of Staudte & Crocker (2011), but still do 
not discount the possibility that low-level attentional processes are causing this effect. 
In their second experiment, Nappa and Arnold (2014) used the pointing and gaze cue 
condition from the first experiment and compared this to a new condition in which 
gaze and pointing cues were replaced with a flashing attention-capture stimulus (a 
solid black square) over one of the characters. When this stimulus was placed over 
N2, response time was significantly slower, suggesting that attention was captured by 
the stimulus. However, the location of the attention-capture stimulus was found to 
have no effect on the participant responses to the experimental question. This finding 
provides strong evidence that the preference for referring to a speaker’s previously 
gazed-at locations when a listener produces new sentences is not driven by low-level 
attentional processes, but instead by the listener’s understanding of the speaker’s 
communicative intentions.  
While the above studies demonstrate the effect of gaze cues on language 
comprehension, Knoeferle and Kreysa (2012) demonstrated the effect of altering 
spoken language on the utilisation of gaze cues. Participants in this experiment heard 
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spoken sentences while viewing a visual scene on a computer monitor. The visual 
scenes were videos featuring a computer monitor with three avatars from the virtual 
world “Second Life”. The sentences described the avatars on the screen and were 
either presented in the common German subject-verb-object (SVO) structure or an 
uncommon (yet still grammatically legal) object-verb-subject (OVS) structure. The 
experimenters manipulated whether or not the videos also contained a person 
watching the screen contained in the visual scene. The person in this video looked 
from the first to the second referent avatar at the onset of the verb in the sentence. The 
experiments found a facilitative effect of this gaze cue on sentence comprehension, 
but this facilitation was far more pronounced when the gaze cue accompanied the 
common SVO sentences compared to the less common OVS sentences. Knoeferle and 
Kreysa (2012) proposed that the additional processing difficulty of OVS sentences 
left fewer cognitive resources available to utilize the gaze cues, suggesting that the 
more difficult language is to process, the less listeners make use of the speaker’s gaze 
cues.  
In Knoeferle and Kreysa’s (2012) task, all of the information required to understand 
the sentence was contained in the spoken language, so the gaze cues were purely 
supportive to language. The studies investigating natural communication and gaze 
cues that are outlined earlier in this section found that listener’s can identify a target 
using gaze cues before language unambiguously describes the target (Hanna & 
Brennan, 2007) and that speakers will sometimes change their utterances to exclude a 
verbal reference if the non-verbal cues of a listener show the listener to already be 
attending the referent item (Clark & Krych, 2004). Given this evidence that 
ambiguous language occurs naturally in conversations and that gaze cues are used to 
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disambiguate these, Macdonald & Tatler (2013) investigated the interaction between 
language and gaze cues using unambiguous and ambiguous instructional sentences.  
The paradigm used by Macdonald and Tatler (2013) considered gaze seeking and 
following behaviour in a real world communicative task. This involved a one-to-one 
interaction between an instructor (the experimenter) and a participant, in which the 
instructor directed the participant to build abstract structures out of building blocks. In 
the task, experimental manipulations were made during instructions that referred to 
block-selection. The instructor varied whether gaze cues were present or absent as 
well as the specificity of his block-selection instructions. Participants were found to 
only seek and follow gaze cues when the language was ambiguous (it did not specify 
which single block the participant was meant to pick up). Furthermore, when 
language was ambiguous and no gaze cues were present, participants showed very 
little gaze seeking behaviour, showing clear evidence for a flexible use of gaze cues, 
dependent on the relative informativeness of language. It was also noted that even 
when gaze cues were necessary for the task and readily available, participants did not 
seek and follow these all of the time. This could potentially be due to methodological 
issues; the participants could not look at the blocks and the instructor’s face at the 
same time. However, it was speculated (Macdonald & Tatler, 2013) that the same 
social factors affecting the results of Laidlaw et al (2011) were at play here. More 
specifically, the social cost of looking at the instructor frequently in each trial may 
have deterred participants from seeking and following these gaze cues.  
Gaze cues have been shown to support language during natural communication by 
disambiguating linguistic uncertainties (Hanna & Brennan, 2007) and allowing a 
listener to infer the intentions of a speaker (Staudte & Crocker, 2011; Nappa & 
Arnold, 2014). As gaze cues are often used alongside language, it is clear that 
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understanding the relationship between gaze and language is important to 
understanding how gaze cues are used during natural collaboration. There is also 
evidence that social presence can influence the extent to which people seek out useful 
cues (Macdonald & Tatler, 2013). For this reason, it is important that any 
investigation of how we use gaze cues should begin with observations of gaze 
behaviour in a natural interaction, in which spoken language and social context can 
potentially exert influence. 
 
The present thesis 
 
The literature discussed in the present chapter shows that the social context in which 
an interaction occurs affects the extent to which interactors look at the eyes and face 
of their partner (Argyle & Dean, 1965; Laidlaw et al., 2011) and the extent to which 
they follow their partner’s gaze cues (Milgram et al., 1969; Gallup, Hale et al., 2012). 
Changes to social context that have been shown to affect these factors include the 
proximity of the interactors to each other (Argyle & Dean, 1965), the perception of 
the relative social status of the other interactor (Efran, 1968), the behaviour of the 
other interactor (Modigliani, 1971) and whether or not the other interactor is 
perceived as being an in- or out-group member (Liuzza et al., 2011). For these 
reasons, my investigation of gaze cueing and spoken language in natural interactions 
begins with a real-world eye tracking study, to find how people naturally use 
language and gaze to complete a collaborative task (Study 1). The participants either 
worked together completely freely, using only a recipe as a guide or they were given 
specific roles to fulfil that affected their social perceptions of their partner. Gaze and 
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language behaviour were investigated in this task, as well as the influence of social 
perceptions on these factors 
Other research in this chapter shows how the language used alongside a gaze cue can 
effect whether that cue is used or not (Knoeferle & Kreysa, 2012; Macdonald & 
Tatler, 2013). Gaze cues have been shown to speed up communication (Clark & 
Krych, 2004; Hanna & Brennan, 2007) and can be used to resolve ambiguities in 
language (Staudte & Crocker, 2011) by the listener inferring the intention of the 
speaker (Nappa & Arnold, 2014). The highly flexible and top-down use of gaze cues 
described by the language literature is somewhat at odds with the lab-based findings 
that gaze cues automatically capture attention. In addition to the largely observational 
Study 1, the current thesis uses controlled real-world and lab-based paradigms that are 
designed to be sensitive to any automatic gaze utilisation effects that may be present 
in natural collaborations (Studies 2-5).  
Beyond considering automatic gaze cueing effects, the experiments in this thesis 
investigate whether the form of language used in an interaction, rather than the 
specificity of language (Macdonald & Tatler, 2013), influences gaze utilisation (Study 
2). Furthermore, given the previous findings that the extent to which we follow gaze 
is affected by the cue reliability, the effects of varying the reliabilities of both gaze 
cues and language cues are explored (Studies 3-5).  
Combined, the five studies in this thesis will provide new insights into the interplay 
between language and gaze cues in natural communication. The extent to which we 
use gaze during collaboration will be explored, as well as the influence that language 
and social context have on gaze cue utilisation.   
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Chapter 2:  
Dual eye-tracking in a natural 
collaboration – Study 1  
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Introduction 
 
People have a strong tendency to follow gaze cues (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; 
Riciardelli et al., 2002) and to orient towards the eyes of others in social scenes 
(Birmingham et al., 2009). However, there is also evidence that the language and 
social context that accompany gaze cues can affect how people orient to and follow 
these cues (Knoeferle & Kreysa, 2012; Liuzza et al., 2011). In the real world, gaze 
cues are rarely used without these accompanying factors, yet most previous research 
has not considered them together. The aim of the present study was to measure eye 
movements in a real-world setting in order to observe how gaze cues are used 
spontaneously during a natural collaboration, in which spoken language is present. In 
order to consider the influence of social context on gaze and language, the social roles 
of the two individuals in the collaborative task were manipulated.  
It is important to begin the investigation of gaze cues and language in collaboration 
with a naturalistic task, as there is evidence that social presence influences our eye 
movement behaviour. Despite the evidence that we have a tendency to fixate the faces 
and eyes of others in static social scenes (Birmingham et al., 2009), when others are 
actually present, we look at faces and eye much less (Laidlaw et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, although we know people orient attention in the direction of a gaze cue 
(Ricciardelli et al., 2002), in the real world people have been found to follow the gaze 
cues of another less when that other can observe them (Gallup, Hale et al., 2012). 
Therefore to understand how language and gaze work together in a natural interaction 
it is important to observe language and gaze in a real world context. There is 
inevitably a lack of control in real world tasks relative to lab-based paradigms, 
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however the present thesis will follow the theoretical framework of cognitive 
ethology (Kingstone, Smilek & Eastwood, 2008). This framework involves observing 
behaviour in as ecologically valid an environment as possible and then using those 
findings to devise simpler experiments in less ecologically valid environments with 
fewer variables. Findings from the real world interactions in the present experiment 
will be used to inform the more controlled gaze cueing experiments in subsequent 
chapters.   
In the present real world paradigm the onset of language and gaze cues could not be 
controlled or directed. Instead, natural behaviour was observed and coarse measures 
were adopted to indicate gaze seeking and following behaviour. In line with a method 
used by Macdonald and Tatler (2013), looks to the other person were used as an 
indicator of gaze seeking behaviour: the more one looked at their partner the more 
likely they were seeking information from the gaze of their partner. Additionally, this 
indicator was measured during instructional phrases, in order to investigate gaze-
seeking behaviour when gaze cues were likely to be most helpful in the task. To 
investigate gaze following, we used shared gaze, which was defined as any instance in 
which participants looked at the same object. The initiator of each instance of shared 
gaze was also recorded as an indicator of who initiated each shared fixation. Gaze 
alignment has previously been shown to occur when participants work together on a 
task (Richardson et al., 2007) and has been shown to increase performance in visual 
search tasks (Brennan, Zelinsky, Hanna, & Savietta, 2012). If this alignment of gaze 
can help participants in computer-based tasks, then it is interesting to see if this 
alignment spontaneously occurs in real-world collaborations and, if so, for how long 
it occurs. These measures are rough indicators of the phenomena that are under 
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investigation in this thesis, but the findings inform later and more controlled 
experiments.  
Rather than being entirely observational, this dual eye-tracking study did involve one 
manipulation: participant pairs were either given social roles (a leader and a follower) 
or they were not. The manipulation of the perception of another has been used before 
in this research area. There is some evidence from early social interactions studies 
(outlined in detail in the previous chapter) that social perceptions can influence the 
extent to which we look at another, such as work by Efran (1968) that showed college 
Freshmen looked more at Seniors than fellow Freshman. More recently, participants 
carrying out a Posner (1980) task in Italy were shown distracter gaze cueing stimuli 
made from the faces of Italian political figures, including Silvio Berlusconi (Liuzza et 
al, 2011). The gaze of Berlusconi was found to cause significantly more interference 
in the task for in-group than out-group participants. Crosby et al. (2008) showed that 
participants were more likely to look at an individual on a monitor if they thought the 
individual could hear comments that were potentially offensive to that individual. 
These results show that social factors such as beliefs about another individual can 
affect how others look at them as well as how others look at external objects whilst 
communicating with them. Although these results show effects of prior beliefs about 
others on gaze behaviour, it is still unclear how beliefs about the role or knowledge of 
another affect the use of gaze cues in natural collaboration. 
The present study aims to observe collaborations between two people in a natural 
environment. Participants, in pairs, were given a recipe to follow in order to make the 
batter for a cake. During this collaboration their eye movements were recorded using 
portable eye-trackers. This paradigm allowed us to observe natural eye movement 
behaviour during a natural collaboration featuring spoken language and social 
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influences. When coding the data, the time participants spent looking at each other 
(partner gaze) or at the same object simultaneously (shared gaze) were of particular 
interest as well as the time taken for participants to look at an item after the onset of 
the verbal reference to that item. Although the collaboration was devised to be as 
natural as possible, social context was manipulated in one way: half of the pairs were 
given roles (chef or gatherer) to fulfil and the other half were not. By manipulating 
this, interactions between language, gaze and social context could be investigated. 
The hypothesis was that, in line with Efram’s (1968) findings, the gatherers would 
look at their partner longer than other participants and would be less likely to initiate 
shared gaze, indicating a higher level of gaze seeking and following behaviour.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Twenty-four undergraduate and post-graduate students from the University of Dundee 
participated in this study (Female = 16). They were split into twelve pairs to carry out 
the task. Six pairs were allocated to the roles condition and six were allocated to the 
no roles condition (see design). In the roles condition, three of the pairs were both 
female, one pair both male. Of the two mixed pairs, one had a female chef and the 
other a female gatherer. In the roles condition there were two all female pairs and four 
mixed pairs. Each individual was recruited separately, using the School of 
Psychology’s participant recruitment system, and all participants were asked if they 
knew their partner. All but one pair (a mixed pair in the no roles condition) had never 
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met their partner before. Undergraduate students received course credits for 
participating. 
 
Materials 
The experiment took place in a kitchen area on the University of Dundee campus. The 
kitchen was fully equipped with standard kitchen appliances, but only the oven and 
microwave were used. All items and foodstuffs that could be removed were removed 
before testing and the experimental materials were arranged carefully around the 
kitchen. This included the items and foodstuffs that were to be used for the procedure 
(a knife, a spoon, a set of kitchen scales, a large bowl, a small bowl, butter, sugar, 
whisk, eggs, sieve, flour, milk, and a square tin) as well as a selection of distractor 
items (a jar of instant coffee, a bottle of table sauce, a jar of cooking sauce, a bottle of 
olive oil, a bottle of wine, a salt shaker, a box of tea bags, an insulated coffee cup, a 
box of muesli and an empty re-usable shopping bag). All of these items were placed 
in the same location for each pair of participants. A Recipe Procedure sheet was 
provided for each pair (Appendix 3). This sheet explained, step-by-step, how to make 
the batter for a Victoria Sponge. There was also a Chef Guidelines sheet (Appendix 4) 
and a Gatherer Guidelines sheet (Appendix 5) for those in the roles condition. These 
sheets explained the responsibilities and duties for participants in the chef and 
gatherer roles. Eight toy building blocks (Megabloks) were required to calibrate the 
eye-trackers. 
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Design 
This experiment had a between subjects design. The two independent variables for the 
analysis of shared gaze and the time participants spent looking at each other (partner 
gaze) were the use of roles (roles or no roles) and the allocation of roles within the 
roles condition (chef or gatherer). For the analysis of the references used in the 
instructions, the independent variables were the use of roles (roles or no roles) and 
identity of participant (speaker or listener). 
 
Procedure 
This experiment required two participants to work together. The experimenter began 
by fitting a portable eye tracker to the first participant outside the kitchen. At this 
point in the roles condition the first participant was given the Chef Guidelines and the 
second participant was given the Gatherer Guidelines. They were both instructed to 
read over their sheet and make sure they understood their roles. The Chef Guidelines 
informed the chef that they were in charge of preparing the recipe and that the 
gatherer was there to assist them. The sheet explained that the chef was expected to 
mix and prepare ingredients, following a recipe that they could not show to the 
gatherer. The chef would not be expected to collect any items or foodstuffs, but to 
delegate those duties to the gatherer. The chef would also be able to ask the gatherer 
to assist them with any aspect of the preparation they wished. The Gatherer 
Guidelines explained that the gatherer would not be expected to make any decisions 
concerning the preparation, but should instead do as instructed by the chef. Once the 
participants declared they understood their roles the gatherer was asked to remain 
outside whilst the experimenter and the chef entered the kitchen. The experimenter 
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then gave the chef the Recipe Procedure sheet and told the chef where all of the 
necessary items and foodstuffs were located. The chef was then told they would have 
approximately three minutes to familiarise themselves with the kitchen and the 
locations of the items. During these three minutes the experimenter fitted another 
portable eye-tracker to the gatherer. In the no roles condition the second eye-tracker 
was fitted straight after the first. At this point, in both conditions, the participants 
were brought into the kitchen and the eye-trackers were switched on. 
The participants were instructed to stand facing each other with their eyes closed. A 
flash of light was then emitted from a camera flash in between the two participants. 
This flash was picked up by all four cameras across the two eye-trackers and was later 
used as a reference point to synchronise all of the videos. The first stage of calibration 
then took place for each participant in turn using the Megabloks in a circular array on 
a kitchen counter. This was followed by a second stage of calibration on a vertical 
plane using reference points on the experimenter’s body at a distance of about three 
metres (see Eye movements and sound recording section for more details). Once this 
stage of calibration was complete those in the no roles condition were directed to the 
Recipe Procedure sheet and informed that all of the items they would require were 
located around the kitchen. All participants were informed that the experimenter 
would be standing outside the kitchen, out of sight and that the participants must 
make no attempt to interact with him. The experimenter then told the participants that 
they should begin as soon as he was out of the room. The experimenter left and the 
procedure began. Once the participants had put the batter mixture in the oven (the 
final step) the experimenter entered and the earlier procedure with the camera flash 
was repeated. The eye-trackers were then switched off and removed and the eye-
movement and audio data were later analysed.  
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Eye movement and sound recording 
Participants’ eye movements were tracked using Positive Science LLC mobile eye 
trackers, which allowed free head movement. Each eye tracker has two cameras 
mounted on the frame of a pair of spectacles: one records the scene from the 
participant’s point of view and the other records the right eye. Data from these 
cameras were captured on digital camcorders (Figure 2.1). For one of the eye-trackers 
these camcorders were stored, alongside a power supply for the eye-tracker, in a 
lumbar pack worn by the participant. The camcorders connected to the second tracker 
were again stored alongside a power supply, but were stored in a light backpack worn 
by the participant. This eye tracker also has a small microphone attached to the frame. 
This microphone recorded sound throughout the experiment and was able to pick-up 
the voices of both participants. Gaze direction was estimated off-line using Yarbus 
software provided by Positive Science, LLC, which tracks the pupil and corneal 
reflection. Calibration was carried out in two stages, one looking down at a counter 
and the other looking across the room. These two stages were used because by 
tracking one eye, the vergence of the eyes that occurs as participants focus on objects 
at different distances cannot be directly measured. Instead the model was fit to 
fixations on both proximal and distal points. The first stage involved the participant 
fixating on Megabloks in a circular-array as the experimenter pointed to them. The 
second stage involved the participants, at a distance of approximately three metres, 
fixating points on the experimenter’s body as he called them out. These included the 
tip of the experimenter’s left index finger as it pointed up and to the left and the 
opposite for his right index finger, the experimenter’s nose, the tips of the 
experimenter’s left and right shoes and finally the top of the experimenter’s thumb 
whilst it was positioned centrally over his abdomen. If the tracker estimates in the 
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scene video fell on the correct blocks and correct body positions the calibration was 
deemed adequate. Eye movement data were recorded at 30Hz with a spatial accuracy 
of about 1 degree. Once videos for both participants were rendered with the eye 
movement information, Quicktime Pro was used to synchronise both videos in to one 
movie file, ready for analysis.  
 
 
Figure 2.1. Two still images from the rendered eye tracker movies. The top still 
shows an example of partner gaze, with person B (left) looking at person A. The 
bottom still is from the same pair 19 frames (640ms) later and shows an example of 
shared gaze, with both participants looking at a plastic spoon. 
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Video coding and dependent variables 
Eye tracking data were coded manually offline using Quicktime Media Player and 
audio information was extracted using Audacity sound editing software. The first 
three dependent variables investigated when participants looked at the same objects 
(shared gaze). These variables were (1) the proportion of task time in which shared 
gaze occurred, (2) the proportion of shared gaze events initiated by person A and (3) 
the time difference between the start of a shared gaze event and time the initiator first 
fixated the object. For these analyses, in each pair, one participant was labelled person 
A and the other was labelled person B. In the roles condition person A was the chef 
and B was the gatherer. Since there were not any defined roles in the no roles 
condition, participants in this condition were arbitrarily allocated as person A or B. 
The coding of these data was split between the lead experimenter and three 
undergraduate volunteers from the School of Psychology. The lead experimenter 
provided thorough written guidelines for coding for the volunteers and provided them 
with the opportunity to ask questions at any time. To begin, all four coders coded the 
same movie file and these were all compared by the lead experimenter to ensure a 
consistent and high quality of coding. All coders went through the videos frame-by-
frame and marked down frame references for the beginning and end of each shared 
gaze event. Additionally the initiator of each shared gaze event was noted, along with 
the frame references for the time the initiator began fixating on the shared attention 
location.  
The video coders also noted the times the participants looked at each other (partner 
gaze) throughout the task. These data were used for the first two partner gaze 
measures: (4) the proportion of task time spent on partner gaze and (5) the mean 
length of partner gaze events. The remaining two partner gaze measures involved 
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additional coding. Individual instructions were coded and analysed. The lead 
experimenter alone coded these instructions, using Audacity sound editing software 
and the Quicktime movie files. For each pair, each instruction statement was 
numbered and transcribed, noting the speaker. The start time and end time (to the 
nearest frame reference) of each instruction was coded, along with the time that the 
speaker first looked (if at all) at the listener, the time the listener first looked at the 
speaker and whether or not the speaker used spatial language or pointed during their 
instruction. In the roles condition, the speaker was always the chef and the listener 
always the gatherer. In the no roles condition the participant who gave the instruction 
was considered to be the speaker. Therefore the identity of the speaker and listener 
would switch throughout each movie in the no roles condition. From coding these 
data, two dependent variables for the analysis of partner gaze were used: (6) the 
proportion of instructions in which one or more partner gaze event occurred and when 
these events occurred (7) the proportion of partner gaze events that involved the 
listener looking at the speaker.  
During instruction coding, individual references to objects were also coded. Each 
instruction had between one and four references to relevant objects. Like the 
instructions, each reference was numbered and the start and end times were recorded. 
The first time the speaker and listener fixated on each referent object was coded as 
well as whether the reference was made using the name of the object, a pronoun or if 
it wasn’t directly mentioned verbally. This coding allowed for the investigation of the 
effect that a number of different factors had on (8) the time difference between the 
fixation on a referent object and the onset of the verbal reference relating to that 
object. These factors included person (speaker or listener) and the presence of roles, 
but also type of language used. Previous research of natural dialogue has shown that 
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speakers will align speech with their partners (Pickering & Garrod, 2004). This 
alignment can involve ambiguous utterances (such as those using pronouns rather 
than proper nouns) being interpreted unambiguously, due to the context provided by 
previous utterances or the constraints of a shared visual environment (Brown-Schmidt 
& Tanenhaus, 2008). The time between the onset of a reference phrase and a 
listener’s fixation to the referent object can provide an indicator of alignment between 
interactors. The present study will investigate any differences in this measure found 
between different types of verbal reference (proper noun or pronoun and spatial or 
non-spatial). 
 
Statistical Analysis 
For some of the time measures, the distribution of data was skewed to lower values. 
In these cases the data were log10-transformed. When time difference measures 
involved negative values, a constant was added to these values before log10-
transformation to make all values positive. An independent-samples t-test was used to 
compare the proportion of task time in which shared gaze occurred between the roles 
and no roles condition and a 2 (roles condition) × 2 (participant) ANOVA was carried 
out on the proportion of task time spent engaged in partner gaze. For all other 
analyses the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker & Walker, 2014) in the R 
statistical programming environment was used to run linear mixed effects models 
(LMMs). Many of the measures used in this study have uneven distributions of data, 
making traditional ANOVA models inappropriate for these measures. The details of 
the approach to LMMs used in this study are outlined in this section. 
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Random Factors. Typically, LMMs use subject and item as random factors, 
providing a benefit over AVOVAs in which subject and item analysis must be carried 
out separately. In the present study, there was no item equivalent and the task was 
carried out in pairs, so subject pair was the sole random factor. Following the 
guidance of Barr, Levy, Scheepers and Tily (2013) random slope models were used, 
allowing the models to consider the different effects that the fixed factors have on 
different subject pairs. Models that are maximal were used where possible. 
Simplifying models. The maximal (most complex) models can often fail to converge 
if there are not enough observations in the data. In these cases, simpler models were 
attempted. Models were simplified, when necessary, by first removing correlations 
between random-slopes and intercepts. After this, the slope of any interaction from 
the random factor was removed. If the model still failed to converge, the intercept was 
removed, followed by a fixed factor slope. The most complex model that successfully 
converged was always used (See Appendix 1 for more details). Throughout this thesis 
LMMs are numbered and the full models can be seen in Appendix 2. 
Sum coding. All of the fixed factors in these LMMs were categorical variables, 
therefore they required coding.  A form of effects coding known as sum coding was 
carried out. This method involved initially dummy coding a factor with two levels, 
“0” for one level and “1” for the other. After dummy coding the mean value for this 
variable was subtracted from each case. After this process the resulting variable 
would always have a mean of “0”, even if the factors were unbalanced.  
Calculating p-values. To calculate the p-value for an effect of any given fixed factor, 
a second model was produced, which was identical to the original LMM except for 
the omission of the fixed factor under investigation. This model was then compared to 
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the original model using the anova() function in the car library (Fox & Weisberg, 
2011). The p value from these model comparisons was used as the p-value for the 
effect of the fixed factor.  
Pairwise comparisons. When significant or approaching significant interactions were 
identified, post-hoc comparisons were carried out with Tukey tests using the glht() 
function in the multcomp library (Hothorn, Bretz & Westfall, 2008).  
	  
Results 
Shared gaze analysis 
Shared gaze was defined in this experiment as any instance in which both participants 
were fixating the same object. Shared gaze was regarded as an indicator of shared 
attention in the task. Figure 2.2a) shows the mean proportion of task time in which 
shared gaze occurred for subject pairs in the roles and no roles conditions. Subject 
pairs in the roles condition spent a higher mean proportion of time on shared attention 
(.26) than pairs in the no roles condition (.21), but this difference was not found to be 
significant, t(10) = 1.286, p = .228. 
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Figure 2.2. The (a) Proportion of task time in which shared gaze occurred and (b) the 
proportion of shared gaze events initiated by person A in the no roles and roles 
conditions. Standard error is shown in both graphs. Mean task time was 9 minutes 19 
seconds. 
 
Figure 2.2b) shows the proportion of shared gaze events that were initiated by person 
A in each of the roles conditions. In the no roles condition, where letter assignment 
was arbitrary, person A initiated about half of the shared gaze events (.51). In the 
roles condition, where person A was always the chef, person A initiated more of the 
shared gaze events (.57). However, a random-slope LMM (Model 2.1) of shared gaze 
event initiator, using roles condition as a fixed factor and subject pair as a random 
factor, found that roles condition had no significant effect on the proportion of shared 
gaze events initiated by person A, β = .211, SE = .39, z = .557, p = .591.  
To measure the mean time taken for an instance of shared attention to occur, the 
difference between the time the initiator looked at any object and the time that shared 
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gaze on that object began was calculated. Figure 2.3 shows the mean values of this 
time difference for both person A and person B in the roles and no roles condition. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. The mean time gap between the beginning of the initiator’s fixation to 
shared gaze location and the initiation of shared gaze. Results are shown (with 
standard error) for shared gaze events initiated by person A and person B in the no 
roles and roles conditions.  
 
Figure 2.3 shows that the mean time gap is smaller in the roles condition for both 
person A (25.0 frames) and person B (21.4 frames) than in the no roles condition 
(person A = 31.0 frames, person B = 36.8 frames). A random slope LMM (Model 2.2) 
of the log10 time difference was carried out, using presence of roles, initiator and their 
interaction as fixed factors and subject pair as a random factor. The model showed 
that the time differences were significantly smaller in the roles condition compared to 
the no roles condition, β = -.097, SE = .049, t = -1.980, p = .048. Figure 2.3 also 
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shows there was a difference in mean time difference between person A and person B 
in the roles but not the no roles condition. However, the LMM showed that there was 
no significant effect of initiator, β = .036, SE = .045, t = .800, p = .365, nor any 
interaction, β = .083, SE = .091, t = .920, p = .328. 
 
Partner gaze analysis 
Any instance in which one participant looked at the other in the task is referred to as 
partner gaze. The proportion of task time in which partner gaze occurred is shown in 
Figure 2.4. 
 
 
Figure 2.4. The proportion of task time in which partner gaze occurred for person A 
and person B in the no roles and roles conditions. Error bars show standard error. 
Mean task time was 9 minutes 19 seconds. 
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The proportion of task time spent on partner gaze in the roles condition was higher for 
person B (.037) than person A (.018), but in the no roles condition the proportion for 
person A (.023) and person B (.021) were similar. A 2×2 ANOVA found no 
significant main effect of roles condition, F(1,20) = .402, p = .533, or person looking, 
F(1,20) = .976, p = .335, nor any significant interaction, F(1,20) = 1.451, p = .242. 
The next partner gaze measure was the mean time taken for instances of partner gaze 
for person A and person B in the no roles and roles condition. The mean times of 
partner gaze events are shown in Figure 2.5.  
 
 
Figure 2.5. The mean duration of partner gaze events. Results are shown (with 
standard error) for partner gaze events in which person A looked at person B and 
person B looked at person A in the no roles and roles conditions.  
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The mean duration of partner gaze was found to be higher in the roles condition for 
both person A (19.8 frames) and person B (22.1 frames) than in the no roles condition 
(person A = 16.9 frames, person B = 16.3 frames). A random slope LMM (Model 2.3) 
of the log10 partner gaze time was carried out, using presence of roles, person and 
their interaction as fixed factors and subject pair as a random factor. A significant 
effect of roles was found, β = .119, SE = .053, t = -2.240, p = .036. There was no 
significant effects of person, β = -.026, SE = .075, t = -.350, p = .696, nor was there a 
significant interaction, β = -.032, SE = .150, t = -.210, p = .863. 
Partner gaze was also analysed specifically for times in which one participant was 
giving the other participant an instruction. Because these instances of partner gaze are 
coupled with verbal instructions, these instances are likely to be related to 
communication. Figure 2.6a) shows the proportion of instructions in which at least 
one instance of partner gaze occurred for the roles and no roles condition. A random-
slope LMM (Model 2.4), using roles as a fixed factor and subject pair as a random 
factor, showed that the proportion of instructions with partner gaze was not 
significantly different between the no roles (.32) and roles (.51) conditions, β = -.808, 
SE = .568, z = 1.423, p = .155.  
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Figure 2.6. The a) Proportion of instructions in which partner gaze occurred and b) 
the proportion of instructions with partner gaze in which the listener looked at speaker 
in the no roles and roles conditions. Standard error is shown in both graphs.   
 
Figure 2.6b) shows that the proportion of instructions with partner gaze in which the 
listener looked at the speaker was higher in the roles condition (.97) than the no roles 
condition (.64). A random-slope LMM (Model 2.5), using presence of roles as a fixed 
factor and subject pair as a random factor, showed the difference between roles to be 
significant, β = 2.983, SE = 1.348, z = 2.214, p = .027.  
 
Reference analysis 
The time difference between the onset of a verbal reference and time the participants 
fixated the referent item provides insight into how the participants engaged with the 
instructions. The first reference measure compared this time difference across 
participant and roles conditions. Rather than assigning participants as person A or 
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person B, for each reference in these analyses one participant was labelled as the 
speaker of the reference and the other was labelled as the listener of the reference. In 
the roles condition, the chef was always the speaker, however in the no roles 
condition the identity of the speaker varied between references. Data were not 
normally distributed and contained negative values. Means are shown in Figure 2.7, 
with positive values indicating the verbal references came before the fixations on the 
referent objects. For the purposes of the LMM analysis, a constant of 106 frames was 
added to the data, which was then log10 transformed. 
 
 
Figure 2.7. The mean time difference between referent object fixation and the onset 
of the verbal reference. Results are shown (with standard error) for the speaker and 
listener of the reference in the no roles and roles conditions.  
 
The mean time difference between referent object fixation and the onset of the verbal 
reference was similar for the both the speaker (59.9 frames) and listener (50.4 frames) 
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in the no roles condition. However, in the roles condition the log10 time difference 
was smaller for the speaker (5.7 frames) than the listener (43.5 frames). A random-
slope LMM (Model 2.6) of the log10 time difference was carried out, using person, 
role condition and their interaction as fixed factors and subject pair as a random 
factor. There was a significant effect of both participant, β = -0.084, SE =.022, t = -
3.720, p < .001, and role condition, β = -.095, SE =.042, t = -2.250, p = .030, as well 
as a significant interaction, β =-.121, SE =.049, t = -2.510, p = .012. A post-hoc 
Tukey test showed a significant difference between speaker and listener in the roles 
condition (p<.001), but not the no roles condition (p >.999). 
Whether the use of the object name as a reference rather than a pronoun had any 
effect on the time difference between fixation on the referent object and onset of the 
verbal reference was investigated. Because data were not normally distributed and 
contained negative values, a constant of 106 (for speakers) and 87 (for listeners) was 
added to the data, which were then log10 transformed. Figure 2.8 shows the 
(untransformed) mean time difference for references using object names and 
pronouns in the roles and no roles conditions for a) speakers and b) listeners. The 
mean time difference for speakers was larger for object name references in the no 
roles condition (63.6 frames) compared to the roles condition (1.5 frames). For the 
pronoun references there was a much smaller difference between the no roles (29.5 
frames) and roles conditions (18.3 frames). A random-slope LMM (Model 2.7) of the 
log10 transformed data, using roles, reference type and their interaction as fixed 
factors and subject pair as a random factor, confirmed a significant interaction, β =-
.197, SE =.091, t = -2.150, p = .042, as well as a significant effect of roles condition, 
β =-.163, SE =.048, t = -3.430, p = .003. There was no effect of reference type, β =-
.005, SE =.042, t = -.120, p = .963. A post-hoc Tukey test showed that the difference 
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between results in the no roles and roles condition was significant for object name 
references (p <.001) but not pronoun references (p >.999). 
 
 
Figure 2.8. The mean time difference between referent object fixation and the onset 
of the verbal reference for a) speakers and b) listeners. Results are shown (with 
standard error) for the pronoun and object name references in the no roles and roles 
conditions.  
 
Figure 2.8b) shows that time difference between referent object fixation and the onset 
of the verbal reference for listeners was higher for object name references in the no 
roles (78.3 frames) and roles (52.2 frames) conditions than pronoun references (no 
roles = -21.0 frames, roles= 11.4 frames). A random-slope LMM (Model 2.8), using 
roles and reference type and their interaction as fixed factors and subject pair as a 
random factor, showed that reference type had a significant effect on the time 
difference, β =.206, SE =.047, t = 4.410, p < .001. There was no effect of roles 
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condition, β =-.044, SE =.048, t = -.920, p = .313, but there was a significant 
interaction, β =-.212, SE =.105, t = -2.020, p = .040. A post-hoc Tukey test showed 
the difference between object name and pronoun references to be significant both in 
the no roles (p<.001) and roles conditions (p = .038). 
The mean time difference was also compared between the referent object fixation and 
the onset of the verbal reference between references provided with and without spatial 
information. Again, data were not normally distributed and contained negative values, 
therefore a constant of 73 (for speakers) and 67 (for listeners) was added to the data, 
which was then log10 transformed. Figure 2.9 shows the (untransformed) mean time 
difference for these references in the roles and no roles conditions for a) speakers and 
b) listeners, with positive values indicating that the onset of the verbal reference 
preceded the fixation to that reference. The mean time difference was higher for the 
speaker in the no roles condition for both non-spatial (71.4 frames) and spatial (57.3 
frames) references than the roles condition (non-spatial = 9.7 frames, spatial = 10.3 
frames). A random-slope LMM (Model 2.9) of the log10 transformed time difference, 
using roles, reference type and their interaction as fixed factors and subject pair as a 
random factor, showed a significant effect of roles condition, β =-.249, SE =.073, t = -
3.420, p = .002. There was no effect of reference type, β =-.038, SE =.049, t = .770, p 
= .468, nor was there a significant interaction, β =-.154, SE =.107, t = -1. 440, p = 
.210.  
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Figure 2.9. The mean time difference between referent object fixation and the onset 
of the verbal reference for a) speakers and b) listeners. Results are shown (with error 
bars) for references provided alongside non-spatial and spatial information in the no 
roles and roles conditions.  
 
Figure 2.9b) shows that mean time difference between referent object fixation and the 
onset of the verbal reference for listeners varies for non-spatial references between the 
no roles (92.4 frames) and roles (10.2 frames) conditions, but not for spatial 
references (no roles = 70.9 frames, roles= 73.7 frames). A random-slope LMM 
(model 2.10) of the log10 transformed time difference, using roles, reference type and 
their interaction as fixed factors and subject pair as a random factor, showed an 
interaction to be approaching significance, β =.225, SE =.119, t = 1.900, p = .052. The 
difference across role conditions did reach significance, β =-.131, SE =.068, t = -
1.920, p = .049, and the effect of reference type was clearly significant, β =.186, SE 
=.050, t = 3.750, p = .002. A post-hoc Tukey test showed the difference between the 
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non-spatial and spatial reference conditions to be significant in the roles condition 
(p<.001) but not the no roles condition (p = .999). 
Given the similarity in the effects of spatial language and object names on the time 
difference between referent object fixation and the onset of the verbal reference, the 
relationship between spatial language and the use of object name references was 
investigated. Figure 2.10 shows the proportion of references using spatial language 
for pronoun references and object name references.  
 
 
Figure 2.10. The proportion of references provided alongside spatial information 
(with standard error shown) for references using a pronoun or the name of the referent 
object.  
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A higher proportion of object name references was supplied with spatial references 
(.60) compared to pronoun references (.19). A random-slope LMM (Model 2.11), 
using reference type as a fixed factor and subject pair as a random factor, showed that 
this difference was approaching significance, β =2.581, SE =1.513, z = 1.706, p = 
.088. 
 
Discussion 
The present study explored the effects of manipulating the presence of social roles on 
gaze and language in a real world collaborative task. The presence of roles in 
collaboration influenced how participants engaged in shared gaze as well as partner 
gaze. The latter was also affected by the particular role of the individual within each 
pair. The use of proper nouns and spatial language influenced the time taken for 
participants to gaze at referent locations and these influences were mediated by the 
presence of roles and the identity of the participant. The results of this largely 
exploratory study provide evidence that the presence of social roles affects the extent 
to which participants visually engage with a collaborator and their surroundings. 
Furthermore, the presence of roles affected the relationship between language-type 
and gaze allocation. These findings provide the foundation for later, more controlled 
experiments on the interaction between gaze cueing and language.  
There was no significant difference between the proportion of time that partner gaze 
occurred across roles conditions. Participants spent far less time (between 2-4%) 
looking at each other than they spent on shared gaze (between 20-25%). These results 
appear to be at odds with the results of some previous lab-based studies. People have 
been shown to have a preference for looking at eyes when viewing pictures of people 
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(Yarbus, 1967) or social scenes (Birmingham et al, 2009; Zwickel & Võ, 2010), 
however in this task participants spent very little time looking at their partners.  Given 
the potential informativeness of the eyes (Tomasello et al, 2007) and the ease with 
which people can interpret gaze direction (Anderson et al. 2011) this finding may 
seem surprising. However, studies using real people as stimuli may offer an 
explanation. Laidlaw et al. (2011) showed that people were less likely to look at a 
present confederate than the same confederate on a video monitor and Gallup, Hale et 
al (2012) found that people were less likely to follow the gaze of strangers who could 
see them than strangers who could not. The authors of these studies concluded that 
this was due to there being potential consequences (social interaction) to looking at 
the present confederate or the on-coming stranger. The present study differed from 
these other real world studies in one important aspect: the participants were already 
involved in an interaction. The low proportion of time spent on partner gaze suggests 
that the social influences that dissuade people from looking at strangers also have an 
effect during an interaction. This tendency to avoid long looks to a collaborator can 
therefore not simply be explained by the wish to avoid a social interaction, as the 
interaction was already initiated. To speculate, it may be that participants avoided 
spending long looking at each other in order to follow social norms or it may simply 
be that in this task, there were more useful places to look than the collaborator.  
These results present an obvious question; if people rarely look at each other in an 
interaction, can they still utilise gaze cues? Although the results cannot provide a 
definitive answer, there are three main arguments for the ability to utilise gaze cues in 
these circumstances. Firstly, it has been shown that gaze cues can be followed and 
affect language comprehension, even when they are not directly fixated (Knoeferle & 
Kreysa, 2012). Secondly, successfully identifying a gaze cue may not need a large 
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overall proportion of time spent on partner gaze, but may require effective individual 
partner gaze events. Therefore instead of spending a long time looking at the eyes of 
another, an effective way to follow gaze cues may be to look to the eyes briefly and 
infrequently at appropriate times. Thirdly, it may be the case that eyes are generally 
not sought out during a task, but are used when required, for example, during 
instructions. 
One way to investigate the second possibility is to consider the features of a partner 
gaze event that may make the event more effective at perceiving nonverbal signals, 
such as gaze cues. One feature that could have reasonably influenced effectiveness in 
this way is the length of individual partner gaze events. In this study, the mean length 
of partner gaze events was found to be significantly longer in the roles condition than 
the no roles condition. This may indicate that participants in the roles condition were 
more effectively attending to the non-verbal cues of their partners, resulting in the 
shorter gaps found between initiator fixation time and onset of shared attention in the 
roles condition.    
To consider the third possibility, partner gaze was measured when the gaze allocation 
of a partner may have been particularly informative: during spoken instructions. 
Participants in the roles condition were no more likely to look at their partner than 
those in the no roles condition, but when there were instances of partner gaze during 
an instruction, listeners looked at the speaker significantly more in the roles condition 
compared to the no roles condition. This finding shows that our preference for 
looking at others can be affected by social context. In the roles condition the listener 
was always the gatherer, following instructions given by an informed chef, who was 
in charge. In the no roles condition the identity of the listener would switch between 
the two equal partners, depending on who was giving the instruction. Macdonald and 
	   65	  
Tatler (2013) found that the degree of informativeness of gaze cues affected the extent 
to which the cues were sought out, with highly informative cues being sought most 
often. One possible interpretation of the present findings could be that the 
manipulation of the roles of the participants effectively manipulated the perceived 
informativeness of the cues provided by the chef: listeners in the roles condition may 
have considered the gaze cues of the chef to be highly informative, whereas the gaze 
cues of the speaker in the no roles condition may have been considered less 
informative. 
The observed pattern of results may not have arisen from an effect of perceived 
informativeness, but rather from a social effect of authority. Liuzza et al. (2011) 
found that right-wing voters were more heavily influenced by the gaze cues of their 
political leader than the gaze cues of the opposition leader. In the roles condition, the 
chef was in charge of the procedure and was therefore the leader of the gatherer. It is 
possible that, as well as being more inclined to follow the gaze cues of a leader, 
people are also more inclined to orient to the leader’s gaze cues. Previous research has 
shown a fixation-bias for higher social-status individuals when viewing videos 
(Foulsham, Cheng, Tracy, Henrich, & Kingstone, 2010) and the present results extend 
these findings to a real-world interaction. Although the results do not allow us to 
favour one explanation over the other, these findings provide good evidence that the 
social context of collaboration can affect the extent to which collaborators look at 
each other during communication. A more controlled future experiment may be able 
to distinguish between the effects of the perceived reliability of a person and the 
perceived social role of a person. 
As with partner gaze, the overall time participant pairs fixated the same object (shared 
gaze) was not found to vary significantly across roles condition. It was expected that 
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more shared gaze events would be initiated by person A in the roles condition because 
person A was the leader (chef) of the pair and initiating a shared gaze event was an 
indicator of providing a gaze cue that was followed. However this difference was not 
found to be significant. The mean time difference between the initiator of a shared 
gaze event fixating the gazed-at item and the initiation of the shared gaze event was 
significantly shorter for pairs in the roles condition compared to those in the no roles 
condition. The cause of this difference is unclear, but to speculate, one explanation is 
that the presence of distinct social roles increased the extent to which each participant 
attended to the other. Early research on non-verbal communication in real social 
interactions found that dominant interactors looked more at partners when talking and 
subordinate interactors looked more at their partners when listening, perhaps because 
the dominant interactor wanted to ensure they were being listened to and the 
subordinate wanted to signal that they were listening (Ellyson et al., 1981). It may be 
the case that those in the roles condition attended to their partners more and this led to 
them responding more quickly to the gaze location of their partners.  
The relationships between the language used in verbal instructions, gaze allocation 
and social roles were also investigated. The time difference between the onset of a 
verbal reference and time the participants fixated the referent item was the measure 
for this part of the analysis. Overall, speakers in the roles condition were the quickest 
to fixate the referent item after the onset of the verbal reference, likely due to the 
chefs knowing where the objects were located before the procedure began. 
Participants either used the proper name or a pronoun to refer to an object during 
instructions. The effects that these reference types had on the time difference measure 
were investigated. The increased time taken for speakers in the no roles condition 
relative to the roles condition was found only for instructions using proper names but 
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not pronouns. This finding is likely due to speakers using pronouns when objects and 
object locations had already been established, as this is typically when pronouns are 
used (Meyer & Bock, 1999; Schmitt, Meyer, & Levelt, 1999). Therefore knowing 
where the object was located before the procedure began had no effect on the time 
taken to fixate the object in these cases. The effect of pronouns on the time difference 
measure for listeners can be accounted for with this explanation. These participants 
were significantly quicker when pronouns were used, suggesting that the speaker used 
pronouns because they knew that the listener was aware of (or already looking at) the 
target location, much like Clark & Krych (2004) found that a speaker’s utterances 
would change (and simplify and shorten) based on what the speaker knows the 
listener knows. When the speakers in the present study knew the listener was already 
looking, or had already previously attended to an object, they may have shortened 
their utterances accordingly (using pronouns), speeding up communication. 
A similar analysis was carried out for verbal references delivered alongside or without 
verbal spatial information. The presence or absence of these cues was not found to 
have any effect on the time for the speaker to fixate a referent object. Listeners, 
however, were found to be much quicker to fixate the object in the roles condition 
when non-spatial references were used, compared to other instances. Like the use of 
pronouns, it may be the case that the speaker used non-spatial instructions when the 
listener already knew the location of the referent object. This would explain why 
listeners were much quicker to locate non-spatially referenced items in the roles 
condition, as the speaker may not be using spatial language as they know that the 
listener knows the spatial location of the target object. If both the use of pronouns and 
non-spatial language were related to the speaker’s understanding of the listener’s 
knowledge of the referent object location then these factors would be expected to co-
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occur.  Fewer spatial references were found to be used alongside pronoun references 
compared to object name references, however this difference was only approaching 
significance.  
The above results suggest that the use of spatial or non-spatial language in this task 
was influenced not only by what the speaker knew, but also by what the speaker knew 
that the listener knew. As with the findings for the use of pronouns, these findings 
were in line with previous research showing that speakers alter their utterances online, 
as their understanding of what the listener knows changes (Clark and Krych, 2004). It 
is unclear from the present study whether the changes in gaze allocation found across 
different language types were the result of the same factors that affected the use of 
different types of language or whether the use of different language types directly 
affected gaze allocation. However, in a more controlled follow up experiment 
(Chapter 3), the naturally occurring linguistic references that have been identified in 
this study will be manipulated to investigate the interaction between gaze utilisation 
and reference type. 
This study investigated the effect of social roles on language and gaze behaviour in a 
natural collaboration using dual portable eye-trackers. In this real social collaborative 
setting, people spent very little time looking at each other, challenging the 
generalisability of the conclusions from lab-based paradigms (Birmingham et al, 
2007; 2009; Zwickel and Võ, 2010). These results provide a strong case for 
investigating gaze cueing behaviour in highly naturalistic environments, which is how 
this thesis will continue to investigate the interaction between gaze cueing and 
language. 
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This chapter provides evidence to suggest that those in the roles condition were more 
closely attending to where their partners were looking. Listeners were found to look 
more at a speaker providing verbal instructions if the speaker was playing the role of a 
chef, suggesting that our tendency to look at others is either affected by our social 
perceptions of a person or by our perception of their reliability. These results provide 
evidence that social context can affect the utilisation of gaze cues.  
Additionally, the present study has shown that in these collaborations the form and 
type of the spontaneous verbal references used varied between instructions, and as 
these varied gaze allocation varied. Spatial verbal references sometimes used object 
names and spatial language, or pronouns and non-spatial language. The present 
chapter speculated as to why these different types of reference were used and 
discussed the effects on visual behaviour, however there is a limit to what can be 
concluded from this largely uncontrolled naturalistic study. Following the cognitive 
ethology framework (Kingstone et al., 2008), having identified the spontaneous use of 
different reference types and their effect on eye movement behavior in natural 
interactions, this thesis will progress by exploring the effects of manipulating 
different types of verbal reference on gaze cue utilisation in a more controlled 
environment.  
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Chapter 3: 
 Referent expressions and gaze 
cues – Study 2 
 
	   71	  
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter outlined evidence that social context and the type of language 
we use affects how we allocate our gaze in social interactions. Participants in Study 1 
varied the type and form of the verbal references used throughout the interactions, but 
it is not clear how changing the nature of the information conveyed in speech might 
influence whether and how gaze cues are utilised. Specifically, referring expressions 
can contain featural or spatial determiners that unambiguously specify the target 
object and examples of both types of determiner were found in the natural 
collaboration study outlined in the previous chapter. Given the inherently spatial 
nature of a gaze cue, a concurrent featural referring expression offers information 
additional to and non-overlapping with that conveyed by a gaze cue, whereas a 
concurrent spatial referring expression offers information that largely overlaps with 
the gaze cue. The present chapter explores whether and how gaze cue utilisation 
varies depending on whether concurrent spoken language refers to objects using 
spatial or featural disambiguating determiners. 
In Macdonald and Tatler (2013) the informativeness of the language was varied by 
using referring expressions that either unambiguously identified an object or were 
ambiguous and equally described two objects in the array. In this way, gaze cues 
provided no additional information to that provided by unambiguous spoken 
instructions. However, gaze did provide additional and essential information for 
locating the target object when provided alongside ambiguous spoken instructions. 
Gaze cues therefore either provided entirely redundant information or were the only 
source of information that reliably signalled the location of the correct object. The 
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aim of the present study was to investigate whether the type of information conveyed 
in language can vary gaze cue utilisation in the same way as varying the 
informativeness of language. Inspiration for how to vary language in this study came 
from the finding in Study 1 that instructions with spatial language were associated 
with increased time to fixate referent items. Here, the type of disambiguating 
determiner (featural or spatial) used in an instruction was manipulated. Gaze cues are 
inherently spatial cues; they direct attention to the position of an object, but are not 
capable of providing any information about the features of the object, such as colour 
or shape. Therefore, a gaze cue may be able to communicate the same information as 
a verbal spatial reference, but not a verbal featural reference, making gaze cues 
potentially more informative alongside featural references. The present study 
considered whether people’s gaze seeking and following behaviour reflects the 
increased informativeness of a gaze cue provided with a featural descriptor compared 
to a spatial descriptor. 
Despite the fact that studies of gaze cuing in more natural contexts appear to argue 
against reflexive gaze following, there is previous evidence that automatic and 
selective gaze utilisation may occur together. Laidlaw, Risko and Kingstone (2012) 
presented participants with static images of faces and instructed participants to not 
look at either the mouths or eyes. Compared to free viewing, participants managed to 
easily avoid fixating mouths, but struggled with eyes. However, when carrying out 
this task on pictures of inverted faces, participants could equally suppress looks to 
mouths and eyes. Combined, these results suggest orienting to another’s eyes is both 
selective and automatic and that the automatic effect may be linked to holistic face 
processing. Hill et al. (2010) found evidence of automatic gaze following in a Posner-
type (1980) task when targets were presented less than 200 ms after gaze cue onset, 
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but selective gaze following when targets were presented more than 200 ms after gaze 
cue onset. These studies provide good evidence for the existence of both automatic 
and selective components of gaze cue utilisation; however it is still not clear whether 
the automatic component has any effect in a real world social interaction, in which a 
number of complex factors influence the use of gaze cues.   
In these previous studies, key evidence suggesting an automatic component of gaze 
following has been provided by situations in which participants follow gaze cues that 
do not reliably signal information about the target (such as gaze cues that cue a 
direction incongruent with the target). Therefore, this paradigm includes an 
incongruent gaze condition, to allow automatic attentional effects to be inferred from 
any disruption in task performance caused by incongruent gaze cues.  
Study 1 found that our social perceptions of a partner in a task could affect how we 
allocate gaze to and with that partner. There is also evidence the social skills of an 
individual can affect gaze orienting and following behaviour. Laidlaw et al. (2011) 
found the extent to which participants orient to a present stranger was inversely 
correlated with a measure of the participants’ autistic traits. Freeth, Foulsham & 
Kingstone (2013) found the converse effect when people were actually involved in an 
interaction; high levels of autistic traits were associated with decreased looking time 
at a person speaking in a video, but not in real one-to-one interactions. In the present 
study, participants completed the same Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) 
questionnaire (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 2001) used by 
Laidlaw et al. (2011) and Freeth et al. (2013) to investigate any effect autistic traits 
may have on the eye movement measures.  
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In the present study, each participant followed instructions to complete a search task, 
while wearing a portable eye-tracker. The instructor varied the verbal determiner used 
at the end of the instruction (featural or spatial) and the presence of gaze cues (absent, 
congruent or incongruent). The present study aims to first investigate whether the type 
of verbal reference used influenced the extent to which gaze cues were sought out and 
followed. Secondly, the incongruent gaze condition was used to investigate whether a 
real-world complex task can be influenced by the low level attentional shifts caused 
by gaze cues. We hypothesised that participants would utilise the instructor’s gaze 
flexibly, based on the informativeness of the gaze cue relative to the language used in 
the instruction.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Twenty-four undergraduate students (female = 23) from the University of Dundee 
were recruited for this study. They received course credit for participation. They were 
split equally into three groups: one for each of the gaze conditions. 
 
Materials 
Forty experimental items and 20 distracter items were used for this experiment. The 
40 experimental items were made up of 20 object pairs. The objects in each pair were 
identical, except for their colour (see Figure 3.1). All of the items were used in each 
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of the eight sets of trials (each set involved five trials). For each set of trials one of 
eight different object layouts was used. Each layout involved the objects positioned 
equally across four surfaces (two on table tops, two under tables). To counterbalance 
for any directional biases, half of the participants used an alternative set of layouts, 
which were the mirror image of the initial eight layouts. The instructor used a unique 
instruction sheet for each participant. Each trial was counter-balanced for the location, 
colour and type of determiner used for the target across participants.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. An example of one of the 20 object pairs. These purses differ only in 
colour. 
 
Each participant filled out an Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) Questionnaire 
(Appendix 6), devised by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001).  The questionnaire involved 50 
statements that were designed to measure the degree of self-reported autistic traits in 
non-clinical populations. Participants had the same four multiple-choice responses to 
each statement: “Definitely agree”, “Slightly agree”, “Slightly Disagree” and 
“Definitely disagree”. Each questionnaire was scored out of 50 according to the 
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guidelines set by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) (See Analysis of Autism-Spectrum 
Quotient Questionnaire section). 
 
Design 
This experiment used a 2 (within subjects) × 3 (between subjects) design. The 
independent variables were type of determiner used (featural or spatial) and gaze 
condition (absent, congruent or incongruent). A between-subjects design was used for 
gaze condition to give participants the opportunity to learn the type of cue to expect 
from the instructor, so that potential gaze seeking strategies could be investigated. In 
order for participants to learn instructor gaze behaviour, trials had to be blocked by 
gaze condition. In a within-subjects design, this would require a large number of trials 
per participant, making analysis overly laborious. Furthermore, in a within-subject 
design learned behaviours from one block may influence another. Therefore only one 
gaze condition was assigned to each participant.  
 
Procedure 
In addition to the mobile eye tracker worn by the participant throughout each 
recording session, two extra cameras were used. One was placed so that it would 
capture the instructor (experimenter) throughout the procedure and the other was 
placed so that it would capture the participant. The eye tracker was calibrated (see Eye 
Movement Recording section). The participant was positioned in front of a bag facing 
the instructor, who was approximately four metres away (see Figure 3.2).	   The 
participant was aware that the instructor was an experimenter, but was not made 
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aware that he was investigating gaze cueing. Between the participant and instructor 
and on either side of them were two tables. There were 15 objects on each table-top 
and 15 objects underneath each table, but still visible from the participant’s and 
experimenter’s starting positions. Of the 60 objects, 40 were experimental objects and 
five of these were the targets for the first set of five trials. The counterpart (identical 
object with different colour) to each of these five target objects was positioned on the 
opposite side to the target. When experimental items were not targets for any given 
layout, objects were sometimes positioned on the same side as their counterpart (as is 
the case with the green and yellow frisbees in Figure 3.2). 
 
 
Figure 3.2. A still image from the synchronised digital video recordings. The panel on 
the left shows the instructor providing a gaze cue and the panel on the right shows the 
participant standing opposite the instructor. The central panel shows the scene and 
right eye recordings from the eye-tracker. The cross-hair shows the participant’s point 
of fixation. 
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The instructor explained to the participant that they would be told to pick up objects, 
one at a time. After each instruction they were required to find the object, pick it up 
and then put it in the bag, before returning to their starting position. For each 
instruction the instructor looked at the participant before beginning. Each instruction 
statement followed the same structure; they began with the words “Pick-up the [object 
name]” and were followed by either “on the [left or right]” (spatial condition) or 
“that’s [object colour]” (featural condition). Before the experiment began, the 
experimenter explained that spatial references would refer to locations with respect to 
the participant rather than with respect to the experimenter giving the instruction. 
Thus an instruction to “pick up the purse on the right” would mean the purse to the 
right of the participant. After five instructions were given the participant was escorted 
behind a partition and the objects were re-arranged into a pre-determined layout. 
Eight layouts were used in total for each participant and the order was randomised. Of 
the 40 instructions, 20 used a spatial determiner (left or right) and 20 used a featural 
determiner (object colour). In the congruent gaze cue condition, the instructor looked 
at the target object after stating the object name, but before giving the determiner. At 
the same point in the incongruent condition, the instructor looked at the counterpart to 
the target object, on the other side of the room. In the no gaze condition the instructor 
looked at neither object, but instead looked down to the instruction sheet. After the 
main procedure participants completed the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) 
questionnaire. 
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Eye Movement Recording 
Participants' eye movements were tracked using a Positive Science LLC mobile eye 
tracker (New York, NY). This was one of the eye-trackers used in Study 1, and videos 
were recorded and rendered and eye position estimated using the methods outlined in 
study one. Calibration involved asking the participant to look at particular points on a 
pin board at a distance of about three metres, followed by particular toy building 
blocks (Megabloks) on a counter top at a distance of 70 cm. Calibration was repeated 
after the task. Sound was also recorded throughout the experiment. 
 
Analysis of eye-movement and audio data 
Eye-tracking data were manually coded offline by the first author and a volunteer 
research assistant. There was no minimum fixation duration criterion. The first author 
coded the timings of looks to the target and counterpart objects as well as the timings 
of gaze cues. The first author and a research assistant coded the number of looks to 
the instructor and length of looks to the instructor for each trial. The lead 
experimenter and research assistant initially coded the same movie file and these were 
compared by the lead experimenter to ensure a consistent and high quality of coding. 
Looks to the instructor were considered to be any fixations that were on any part of 
the instructor's body. This liberal criterion, also used in Macdonald & Tatler (2013), 
was employed so that any looks to the instructor were classed as potential instances of 
foveal or parafoveal gaze-seeking behaviour.  
Audacity sound editing software was used to extract the timings for the onset of each 
instruction statement, the onset of each object name and the onset of each determiner 
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word. Of the 960 experimental trials from the 24 participants, 144 were discarded, 
due to three of the objects being commonly misidentified, leaving 816 potentially 
usable trials. There was further data loss, due to camera errors or loss of pupil/corneal 
reflection tracking, which affected different dependent variables in different ways. 
The number of trials used in the analysis of each dependent variable is noted below. 
The first three dependent variables (DVs) were indicators of gaze seeking and 
focussed on looks to the instructor. These were: (1) proportion of trials in which the 
participants fixated on the instructor at trial onset (779 analysed trials), (2)	  proportion 
of trials in which the participants fixated on instructor at the time of gaze cue (744 
analysed trials) and (3) the mean proportion of time in each trial the participant spent 
fixating the instructor (642 analysed trials). The instructor provided gaze cues after 
the onset of the object name, but before the onset of the disambiguating word. Gaze 
cue onset times were identified from the video footage of the instructor (left-most 
panel in Figure 3.2). On average, the gaze cue was provided 791ms after the onset of 
the object name. Since no gaze cues were given in the no gaze cue condition, that 
time point could not be used. Instead, the mean time the gaze cue was given in the 
incongruent and congruent conditions relative to the onset of the object name and 
onset of the determiner was calculated. On average, gaze cues were given after .88 of 
the time between the onset of the determiner word and object name had elapsed.  For 
each trial in the no gaze condition, .88 of the time difference between the onset of the 
determiner word and onset of the object name was calculated. This was added to the 
time of onset of the object name to calculate the “time of gaze cue”. When calculating 
the proportion of time spent looking at the instructor, the onset of the instruction 
sentence was used as the beginning of the trial and the pick-up time was used as the 
end of the trial.  
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The remaining two dependent variables were used as indicators of gaze following. 
Firstly, (4) the proportion of trials in which participants initially looked in the correct 
direction after the onset of the gaze cue (750 analysed trials). This allowed for the 
investigation of initial responses to congruent and incongruent gaze cues. The effect 
of the conditions on performance in the task was investigated by measuring (5) the 
time difference between the first look at the target and the onset of the trial (705 
analysed trials). Smaller time differences between the first look at the target object 
and the onset of trial were used as indicators of better performance.   
 
Time-course of trials 
Given that the stimuli used in this experiment were produced and presented by a 
present experimenter in real time, there is naturally some variation in the timings of 
the language and gaze cue onsets. On average the onset of the object name occurred 
428 ms after the beginning of the instruction sentence. When a gaze cue was 
provided, this occurred a mean 791 ms after the onset of the object name. The onset 
of the disambiguating word occurred on average, 96ms after the gaze cue, 887 ms 
after the onset of the object name and 1313 ms after the beginning of the senctence. 
Mean total trial time (time between onset of sentence and a participant touching an 
object) was 5528 ms. 
 
Analysis of Autism-Spectrum Quotient Questionnaires 
The responses to each statement were scored according to the guidelines set out by 
Baron-Cohen et al. (2001). Half of the statements were congruent with an autistic trait 
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(e.g. “I would rather go to a library than a party”) and the remainder of the statements 
were incongruent with an autistic trait (e.g. “I find social situations easy”). A point 
was given to each “Definitely agree” or “Slightly agree” response to autistic-trait-
congruent statements and to each “Slightly Disagree” and “Definitely disagree” 
response to autistic-trait-incongruent statements. The total point-score out of 50 was 
considered the participant’s AQ score. The more the participant identified with 
autistic traits, the higher the score. Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) found that a subject 
pool of adults with high-functioning autism or Asperger syndrome had a mean score 
of 35.8 (SD = 6.5) and a cohort of control subjects scored a mean of 16.4 (SD = 6.3). 
The scores in the present study ranged from 7-24, with a mean of 16.8 (SD = 4.7), 
showing results typical of a normal population. The participants were divided into two 
groups: a low AQ group of the eleven participants that scored between 7-17 (Mean = 
13.3, SD = 2.2) and a high AQ group of the 13 participants that scored between 18-24 
(Mean = 19.8, SD = 4.2). Of the eleven participants in the low AQ group, six were in 
the no gaze condition, two were in the congruent condition and three were in the 
incongruent condition. Of the 13 participants in the high AQ group, two were in the 
no gaze condition, six were in the congruent condition and five were in the 
incongruent condition.  
 
Statistical analysis 
The data were all analysed using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker & 
Walker, 2014) in the R statistical programming environment to run linear mixed 
effects models (LMMs). As with Chapter 2, the details of the approach are outlined in 
this section.  
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Random Factors. The majority of LMMs in this chapter used subject and item as 
random factors. However, the models investigating the proportion of trials in which 
the instructor was fixated at the onset of the trial do not include item as a random 
factor. This is due to this measure occurring early in the trial, before item could 
theoretically have any effect on performance. Random slope models were used for the 
reasons outlined in Chapter 2. Again maximal models were used where possible. 
Simplifying models. When these maximal models failed to converge and required 
simplification of the random effects structure, the approach was to first remove the 
correlations between random-slopes and intercepts. After this, the slope of any 
interaction from the random factor was removed, starting with the item random effect 
(if present). If necessary, further simplification was made by selectively removing the 
slopes of the interaction and main effect terms, initially in the item-level random 
effect structure (see Appendix 1 for more details). 
Sum coding, calculating p-values and pairwise comparisons. These procedures 
were all carried out as outlined in Chapter 2. 
 
Results 
 
Gaze seeking: Looks to the instructor 
The first measure was concerned with any effect the between-subjects gaze conditions 
had on whether or not participants fixated the instructor at the onset of each trial. The 
mean proportion of trials in which this occurred for each gaze condition is shown in 
Figure 3.3a. Participants were nearly always looking at the instructor when the trial 
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began in both the no gaze (.97) and congruent gaze (.98) conditions, but fewer trials 
began with a look to the instructor in the incongruent gaze condition (.76). An LMM 
(Model 3.1) using gaze condition as a fixed factor (and subject as a random factor) 
confirmed that there was no significant difference between the congruent and no gaze 
conditions, β = .149, SE = 1.303, z = .115, p = .909, but there was a significant 
difference between the no gaze and incongruent conditions, β = -2.844, SE = 1.170, z 
= -2.431, p = .015.  
To investigate if AQ had any influence on whether participants in the incongruent 
condition looked at the instructor, An LMM (model 3.2) using AQ group as a fixed 
factor and subject as a random factor was carried out. There was no significant 
difference in the mean proportion of trials in which the instructor was fixated at the 
onset of the sentence between the low AQ group (.74) and high AQ group (.76), β = 
0.1369, SE = 1.702, z = 0.080, p = .	  936.  
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Figure 3.3. The proportion of trials in which the participant fixated the instructor a) at 
the onset of the instruction sentence (beginning of trial) and b) at the onset of the gaze 
cue. Results are shown (with standard error) for the No gaze, Congruent gaze and 
Incongruent gaze conditions. 
 
The proportion of trials in which the participants fixated the instructor at the onset of 
the gaze cue was measured (Figure 3.3b). In most trials, at the onset of the gaze cue 
participants in the congruent gaze condition were looking at the instructor (.87). The 
proportion of looks to the instructor at this point was lower for the no gaze condition 
(.67) and lower still for the incongruent condition (.50). An LMM (Model 3.3) using 
gaze condition as a fixed factor (and subject and item as random factors) showed the 
difference between the no gaze condition and the congruent condition to be non-
significant, β =1.533, SE = 1.039, z = 1.476, p = .140. The difference between the 
incongruent and no gaze conditions was also non-significant, β =-1.008, SE = 1.029, z 
= -.980, p = .327, but the difference between incongruent and congruent conditions 
was significant, β =-2.541, SE = 1.047, z = -2.427, p = .015.  
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As with looks at the onset of the sentence, AQ analysis was focussed on whether AQ 
influenced the extent to which participants fixated the instructor at the onset of the 
gaze cue. As none of the gaze conditions approached 100% trials with looks to the 
instructor, all conditions were investigated using LMMs with AQ group as the fixed 
factor and subject and item as random factors. There was no significant difference 
found between AQ groups for the congruent condition (Model 3.4), β =-1.266, SE = 
2.063, z = -.614, p = .540, the incongruent gaze condition (Model 3.5), β =-1.154, SE 
= 1.807, z = -.639, p = .523, nor in the no gaze condition (Model 3.6), β =-2.048, SE = 
1.497, z = -1.368, p = .171. 
The mean proportion of trial time spent looking at the instructor for each gaze and 
reference condition is shown in Figure 3.4. An LMM (Model 3.7) for the congruent 
and no gaze conditions (using subject and item as random factors) showed no 
significant effect of gaze condition, β =.039, SE =.028, t = 1.378, p = .155, but a 
significant effect of reference condition, β = -.017, SE =.008, t = -2.066, p = .043, and 
a significant interaction, β = -.033, SE =.016, t = -1.994, p = .049. Pairwise 
comparisons showed that the mean proportion of trial time that the participant spent 
looking at the instructor was significantly greater for featural trials than spatial trials 
in the congruent condition, p = .011 (mean featural trial time = 5,126 ms, mean spatial 
trial time = 5,325 ms), but not the no gaze condition, p = .999 011 (mean featural trial 
time = 5,380 ms, mean spatial trial time = 5,478 ms). 
 
	   87	  
 
Figure 3.4. The proportion of trial time that the participant spent looking at the 
instructor. Results are shown (with standard error) for the No gaze, Congruent gaze 
and Incongruent gaze conditions for both featural and spatial reference conditions. 
Mean trial time throughout the experiment was 5,528 ms. 
 
An LMM (Model 3.8) for the no gaze and incongruent gaze conditions (using subject 
and item as random factors) showed no effect of gaze condition, β =-.024, SE =.034, t 
= -.695, p = .466, nor reference condition, β =-.006, SE =.008, t = -.710, p = .478, nor 
any significant interaction, β =-.011, SE =.016, t = -.718, p = .482. 
The congruent gaze data was analysed further to investigate whether AQ influenced 
the extent to which participants looked at the instructor and whether any effect 
interacted with reference type (Figure 3.5). The LMM (Model 3.9) used reference 
type and AQ group as fixed factors and subject and item as random factors. A 
significant effect of reference type was found with this model, supporting the findings 
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of the previous Tukey test, β =-.035, SE =.013, t = -2.579, p = .014. The model also 
showed a significant effect of AQ group, β =-.075, SE =.026, t = 2.902, p = .009, but 
no significant interaction, β =-.038, SE =.034, t = 1.127, p = .252. Despite the lack of 
a significant interaction in the model, there was a priori interest in whether the change 
in reference condition affected the AQ groups differently. Post-hoc Tukey tests 
revealed that the difference between featural and spatial reference instructions was 
significant in the low AQ group (p = .038), but not the high AQ group (p = .355). 
 
 
Figure 3.5. The proportion of trial time that the participant spent looking at the 
instructor for the congruent gaze condition only. Results are shown (with standard 
error) for the high AQ group and low AQ group for both featural and spatial reference 
conditions. Mean trial time throughout the experiment was 5,528 ms. 
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The mean proportion of trial time that the participants spent fixating the instructor did 
not significantly vary across the no gaze and incongruent gaze conditions, nor did it 
vary across the featural and spatial reference conditions. Therefore, the influence of 
AQ group on all of the data from the no gaze and incongruent conditions was 
analysed together. Despite a difference between the low AQ (.25) and high AQ (.21) 
groups, an LMM (Model 3.10) using AQ group as a fixed factor and subject and item 
as random factors showed no significant difference in the mean proportion of trial 
time spent fixating the instructor between the low and high AQ groups, β =-.046, SE 
=.033, t = -1.403, p = .148.  
The results from the analysis of looks to the instructor suggest that participants 
engaged in selective gaze seeking behaviour. Participants looked to the instructor at 
the onset of the gaze cue more frequently when these cues were anticipated to be 
congruent and they spent more time looking at the instructor overall when the gaze 
cue provided the most uniquely informative information (when presented alongside 
featural language in the congruent gaze condition).  
 
Initial gaze following 
Initial gaze following was investigated by measuring the mean proportion of trials in 
which the first saccade launched after the gaze cue was in the direction (left or right) 
of the target object (Figure 3.6a). The first eye movement was usually in the correct 
direction in the congruent gaze condition for both spatial (.92) and featural (.89) 
references. There were fewer trials with correct first initial saccades in the no 
gaze/spatial condition (.79) and fewer still in the no gaze/featural condition (.56). An 
LMM (Model 3.11) of the congruent and no gaze conditions (using subject and item 
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as random factors) showed a significant effect of gaze condition, β =.1.532, SE =.296, 
z = 5.185, p < .001, and reference type, β =.687, SE =.259, z = 2.653, p = .008, but no 
significant interaction, β =-.775, SE =.523, z = -1.482, p = .138. Pairwise comparisons 
showed a significant difference between the congruent and no gaze conditions in 
featural reference trials, p < .001, and in spatial reference trials, p = .028. 
From Figure 3.6a it appears that there was little difference in the results for the 
incongruent gaze condition and no gaze condition for both spatial (.74) and featural 
(.56) references. An LMM (Model 3.12) of the incongruent and no gaze conditions 
(using subject and item as random factors) confirmed that there was no effect of gaze 
condition, β =-.125, SE =.231, z = -.541, p = .589, nor any interaction between gaze 
and reference conditions, β =-.247, SE =.399, z = -.618, p = .536. There was, 
however, a significant effect of reference type, β =.943, SE =.202, z = 4.678, p < .001. 
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Figure 3.6. The mean proportion of trials with initial eye movements after the gaze 
cue in the correct direction for a) the full dataset and b) only trials in which the 
participant was looking at the instructor when the gaze cue was given. Results (with 
standard error) are shown for the No gaze, Congruent gaze and Incongruent gaze 
conditions for both featural and spatial reference conditions.  
 
It is possible that performance in this measure may have been mediated by whether or 
not the participant was fixating the instructor at the point in the time at which the gaze 
cue was given. To investigate this, the analysis was repeated using only the trials in 
which the instructor was fixated at the onset of the gaze cue. This analysis included 
87% of congruent trials, 67% of no gaze trials and 50% of incongruent trials (See 
Figure 3.3b). Results from this analysis are shown in Figure 3.6b. 	  
The focus of interest in this re-analysis was to investigate whether the relationship 
between the results for those in the three gaze conditions changed, when analysing 
only those trials with fixations on the instructor at the onset of the gaze cue. The 
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LMM (Model 3.13) of congruent and no gaze trials showed the same effects as the 
LMM on the full dataset; there were main effects of gaze condition, β =2.154, SE 
=.364, z = 5.894, p < .001, reference condition, β = .942, SE =.389, z = 2.424, p = 
.015, but no significant interaction, β =-.984, SE =.732, z = -1.343, p = .179. From 
Figure 3.7, there appears to be little difference in the mean proportion of trials with 
initial eye movements in the correct direction between the no gaze (spatial = .83, 
featural = .53) and incongruent gaze (spatial = .77, featural = .56) conditions. The 
LMM (Model 3.14) showed that there was no significant main effect of gaze 
condition, β =-.149, SE =.456, z = -.327, p = .744, nor an interaction, β =-.572, SE 
=.657, z = -.871, p = .384, but there was a significant main effect of reference type, β 
=1.364, SE =.317, z = 4.300, p < .001; this replicates the pattern of effects found in 
the analysis of the full dataset. 
A similar analysis using only the trials in which the instructor was not fixated at the 
onset of the gaze cue would not be appropriate given the small percentage of trials in 
which this occurred in the congruent (13%) and no gaze (33%) conditions. However, 
for the incongruent gaze condition only, an LMM (Model 3.15) was used to 
investigate any interaction between reference type and whether the participant looked 
at the instructor at the onset of the gaze cue (Figure 3.7). 
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Figure 3.7. The mean proportion of trials with initial eye movements after the gaze 
cue in the correct direction. Results are displayed for the Incongruent gaze condition 
only and separated by reference condition and by whether or not the instructor was 
fixated at the onset of the gaze cue. 
 
The LMM showed there to be no difference in performance between the trials in 
which the instructor was fixated and those in which he was not, β =.137, SE =.478, z = 
.286, p = .775. A significant effect of reference type was found, β =.892, SE =.351, z 
= 2.543, p = .011, but there was no interaction, β =.463, SE =.656, z = .705, p = .481. 
As with the measure of proportion of trial time spent fixating the instructor, the 
influence of AQ group on the proportion of first saccades in the target direction was 
investigated. LMMs using AQ group as a fixed factor and subject and item as random 
factors showed that there was no significant effect of AQ group in the congruent 
condition (Model 3.16), β =-.764, SE =1.100, z = -.694, p = .487, nor the incongruent 
and no gaze conditions (Model 3.17), β =-.286, SE =.217, z = -1.319, p = .187. 
	   94	  
The analysis of first saccade direction after the gaze cue onset showed that saccades 
were no more likely to be launched in the wrong direction following an incongruent 
gaze cue than in the absence of gaze cues (Figure 3.6). This is somewhat in contrast to 
the increased proportion of erroneous gaze-following responses to incongruent gaze 
cues typically found in Posner type gaze-cueing paradigms (Ricciardelli et al., 2002; 
Kuhn & Kingstone, 2009). However, it may be that any distracting effect of the 
incongruent gaze cue might manifest not as differences in overt responses but as 
differences in covert attention allocation. Such effects might result in a delayed overt 
response following an incongruent gaze cue rather than an incorrectly-directed overt 
response. The next analysis explores the possibility of such covert effects of gaze cues 
by comparing the time taken to first fixate the target, which could have potentially 
been influenced by attentional effects that did not result in the launching of saccades 
in the wrong direction. 
 
Gaze following: Looks to objects 
The effect of the conditions on performance in this task was investigated by 
measuring the mean time difference between the onset of the instruction sentence and 
the first fixation on the target object (Figure 3.8a). An LMM (Model 3.18) of the 
congruent (spatial = 70 frs., featural = 67 frs.) and no gaze conditions (spatial = 76 
frs., featural = 86 frs.), with subject and item as random factors showed a significant 
effect of gaze condition, β = 12.550, SE = 3.857, t = 3.254, p = .003, and a significant 
interaction, β = -12.625, SE = 6.173, t = -2.045, p = .040. Reference type did not have 
a significant effect, β = -3.577, SE = 3.006, t = -1.190, p = .212. Pairwise comparisons 
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showed a significant difference between the no gaze and congruent conditions for 
instructions with featural references, p < .001, but not spatial references, p = .504.  
The LMM (Model 3.19) of the incongruent (spatial = 84 frs., featural = 83 frs.) and no 
gaze conditions, with subject and item as random factors, showed no significant effect 
of gaze condition, β = -3.169, SE = 5.494, t = -.577, p = .546, reference type, β = -
4.480, SE = 3.121, t = -1.435, p = .150, nor any interaction, β = 10.944, SE = 6.850, t 
= -1.598, p = .111. As there was a priori interest in the different effects of reference 
type in different gaze conditions, pairwise comparisons were carried out despite the 
lack of a significant interaction. The comparisons showed no significant difference 
between the featural and spatial instructions for those in the incongruent condition, p 
= .993, and an approaching significant difference for those in the no gaze condition, p 
= .061. 
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Figure 3.8. The mean time difference (frames) between the onset of instruction 
sentence and the first fixation of the target object for a) the full dataset and b) only 
trials in which the participant was looking at the instructor when the gaze cue was 
given. Results (with standard error) are shown for the No gaze, Congruent gaze and 
Incongruent gaze conditions for both featural and spatial reference conditions. 
 
As with the previous measure, it is possible that the time difference between the onset 
of the sentence and the first fixation on the target object may have been affected by 
whether or not the participant was looking at the instructor when the gaze cue was 
provided. Therefore analysis was repeated for only those trials in which the instructor 
was fixated at the onset of the gaze cue (Figure 3.8b). The pattern of results in Figure 
3.8b is very similar to the pattern in Figure 3.8a. The LMM (Model 3.20) for 
congruent and no gaze conditions showed a significant effect of gaze condition, β = -
15.397, SE = 2.676, t = -5.755, p < .001, and an interaction, β = 15.873, SE = 6.428, t 
= 2.469, p = .015, but no effect of reference type, β = -2.76, SE = 3.045, t = -.919, p < 
.328. The LMM (Model 3.21) of the incongruent and no gaze conditions showed an 
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approaching significant effect of reference type, β = -7.178, SE = 4.182, t = -1.720, p 
= .081, but no significant effect of gaze condition, β = 4.058, SE = 4.351, t = .930, p = 
.331, nor any interaction, β = 12.435, SE = 8.434, t = 1.470, p = .132. Because there 
was a priori interest in how verbal reference type may mediate gaze following, 
planned comparisons were performed despite the lack of a significant interaction. No 
significant difference was found between the featural and spatial instructions for those 
in the incongruent condition, p = .999, but there was a significant difference for those 
in the no gaze condition, p = .016. 
For the incongruent condition only, an LMM (Model 3.22) was carried out on the 
time difference between the onset of sentence and the first fixation on the target 
object, using whether the instructor was fixated at the onset of the gaze cue and 
reference type as fixed factors. Participants in the incongruent condition took longer 
to make their first fixation on the target object when they looked at the instructor as 
he provided the gaze cue (spatial = 88.6 frs., featural = 90.7 frs.) compared to when 
they did not fixate the instructor (spatial = 77.0 frs., featural = 73.3 frs.). This 
difference was not significant, β = 8.633, SE = 6.763, t = 1.276, p = .180. This finding 
is limited, however, in what it can tell us about the effect of incongruent gaze cues. 
The time difference here may simply be a result of the participants who are not 
looking at the instructor at the onset of the gaze cue, having a head-start on the search, 
as they begin looking at the tables earlier.  
The influence of AQ group on the time to first fixate the target was investigated for 
each gaze condition. LMMs using AQ group as a fixed factor and subject and item as 
random factors showed the there was no significant effect of AQ group in the 
congruent condition (Model 3.23), β = 6.187, SE = 5.252, t = 1.178, p = .229, the 
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incongruent condition (Model 3.24), β = .987, SE = 9.110, t = .108, p = .897, and no 
gaze conditions (Model 3.25), β = -6.620, SE = 8.107, t = -.817, p = .371. 
 
Discussion 
 
In the present study a real world search task paradigm was used to investigate the 
effect of the type of verbal reference used in an instruction on gaze cue utilisation. 
The real world paradigm used real gaze cues and spoken language and measured 
indicators of gaze seeking and following. The results showed clear signs of selective 
gaze utilisation behaviour, but also some indication that gaze cues affected the time to 
fixate the target, even when the cues were known to be unreliable.  
Measuring the participants’ looks to the instructor allowed for the investigation of 
gaze-seeking behaviour. The first of these measures was the proportion of trials in 
which the participant fixated the instructor at the start of the trial. Participants in the 
congruent and no gaze conditions were found to fixate the instructor at the beginning 
of most trials. However, there were significantly fewer trials with initial fixations on 
the instructor in the incongruent gaze condition. This is likely due to these 
participants avoiding what they anticipated to be unhelpful gaze cues. This shows 
strategic gaze seeking behaviour, however it may also suggest an automatic capture of 
gaze cue stimuli. Participants began each trial standing facing the instructor, so in 
order to begin a trial by not looking at the instructor, participants would have had to 
look away. If gaze cues were known to be unhelpful and gaze following was a 
completely selective process, then there would be no need to avoid these stimuli. 
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Therefore, the finding could suggest the participants were looking away because they 
anticipated a cue that would hinder them in the task. This explanation is in line with 
the typical findings of the gaze cueing paradigm (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; 
Ricciardelli et al, 2002) in which known unhelpful gaze cues disrupt task 
performance, however these results clearly show that participants strategically altered 
their gaze seeking behaviour due to their expectation of gaze cue reliability.  
The second gaze seeking measure was the proportion of trials in which the participant 
fixated the instructor later on in the sentence; specifically, at the point that the gaze 
cue was provided. For the no gaze condition, the average time that the gaze cue 
occurred in the other two conditions was calculated and was used to calculate a 
pseudo-gaze cue time for comparison (see Method). Participants looked at the 
instructor at the onset of the gaze cue in more trials in the congruent gaze condition 
compared to the incongruent gaze condition, showing that participants looked to the 
instructor more when they expected a helpful cue compared to when they expected an 
unhelpful cue. This supports the earlier findings (Macdonald & Tatler, 2013) that 
gaze cues were sought out more when they were more informative. It is unclear 
whether this difference is driven by those in the congruent condition actively seeking 
gaze cues, those in the incongruent condition actively avoiding gaze cues, or a 
mixture of these two behaviours.  
The final gaze orienting measure was the mean proportion of trial time that 
participants spent looking at the instructor. This was used as an indicator of gaze 
seeking for featural and spatial determiner trials for participants in all three gaze 
conditions. In the previous chapter, the possibility was discussed that in a natural 
interaction long periods of viewing a collaborator may not be the ideal way to view a 
gaze cue. However, in this paradigm, gaze cues were maintained throughout the trial, 
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meaning that all looks to the instructor after gaze cue onset could have potentially 
gathered information from gaze. Participants provided with featural references in the 
congruent gaze condition spent the most time looking at the instructor, suggesting that 
gaze cues were sought out the most when featural references were provided alongside 
an informative gaze cue. This condition was the condition in which the gaze cue was 
the most useful, relative to the spoken language being used. This is because the gaze 
cue was a) directed to the correct object and b) a unique source of spatial information. 
In the condition where congruent gaze cues were provided with a spatial determiner 
the gaze cue still reliably signalled the location of the target, but provided information 
that was also provided by language, making it no longer uniquely informative in 
providing the spatial location of the target object. The finding that gaze cues were 
oriented to for longer when they provided information not available from the spoken 
language provides further evidence for selective gaze seeking behaviour in real world 
interactions. Crucially, although gaze behaviour was predictable, reference condition 
was not, therefore participants must have selectively modified gaze-seeking behaviour 
during the trial, once the disambiguating word was processed and identified. 
Combined, the measures investigating looks to the instructor provided evidence that 
participants adopted strategic gaze seeking behaviours, with those in the congruent 
gaze condition more likely to fixate the instructor at the onset of the gaze cue than 
those in the other conditions. Furthermore, within the congruent gaze condition, 
participants were found to spend longer looking at the instructor when the gaze cues 
were more exclusively informative (when provided alongside featural determiners). 
However, evidence showing that participants actively avoided the instructor when 
unhelpful gaze cues were used, relative to when no gaze cues were used, could 
suggest that participants were avoiding a potentially unhelpful reflexive stimulus. 
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The gaze seeking analysis also provided the only significant effects of AQ group. The 
AQ group effects must be interpreted with caution, as group assignment was 
unbalanced within the gaze condition groups. Nonetheless, the analysis of the 
influence of AQ group and reference type on the proportion of trial time spent 
fixating the instructor provided intriguing results. Firstly, for the congruent condition 
only, those in the high AQ group spent more time fixating the instructor on average 
than those in the low AQ group. This finding could be accounted for by a speculative 
explanation discussed by Freeth et al. (2013). These experimenters found that low AQ 
scorers would look more at an individual in a video than high AQ scorers, but that this 
difference was not present in a real interaction. One possible explanation that Freeth 
et al. provided was that those with a low AQ score were more sensitive to social cues 
(so looked more in the video), but were also more sensitive to social norms that 
prevented them from spending too long looking at the experimenter, in the same way 
that Laidlaw et al (2011) and Gallup, Hale et al (2012) showed people avoiding 
looking at others who could potentially look back. If the interpretation of Freeth et al. 
(2013) is applied to the present study, it could be argued that the low AQ group was 
more sensitive to the same social norms and therefore spent less time looking at the 
instructor. A second intriguing finding is that, although featural trials have a greater 
looking time than spatial trials for both AQ groups, this difference is only significant 
for the low AQ group. This could be explained by the high AQ group using the 
congruent cues fairly indiscriminately, whereas the low AQ group were showing 
sensitivity to social norms and only spending extra time looking at the instructor when 
the gaze cue was more useful (when provided alongside featural language). These 
results, however, are based on a small and unbalanced sample of participants, 
therefore any interpretation must be regarded as speculative. 
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The selective behaviour toward gaze cues discussed above was also found in the gaze 
following measures. Immediate gaze following was investigated by measuring the 
mean proportion of trials in which the first saccade launched after the onset of the 
gaze cue was in the target direction. When participants in the no gaze condition were 
provided with featural verbal references they performed no better than chance in this 
measure. However, they performed significantly better when spatial determiners were 
used. This can be accounted for by some of these initial eye movements occurring 
after the end of the sentence: in the spatial determiner sentences, each instruction 
ended with either the word “left” or “right”, indicating the location of the target. Thus, 
any participants who made their first eye movement after hearing these instructions 
were expected to move their eyes in the target direction. There were more first eye 
movements in the correct direction in the congruent gaze condition relative to the no 
gaze condition. Pairwise comparisons showed this difference to be significant in both 
the featural and spatial reference trials, showing evidence that that congruent gaze 
cues were initially followed by participants regardless of the type of verbal reference 
used.  
The results in the incongruent condition did not differ significantly from those in the 
no gaze condition. This therefore suggests that the participants did not initially follow 
anticipated incongruent gaze cues, as the mean proportion of initial eye movements in 
the correct direction was the same, regardless of whether an incongruent gaze cue or 
no gaze cue was given. To allow for the possibility that the data in the incongruent 
condition were skewed by those trials in which the participants did not see the gaze 
cue, this analysis was repeated using only the trials in which the instructor was fixated 
at the onset of the gaze cue. On reanalysis, the results did not differ significantly 
between the no gaze and incongruent conditions. For the incongruent condition only, 
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the next stage of analysis focussed on whether looking at the instructor at the onset of 
the gaze cue affected the mean proportion of trials with initial eye movements in the 
correct direction. Participants behaved the same way, regardless of whether or not 
they looked at the instructor as he provided the gaze cue. This is a clear indicator of 
selective gaze following behaviour. The incongruent gaze cues had no influence on 
the direction of the first eye movement after the gaze cue was given, showing that 
these incongruent (and uninformative) gaze cues were ignored. These results support 
previous findings showing that unhelpful gaze cues are ignored more (Itier, et al., 
2007) and followed less (Macdonald & Tatler, 2013) than those that are helpful. 
The time difference between the onset of the sentence and the first fixation on the 
target object provides an indicator of task performance. In the no gaze condition, 
participants were slower to fixate the target object when featural determiners were 
used relative to spatial determiners. This can be explained by the relative ease of the 
task with spatial references. When the word “left” or “right” was used, half of the 
objects ceased to be competitors and the search array was halved. No such effect 
occurred when featural references (“blue”, “red”, etc.) were used. Participants were 
quicker overall in the congruent gaze condition, where there was no significant 
difference between performance in the featural and spatial determiner conditions. 
Pairwise comparisons showed there to be a significant difference between the no gaze 
and congruent gaze conditions when featural references were used, but not when 
spatial references were used. This may suggest that gaze cues were utilised more 
often when they were more informative (when congruent gaze cues accompanied 
featural references in spoken instructions). However, failure to find a significant 
difference between the spatial reference trials for the congruent and no gaze 
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conditions may be due to the ease with which the task was completed in the spatial 
reference trials across both gaze conditions.  
While the immediate gaze following and time difference measures show similar 
patterns of behaviour in the congruent gaze condition relative to the no gaze 
condition, the relationship differs between the no gaze and incongruent conditions. 
There was no difference in initial gaze following between these two conditions, 
however, there was an approaching significant difference between the first fixation 
time in the no gaze condition between the featural and spatial reference conditions, 
with the featural trials taking longer. This difference was not found in the incongruent 
gaze condition. As with the immediate gaze following measure, this dependent 
variable was reanalysed using only the trials in which the instructor was fixated at the 
onset of the gaze cue. The difference between reference conditions was found to be 
significant in the no gaze condition for this reanalysis. However, as with the initial 
analysis, there was no significant difference between reference conditions in the 
incongruent gaze conditions. This pattern of difference between the no gaze and 
incongruent gaze conditions is surprising, given the evidence from the immediate 
gaze following measure that incongruent gaze cues were ignored. However, these data 
show that the spatial language advantage seen in the no gaze condition was absent in 
the incongruent gaze condition. It is unclear why this should be if the cues were 
actively ignored in the incongruent condition, however, to speculate, this effect may 
be due to the two pieces of contradictory spatial information provided to the 
participants when incongruent gaze cues accompanied spatial language: in this 
condition, the verbal spatial reference (“left” or “right”) was accompanied by a gaze 
cue to the opposite direction. This contradictory gaze cue may have been distracting 
for the participant and inhibited the beneficial effect of spatial language over featural 
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language, despite participants understanding that the cue was not useful. If this is the 
reason that the spatial language advantage found in the no gaze condition disappeared 
in the incongruent gaze condition, then this result may indicate that gaze cues have a 
non-volitional effect on attention in a real-world interaction, even when gaze cues are 
used selectively. These findings support the conclusions of lab-based studies that 
found evidence of automatic and selective gaze seeking (Laidlaw et al, 2012) and 
gaze following (Ricciardelli et al, 2013) mechanisms. The present study, however, 
might indicate that these findings can be extended to a real-world environment, in 
which real gaze cues were used in a real social interaction.  
The present study investigated the interaction between gaze cue utilisation and the 
type of verbal reference used in spoken instructions. The results show that participants 
selectively sought out gaze cues based on the expected informativeness of these cues, 
but also that the extent to which these helpful cues were sought out may have been 
influenced by the social skills of the participant. Evidence for selective gaze following 
was also found. However, although participants were able to inhibit gaze following 
when gaze cues were unreliable, there was evidence that the speed of visual search 
was nevertheless disrupted when inherently spatial gaze cues were accompanied by 
contradictory spatial verbal references. Previous lab-based studies have suggested 
both volitional and non-volitional gaze utilisation and the present results now provide 
evidence for this in a real-world social interaction. 
The results showing that gaze cues are utilised based on their perceived 
informativeness or reliability were found using stimuli with coarse distinctions; gaze 
cues were either always right, always wrong or not present. Given the difficulties 
present in real world experiments (lack of experimental control, small sample sizes 
and time-consuming analysis), the use of coarse distinctions between gaze cueing 
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conditions was necessary to allow for meaningful conclusions. Now that this study 
has established that cues are selectively used in a real-world search task, based on 
their relative reliability, the effects of varying gaze cue and language reliabilities can 
be explored in a more controlled lab-based experiment, using more subtle distinctions 
in reliability. This will allow for a more detailed understanding of the relationship 
between language and gaze cue reliabilities. 
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Chapter 4:  
Varying the reliability of gaze and 
language (i) – Study 3  
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Introduction 
 
The results from Study 2 show that altering the relative reliability of a gaze cue by 
changing the type of verbal reference that accompanies it can affect the extent to 
which the cue is sought out and followed. There is previous evidence that the effects 
of gaze cues on attention and eye movements can be modulated by the perceived 
reliability of the cue (Hill et al., 2010). The present study aims to bring together the 
findings from Study 2 and the methodologies of lab-based studies that have 
investigated the effects of manipulating cue reliability. A novel paradigm was devised 
in which both gaze cues and language cues were systematically varied, in order to 
gain a more detailed understanding of how changing gaze cue and language cue 
reliabilities affects attention and behaviour. 
A reflexive attentional shift (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998) cannot fully account for the 
way we respond to gaze cue stimuli, as these responses have been shown to vary with 
perceived cue-reliability. When gaze cue validity is reduced to 20%, the reflexive 
effect is still present, but only at short SOAs (~100ms) (Kuhn & Kingstone, 2009), 
suggesting that at later SOAs, a top-down cognitive mechanism overrides the 
reflexive response. Hill et al. (2010) directly compared responses to different gaze cue 
reliabilities. Half of their participants took part in a version of the gaze cueing 
paradigm in which all gaze cues were either valid or invalid. The remaining 
participants took part in a task in which 50% of gaze cues were valid and the rest 
invalid. The invalid trials had a detrimental effect on response time for participants in 
the former task at SOAs up to 150ms only, however in the latter paradigm the 
detrimental effect was apparent up to 750ms. The authors argued that this was 
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evidence for two streams of attentional control when viewing a gaze cue. Initially 
there is an automatic orienting effect (present in both tasks) and then a slower, top-
down, selective effect (present when cues were 100% invalid). Whether both, one or 
neither of these attentional effects is unique to social cues is unclear, however it is 
clear that the perceived reliability of a gaze cue modulates our response. 
There is evidence from previous chapters in this thesis, as well as previous literature, 
that language accompanying gaze cues can affect how these cues are used, even when 
cues are completely reliable. Knoeferle and Kreysa (2012) found that when 
unambiguous sentences were harder to process (sentences with an uncommon, but 
grammatically legal structure), participants were less likely to use helpful gaze cues. 
Knoeferle and Kreysa argued that the extra cognitive resources required for sentence 
comprehension leave fewer resources free to utilise non-verbal cues, suggesting a 
hierarchical use of language and gaze, in which linguistic processing takes precedence 
over gaze following.  
In Study 2 of this thesis, participants were found to look longer at an instructor using 
helpful gaze cues when the verbal instructions did not provide overlapping spatial 
information, suggesting that gaze cues are used more when they offer information not 
provided by language. These language studies suggest that gaze cues are subordinate 
to spoken language, however, the paradigms described above used gaze in a 
supportive capacity. The present study employs a task in which the usefulness of gaze 
cues and language cues are independent of each other, with neither cue subordinate to 
the other. Each cue directed the participant to one of two potential targets, making 
language and gaze equivalent cues, except in terms of reliability, which was 
modulated between sessions. 
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A highly simplified lab-based version of Study 2 was used to investigate the 
relationship between gaze and language reliabilities. Participants each carried out 
4,320 trials (over nine sessions) of a simple target selection task. The reliabilities of 
the gaze and language cues were varied, as well as whether targets were referred to 
with featural or spatial references. The influence of these cues on eye movements and 
performance was analysed. It is arguable that the effects of language type on gaze 
following found in Study 2 may simply be a result of the extent to which the gaze 
cues were sought out. In this paradigm, as in the typical gaze cueing paradigm 
(Friesen & Kingstone, 1998), participants did not need to seek gaze cues, as the cues 
appeared on the screen in front of them at the onset of the trial and remained present 
throughout. Therefore any effect of reference type on gaze following cannot be due to 
a change in gaze seeking behaviour. 
Given the well-established gaze cueing effects using similar paradigms (Friesen & 
Kingstone, 1998; Ricciardelli et al, 2002), the hypothesis was that gaze cues would 
influence eye movements even when less reliable than language. However it was also 
hypothesised that this effect would be modulated by gaze cue reliability, as top-down 
social-attentional processes inhibit gaze following at low reliabilities (Hill et al, 
2010). Previous evidence suggests that gaze cues are ignored in favour of language 
when gaze provides no additional information (Macdonald & Tatler, 2013) or when 
available cognitive resources are focussed on language processing (Knoeferle & 
Kreysa, 2012). Therefore, language cues were predicted to be favoured over gaze cues 
and lead to task disruption when incongruent. 
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Method 
 
Participants 
Five students (female = 3) aged between 24-28 (mean = 25.2) from the University of 
Dundee took part in nine one-hour sessions over a two-week period. They each 
received £20 for their participation.  
 
Materials  
Gaze cue stimuli were composed of eight four-second videos. Multiple versions of 
each cueing video were produced to prevent participants from predicting gaze 
direction by learning to detect small visual features in the initial frames. The videos 
began with a face staring forward, then after two seconds the face turned to look left 
or right. Each of these clips was mirrored to provide 16 unique clips (eight cueing to 
the left and eight to the right). Language cues were made up of 30 two-second 
descriptor audio clips (“select the [object name]”), two two-second spatial-determiner 
audio clips (“on the [left or right]”) and twelve two-second featural-determiner audio 
clips (“that’s [colour]”). The end of the noun in the descriptor audio clip always 
occurred 1,700 ms into the clip and was followed by 300 ms of silence. Each of these 
descriptor audio clips began with silence, until the instruction sentence began. The 
duration of the initial silent section varied depending on the duration of the instruction 
sentence, which varied depending on the duration of the critical noun. The duration of 
this silence ranged from 28 ms to 802 ms, with a mean duration of 535ms. The 
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determiner audio clips began immediately with the onset of the determiner phrases 
and the remainder of the two-second clips were filled with silence. As with the initial 
descriptor clip, the exact duration of these silent sections varied depending on the 
duration of the particular descriptor phrase. The onset of the determiner word within 
the determiner phrase occurred on average 172 ms into these clips. On either side of 
the gaze stimulus there was a target picture. These pictures were 200 × 200 pixels in 
size and featured objects that differed only in colour (see Appendix 7 for full list of 
images). There were 30 pairs of pictures, each of which was used once in each 30-trial 
block. Stimuli were presented on a 19-inch computer monitor (with a resolution of 
1024 × 768), approximately 64 cm away from the participant, whose head was 
stabilised on chin and forehead rests. At this distance the screen was 31.8° × 23.8° of 
visual angle. A control pad with a left and a right trigger was used for participant 
responses.  
 
Eye movement recording 
This experiment was carried out using an SR Research EyeLink 1000 desk-mounted 
eye-tracker and the SR Research Experiment Builder software. This system uses 
corneal reflection and pupil position to calculate where a participant is fixating. 
Calibration involved the participant fixating on nine markers on the screen. Once 
calibrated, a verification procedure took place. If the verification procedure found 
mean spatial accuracy error to be more than .5°, or if any one of the spatial accuracy 
errors was greater than 1°, calibration and verification procedures were repeated. 
Verification (and if necessary, re-calibration) was carried out after every block of 30 
trials. The mean calibration error was .369° (SD = .112°) of visual angle. Before each 
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trial, participants fixated a marker in the middle of the screen. The lead experimenter 
could see the estimated fixation point on their display and was required to accept this 
fixation in order for the trial to begin. The average error for the single-point 
calibration check before each trial was .502° (SD = .260°) of visual angle. 
 
Design 
The present experiment used a within-subjects design. Between sessions there were 
two independent variables: The probability that the gaze cue was correct (50%, 80%, 
100%) and the probability that the language cue was correct (50%, 80%, 100%). Each 
of the nine sessions used a unique combination of these probabilities. Within each 
session, there were 16 blocks of trials and in each of these the proportion of correct 
cues matched the proportion for the whole session. Within each block whether each 
cue was correct varied (except when the cue was 100%). Half of the language cues in 
each block used spatial references (left or right) and the other half used featural 
references (colour). 
 
Procedure 
Each participant was initially informed that they would be required to take part in 
nine sessions over a two-week period. The lead experimenter explained to the 
participant that in each session they would have to do the same thing; complete 480 
trials of a simple decision task. Participants were informed that in each trial they 
would be shown pictures of two objects on a screen, one on the left and one on the 
right, and that they would have to choose between these by looking at their chosen 
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target and then pressing the left or right trigger on the control pad. They were told that 
there would be verbal and non-verbal cues to help guide them, but that these might 
not always be reliable. Participants were then informed that they would receive 
immediate visual feedback after each response and that they should try their best to 
get as many correct as possible. The eye-tracker was then set-up, calibration carried 
out, and then the first trial began. The trial started with one of the 16 four-second 
videos playing in the centre of the screen. Throughout the trial the target items were 
displayed at either side of the video. Alongside the video, one of the two-second 
descriptor audio clips played. When the audio clip finished (simultaneously with the 
onset of the gaze cue), the audio determiner clip began playing (Figure 4.1). After this 
point, participants were able to select a target, after which they were informed  (on 
screen) whether they were “correct” (in green) or “wrong” (in red). Participants were 
free to take breaks at any time. The session was complete after 480 trials. Participants 
returned on eight more occasions to repeat this procedure. Across the sessions 
language cue reliability (50%, 80%, 100%) and gaze cue reliability (50%, 80%, 
100%) varied in all possible combinations. Each of the 16 video stimuli was used 30 
times, once with each object.  Participants were not told the reliabilities of the gaze 
and language cues. 
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Figure 4.1. Outline of a trial. After the central fixation point was fixated, a video 
began showing a face looking at the participant, with pictures on either side that 
differed in colour. While this video played the first part of the sentence was heard. 
After two seconds the head began to turn towards one of the targets while the second 
part of the sentence was heard. After making a decision the participant received 
immediate feedback 
 
Analysis  
Five main dependent variables were used for the analysis of the results: two 
performance measures (accuracy and response time) and three eye movement 
measures (first saccade direction, first saccade latency and time to first fixate the 
target).  The initial analysis focused on how these variables were affected by the 
“Select'the'coat'
hanger…'
“…on'the'le/”'
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overall reliability of both language and gaze cues as well as the type of reference 
used. For analysis, 3 (gaze reliability) × 3 (language reliability) × 2 (reference type) 
ANOVAs were performed for each of the dependent variables. 
The interaction between cue congruity and reliability was also investigated. To do this 
the session in which both cues were 50% reliable and the session in which both cues 
were 80% reliable were analysed. These sessions were used because they were the 
only sessions with incongruent trials in which both cues were equally reliable. 
Secondly, sessions in which one cue was 100% reliable and the other cue less reliable 
were analysed to see if there was a detrimental effect of incongruent gaze and 
language cues and to investigate whether this was mediated by cue reliability. For 
many of these analyses uneven sample sizes were compared, so traditional ANOVA 
models were avoided. Instead, the lme4 package in the R statistical programming 
environment was used to run linear mixed effects (LMM) models. The approach to 
LMMs in this chapter was identical to my approach in Chapter 3. As with earlier 
chapters, pairwise comparisons were analysed with Tukey-tests using the glht() 
function in the multcomp library (Hothorn, Bretz & Westfall, 2008). Some additional 
simple comparisons were carried out using independent samples t-tests. 
 
Results 
 
Effect of changing cue reliability 
Each of the nine sessions used a different combination of language and gaze cue 
reliabilities. Figure 4.2 shows the results for accuracy in each session. A clear 
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interaction can be seen between language and gaze cue reliability. A 3×3×2 ANOVA 
confirmed main effects of language reliability, F(2,72) = 219.68, p < .001, and gaze 
reliability, F(2,72) = 214.76, p < .001, as well as a significant interaction, F(4,72) = 
72.40, p < .001, but no three-way interaction with reference type, F(4,72) = .274, p = 
.893.  There was also no main effect of reference type, F(4,72) = .095, p = .759, nor 
any interactions with either gaze reliability, F(4,72) = .468, p = .628, or language 
reliability, F(4,72) = .158, p = .854. Accuracy approached ceiling whenever at least 
one cue was 100%, approached .8 when the most reliable cue was 80% accurate and 
approached .5 when both cues were 50% accurate. One participant who behaved 
atypically can account for the large error bar in the session in which gaze cues were 
80% reliable and language cues were 50% reliable.  
 
 
Figure 4.2. The mean accuracy (proportion of correct responses) across all gaze and 
language reliabilities. Error bars show standard error of means. 
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The proportion of first saccades in the correct direction (Figure 4.3) was found to 
decrease as gaze reliability decreased, F(2,72) = 630.13, p < .001. There was no 
significant effect of language reliability, F(2,72) = .134, p =.874, however there was a 
significant interaction between gaze and language reliabilities, F(4,72) = 3.206, p = 
.018. When gaze was 80% reliable, the proportion of correct first saccades increased 
with decreasing language reliability. However, when gaze was 50% reliable, the 
proportion of correct first saccades increased with increasing language reliability. 
There was no effect of reference type, F(2,72) = .010, p = .921, nor was there any 
interactions found with gaze reliability, F(4,72) = .008, p = .992, or language 
reliability, F(4,72) = .358, p = .700, nor between all three factors, F(4,72) = .165, p 
=.955.  
 
Figure 4.3. The mean proportion of first saccades in the correct direction across all 
gaze and language reliabilities. Error bars show standard error of means. 
 
The mean first saccade latency is shown in Figure 4.4. As gaze reliability decreased, 
time to launch the first saccade increased, F(2,72) = 12.062, p < .001. There was no 
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main effects of language reliability, F(2,72) = 1.536, p = .222, or reference type, 
F(2,72) = .133, p = .716. Gaze reliability did not significantly interact with language 
reliability, F(4,72) = 1.441, p = .229, or reference type, F(4,72) = .072, p = .931, nor 
was there a three-way interaction, F(2,72) = .007, p > .999. There was also no 
interaction found between language reliability and reference type, F(2,72) = .040, p = 
.961. 
 
Figure 4.4. The mean first saccade latency across all gaze and language reliabilities. 
Error bars show standard error of means. 
 
The time to first fixate the target (FT) (Figure 4.5) increased as gaze reliability 
decreased, F(2,72) = 34.43, p < .001. In Figure 4.5, FT appears quickest for low 
reliability language conditions, except when gaze was 100% accurate. A significant 
interaction between gaze and language reliability, F(4,72) = 3.66, p = .009, as well as 
a main effect of language reliability was found, F(2,72) = 4.25, p = .018. As with the 
accuracy measure, there was no three-way interaction, F(4,72) =.019, p = .999, nor 
was there a main effect of reference type, F(2,72) = .420, p = .519. No significant 
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interaction was found between reference type and gaze reliability, F(4,72) = .025, p = 
.976, or language reliability, F(4,72) = .023, p = .978. 
 
 
Figure 4.5. The mean time to first fixate the target (FT) across all gaze and language 
reliabilities. Error bars show standard error of means. 
 
Response time similarly increased as gaze reliability decreased, F(2,72) = 13.89, p < 
.001 (Figure 4.6). There was no main effect of language reliability, F(2,72) = .073, p 
= .930, nor any interaction between gaze and language reliability, F(4,72) = 1.19, p = 
.321. There was no significant three-way interaction or main effect of reference type, 
F(4,72) = .019, p = .999. Additionally reference type did not interact with either gaze, 
F(4,72) = .027, p = .973, or language reliability, F(4,72) = .016, p = .984. 
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Figure 4.6. The mean response time (RT) across all gaze and language reliabilities. 
Error bars show standard error of means. 
 
 
Effects of cue congruity 
 
Effects of equally reliable incongruent cues. Gaze cues and language cues are both 
naturally informative cues that have been manipulated to be equally useful in certain 
sessions in this paradigm. A bias for selecting the target cued by either stimuli when 
they were equally reliable may be indicative of a natural preference for one cue over 
the other.  
Out of the three sessions in which language and gaze cues were equally reliable, two 
included trials with gaze and language cues incongruent to each other. The first of 
these was the session with 50% reliable gaze and language cues. In this session, 
neither cue was at all informative, therefore participants performed no better than 
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chance (Figure 4.2). Figure 4.7 shows the proportion of incongruent trials in which 
participants selected the picture cued by language and gaze. When cues were 
incongruent with eachother, there was no significant difference found between the 
proportion of targets selected that were cued by gaze and language, t(8) =  .098, p = 
.924. 
 
Figure 4.7. The proportion of targets selected that were cued by gaze and language in 
50% gaze and language cue reliability conditions when cues were incongruent. 
Standard error across trials is shown. 
 
A lack of a significant difference between the proportion of targets cued by gaze and 
targets cued by language that were selected may indicate that participants were not 
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naturally biased to either cue. However, all five participants reported “giving up” 
during this session. All participants completed all trials, but since neither cue was any 
more informative than chance, there was no beneficial strategy for participants to 
employ, leading to participants losing motivation to get as many trials correct as 
possible. 
Participants were much more likely to remain motivated during the session with 80% 
gaze and language reliability. This is because both cues were mostly correct, so 
participants could employ one of two equally advantageous strategies: follow gaze 
cues or follow language cues. One participant was removed from this analysis as they 
exhibited very different behaviour to the other participants. Figure 4.8 shows the 
proportion of targets cued by gaze and language that were selected, for trials in which 
language and gaze indicated different objects (incongruent trials). Language cues 
were selected in significantly more incongruent trials, t(6) =  8.627, p < 0.001. This 
indicates that when cues were equally reliable and incongruent with each other, 
participants were more likely to select the target cued by language. 
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Figure 4.8. The proportion of targets selected that were cued by gaze and language in 
the 80% gaze and language cue reliability conditions when cues were incongruent. 
Standard error across trials is shown. 
 
To investigate if the type of language had any influence on the preference for 
selecting language-cued targets over gaze-cued targets, two LMMs were carried out 
on the proportion of incongruent trials in which participants selected the language 
cue. The first of these models (Model 4.1) (using reference type as a fixed factor and 
subject and item as random factors) was fit to data from the session with 50% reliable 
language and gaze cues (Figure 4.9a). No effect of reference type was found on the 
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proportion of trials in which the participant selected the language cue, β = -.221, SE 
=.184, t = -1.200, p = .230. 
 
 
Figure 4.9. The proportion of targets selected that were cued by gaze and language in 
featural and spatial reference trials. Results are shown for incongruent trials in the 
sessions with a) 50% gaze and language reliability and b) 80% gaze and language 
reliability. 
 
The second LMM (Model 4.2) also used reference type as a fixed factor (and subject 
and item as random factors), and found that in the 80% gaze and language reliability 
session, participants were more likely to select the target cued by language over the 
target cued by gaze if a featural reference was used, rather than a spatial reference 
(Figure 4.9b). This difference was found to be approaching significance, β = -.551, SE 
=.301, t = -1.829, p = .067. 
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Effects of the less reliable cue. An analysis of the four sessions in which one cue was 
100% accurate and the other cue less accurate was used to investigated the distracting 
effect of less reliable cues. Specific focus was on whether the reliability of the less-
reliable cue affected the measures, even though the other cue was completely reliable. 
The optimal strategy in these sessions involved ignoring the less reliable cues, so any 
effect of these subordinate cues is indicative of non-volitional capture of attention. In 
these four sessions, there were 2-levels of congruity: 1) cues congruent with each 
other and correct and 2) cues incongruent with each other, with the less reliable cue 
incorrect. 
Figures 4.10a and 4.10b show the accuracy results for both congruent and incongruent 
trials in these four sessions. An LMM (Model 4.3) of accuracy (using congruity and 
gaze reliability as fixed factors and subject and item as random factors) for trials 
where language reliability was 100% (Figure 4.10a) showed that participants were 
significantly more accurate in congruent trials, β = 2.099, SE = .487, z = 4.312, p < 
.001. There was a significant interaction between congruity and gaze reliability, β = 
2.856, SE = .629, z = 4.541, p < .001, although there was no overall effect of gaze 
reliability, β = .811, SE = .669, z = 1.213, p = .225. Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that 
the difference between incongruent and congruent trials was significant when gaze-
cues were 80% reliable, p < .001, but not when gaze cues were 50% reliable, p = .294.  
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Figure 4.10. The mean accuracy (proportion) for participants in congruent and 
incongruent cue trials for a) sessions with 100% language reliability and 50% and 
80% gaze reliabilities and b) sessions with 100% gaze reliability and 50% and 80% 
language reliabilities. 
 
An LMM (Model 4.4) (using congruity and gaze reliability as fixed factors and 
subject and item as random factors) of accuracy for trials in which gaze reliability was 
100% (Figure 4.10b) showed that congruent trials have significantly higher accuracy 
scores than incongruent trials, β = 2.469, SE = .735, z = 3.361, p < .001. Language 
reliability did not have an overall effect, β = .778, SE = .658, z = 1.182, p = .237, nor 
was there a significant interaction between the two factors, β = .364, SE =1.140, z = -
.319, p = .750. 
It is possible that the interaction present in Figure 4.10a may be caused by the 
difference in the overall number of incorrect gaze cues between the two gaze 
reliability conditions. It may be that in both sessions, roughly the same number of 
mistakes was made, but that the lower number of incongruent gaze cue trials in the 
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80% gaze condition led to a lower proportion of correct responses when gaze cues 
were incongruent. To explore this possibility, the proportion of correct responses in 
the first two blocks of the 50% gaze session were compared to the proportion of 
correct responses in the first five blocks of the 80% gaze session (Figure 4.11a). 
These sections of each session contained 30 incorrect trials, thus the total number of 
incorrect trials could not skew the proportion of correct responses. An LMM (Model 
4.5) of accuracy for the initial blocks (using congruity and gaze reliability as fixed 
factors and subject and item as random factors) found an effect of congruity, β = 
2.434, SE = .937, z = 2.596, p = .009, but no effect of gaze reliability, β = -.334, SE = 
.975, z = -.342, p = .732, nor any interaction, β = 2.294, SE = 1.571, z = 1.460, p = 
.144. Despite the interaction not reaching significance, there was a priori interest in 
whether cue incongruity had different effects in the 50% and 80% gaze reliability 
conditions. Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that cue incongruity had a significant 
detrimental effect on accuracy in the 80% gaze reliability condition, p < .001, but not 
the 50% gaze reliability condition, p = .852. 
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Figure 4.11. The mean accuracy (proportion) for participants in congruent and 
incongruent cue trials for sessions with 100% language reliability and 50% and 80% 
gaze reliabilities. Results are shown for a) the first and b) the last five blocks of the 
80% gaze condition and two blocks of the 50% gaze condition. 
 
To investigate the possibility that the detrimental effect of incongruent gaze cues in 
the 80% reliability condition may have been short-lived, the proportion of correct 
responses in the final two blocks of the 50% gaze session was compared to the 
proportion of correct responses in the final five blocks of the 80% gaze session 
(Figure 4.11b). An LMM (Model 4.6) of accuracy for the initial blocks (using 
congruity and gaze reliability as fixed factors and subject and item as random factors) 
found an effect of congruity, β = 2.398, SE = .685, z = 3.502, p < .001, but no effect 
of gaze reliability, β = .539, SE = .779, z = .693, p = .688, nor any interaction, β = 
2.675, SE = 1.744, z = 1.534, p = .125. As with the analysis of the initial blocks, post-
hoc Tukey tests showed that cue incongruity had a significantly detrimental effect on 
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accuracy in the 80% gaze reliability condition, p < .001, but not the 50% gaze 
reliability condition, p = .989. 
The proportion of first saccades after the onset of the cues (exactly 2 seconds into the 
video) that were in the direction of the target is shown in Figures 12a and 12b. For the 
two sessions with 100% reliable language cues and less reliable gaze cues, an LMM 
(Model 4.7) (using congruity and gaze reliability as fixed factors and subject and item 
as random factors) showed no significant effect of gaze reliability, β = -.043, SE = 
.089, z = -.488, p = .626, but a significant effect of congruity, β = 3.921, SE = 1.194, z 
= 3.285, p = 001, and a significant interaction, β = .665, SE = .183, z = 3.633, p < 001 
(Figure 4.12a). Pairwise comparisons showed that there was no significant difference 
between the proportion of initial saccades in the correct direction between the 80% 
and 50% gaze cue reliability sessions when gaze cues were congruent (p = .360), but 
there was a significantly higher proportion of correct first saccades in the 50% gaze 
reliability condition when gaze cues were incongruent (p = .015). 
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Figure 4.12. The proportion of first saccades launched in the correct direction after 
the onset of the cues for participants in congruent and incongruent cue trials for a) 
sessions with 100% language reliability and 50% and 80% gaze reliabilities and b) 
sessions with 100% gaze reliability and 50% and 80% language reliabilities 
 
An LMM (model 4.8) of proportion of correct first saccades for trials in which gaze 
reliability was 100% (Figure 12b) showed no overall difference between the 
proportion of initial saccades launched in the correct direction in congruent and 
incongruent trials, β = -.075, SE = .192, z= -.392, p = .695. Likewise, there was no 
significant difference between sessions in which language reliability was 80% 
compared to 50%, β = .576, SE = .342, z = 1.683, p = .092, nor was there any 
interaction between these two factors, β = -.150, SE = .362, z = -.415, p = .678.  
LMMs of first saccade latency were carried out for these four sessions (Figures 4.13a 
and 13b). An LMM (Model 4.9) of saccade latency (using congruity and gaze 
reliability as fixed factors and subject and item as random factors) for trials in which 
language reliability was 100% (Figure 4.13a) showed no overall difference between 
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the mean saccade latency in congruent and incongruent trials, β = .660, SE = 7.693, t= 
.086, p = .923, nor was there a significant difference between sessions in which gaze 
reliability was 80% compared to 50%, β = -15.627, SE = 24.757, t = -.631, p = .493. 
No interaction was found between these two factors, β = -23.256, SE = 21.812, t = -
1.066, p = .285.  
 
 
Figure 4.13. The mean first saccade latency (ms) for participants in congruent and 
incongruent cue trials for a) sessions with 100% language reliability and 50% and 
80% gaze reliabilities and b) sessions with 100% gaze reliability and 50% and 80% 
language 
 
An LMM (Model 4.10) of first saccade latency for trials in which gaze reliability was 
100% (Figure 4.13b) showed no overall difference between the mean saccade latency 
in congruent and incongruent trials, β = 5.343, SE = 4.913, t = -1.088, p = .287. 
However, mean saccade latency was significantly longer when language reliability 
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was 50% compared to 80%, β = -31.976, SE = 11.020, t = -2.902, p = .017. There was 
no significant interaction between these two factors, β =  -12.363, SE = 10.473, t = .-
1.181, p = .250.  
Figures 4.14a and 4.14b show the time to first fixate the target (FT) for congruent and 
incongruent trials in the four sessions. An LMM (Model 4.11) of FT (using congruity 
and gaze reliability as fixed factors and subject and item as random factors) for trials 
where language reliability was 100% (Figure 4.14a) showed participants were 
significantly quicker to first fixate the target in congruent trials, β = -277.04, SE = 
39.60, t = -6.996, p < 001. There was an approaching significant interaction between 
congruity and gaze reliability, β = 230.48, SE = 112.70, t = -2.045, p = .059, although 
there was no overall effect of gaze reliability, β = 85.00, SE = 67.86, t = -1.253, p = 
.198. Post-hoc Tukey tests showed significant differences in the time to first fixate the 
target between the gaze cue reliability conditions for both congruent and incongruent 
cues. However, the time to first fixate the target was shorter in the 80% reliable 
condition, relative to the 50% reliable condition, for congruent cues, p < .001, but 
longer for incongruent cues, p < .001. 
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Figure 4.14. The mean time to fixate target (ms) for participants in congruent and 
incongruent cue trials for a) sessions with 100% language reliability and 50% and 
80% gaze reliabilities and b) sessions with 100% gaze reliability and 50% and 80% 
language reliabilities 
 
An LMM (Model 4.12) of FT for trials in which gaze reliability was 100% (Figure 
4.14b) showed no overall difference between the time to first fixate the target in 
congruent and incongruent trials, β = 4.176, SE = 7.031, t = .594, p = .553. However, 
the time to first fixate the target was significantly quicker when language reliability 
was 80% compared to 50%, β = -123.067, SE = 56.241, t = -2.188, p = .047. There 
was no interaction between these two factors, β = .607, SE = 12.532, t = .048, p = 
.965.  
Finally, LMMs of response time (RT) were performed for trials in which language 
cues were 100% reliable (Figure 4.15a). Congruent trials were found to have 
significantly quicker response times (Model 4.13), β = 115.660, SE = 21.440, t = -
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5.395, p = .001, and an approaching significant interaction was found between 
congruity and gaze reliability, β = -100.350, SE = 48.980, t = -2.049, p = .057. There 
was no overall effect of gaze reliability, β = -10.860, SE = 39.790, t = -.273, p = .761. 
Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that the incongruent trials had significantly longer 
response times when gaze cue reliability was 80% compared to 50%, p < .001, and 
that congruent trials had a significantly longer response time when gaze cue reliability 
was 50% compared to 80% p <.001. 
 
 
Figure 4.15. The mean response time (ms) for participants in congruent and 
incongruent cue trials for a) sessions with 100% language reliability and 50% and 
80% gaze reliabilities and b) sessions with 100% gaze reliability and 50% and 80% 
language 
 
When gaze reliability was 100% (Figure 4.15b) there was no difference between 
response times in congruent and incongruent trials (Model 4.14), β = -7.601, SE = 
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10.857, t = -.700, p = .567. Mean response was quicker when language reliability was 
80% compared to 50%, but this difference was not significant, β = -166.698, SE = 
101.074, t = -1.649, p = .108. There was no interaction between these two factors, β = 
-6.906, SE = 13.633, t = -.507, p = .713.  
 
Discussion 
 
The aim of this study was to investigate how varying the reliability of language cues 
and gaze cues affects attention and performance in a simple task. The previous real 
world experiments in this thesis necessarily used relatively coarse-grained measures 
to investigate this relationship. Using a lab-based desk-mounted eye-tracking 
paradigm, manipulations and measures were more fine-grained in the present study, 
allowing for a more detailed investigation of the relationship between gaze and 
language reliabilities. A target selection task was used in which the accuracy of both 
gaze and language cues varied across sessions. In order to gather reliable data each 
session comprised 480 trials, allowing participants to learn cue reliabilities. 
Additionally, the sessions were conducted on different days, to reduce the chance of 
strategies learned in one session affecting another. Participants generally learned 
quickly and used the most informative cue provided to inform their response. Gaze 
reliability had an effect on the time to first fixate the target (FT) and response time 
(RT), showing that these cues speed up performance when useful. Gaze and language 
cues had rather different effects on attention and performance when they were the less 
reliable cue. Language was most disruptive when least reliable, suggesting that it was 
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the favoured cue (Knoeferle & Kreysa, 2012). Gaze cues were followed more often 
when more reliable, supporting the findings of Macdonald and Tatler (2013). 
The analysis of the effects of cue reliability on accuracy shows a clear interaction 
between the language and gaze cues. Participants strategically followed the 
instructions of the most reliable cue at their disposal. The time to hit target (FT) was 
also affected by both gaze and language reliabilities, and these effects interacted, 
indicating that the relative usefulness of these cues affected eye movement behaviour. 
Mean response time was not significantly influenced by language reliability, but was 
affected by gaze reliability. This effect could be due to the incorrect gaze cues guiding 
attention to the incorrect item before participants reoriented attention to the correct 
item. This idea is supported by the first saccade direction measure, which showed that 
when gaze cues were 50% reliable, participants launched their first saccade in the 
wrong direction in around 50% or trials, whereas when gaze cues were 80% reliable, 
their first saccades were in the wrong direction in around 20% of trials, indicating that 
initially, gaze cues are persistent at low reliabilities. However, the findings from the 
first saccade latency measure, suggest that the effect of gaze reliability on response 
time may also have been partly due to the participants actively avoiding following 
these cues when they were less reliable and instead waiting until they heard the 
language cue before moving their eyes to the correct target. The first saccade latency 
measure shows that the lower gaze cue reliability, the longer participants waited to 
launch their first saccade. The mechanism for this finding is unclear. To speculate, 
this effect may be due to increased uncertainty of the gaze cues leading to an overall 
increase in hesitancy in the task. Alternatively, these means may have been skewed by 
more trials in which participants waited for language to identify the target when gaze 
cues were less reliable.  
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In all of the main measures, reference type had no significant effect, nor did it interact 
with either gaze or language reliability. In this paradigm at least, there was no 
evidence that the type of language used had any effect on whether gaze or language 
cues were followed. This finding is in stark contrast to the findings of Study 2, which 
showed that varying the type of language used in an instruction varied gaze cue 
utilisation. This may be because the effects found in Study 2 were confined to the 
gaze-orienting stage of gaze cue utilisation, and therefore when this stage was 
removed, no effect remained. Alternatively, it is possible that in this simple task, the 
spatial location of a target was very quickly ascertained from a featural determiner. In 
the featural reference condition in Study 2, a target item was positioned either to the 
left or right of the participant, amongst 29 other items of varying colour. In the 
present study, there was only one item on either side of the screen. Previous evidence 
has found that if the stimuli are large enough (in terms of the proportion of visual 
field they inhabit), colour can be detected and distinguished parafoveally (Nagy, 
Sanchez & Hughes, 1990), meaning participants may have been able to identify the 
side of the screen cued quickly using peripheral vision. If this were the case, then 
there would have been no advantage of using a gaze cue with a featural language cue 
compared to a spatial language cue, as there is effectively information overlap in 
either case.  
The analysis of congruity effects allowed for the investigation of what happens when 
gaze and language cue different targets, and how this is affected by reliability. Study 
2 provided evidence that in the real world gaze cues were ignored when incongruent 
to language, however, language cues were always correct in that task, while gaze cues 
were either supportive or distracting. In the present study, gaze and language cues 
were equivalent. Although this equivalence may not be ecologically valid, it did allow 
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for any innate preference for either cue to be identified. Starting with equally reliable 
cues, no bias was found for either language or gaze when both cues were 50% 
reliable. Separating analysis by reference type again showed no sign of a preference 
for either cue. However, the results from this session are perhaps ultimately 
uninformative because participants all self reported losing motivation. This session 
was unique in this experiment, as it was the only session in which participants could 
not employ a strategy to perform significantly better than chance. Because the 
participants reported that they disengaged with the task, we cannot infer anything 
from these results about any cue preferences when both cues were equally unreliable. 
A better way to investigate whether participants showed a natural preference for 
either cue is to investigate the session in which the cues were equally reliable and also 
more reliable than chance (80%). Here, participants followed the language cue more 
often when the cues were incongruent, suggesting that language is the dominant cue. 
This finding supports the hypothesis, as well as the results of earlier studies. 
Macdonald and Tatler (2013) showed that when language and gaze cues were both 
informative participants used language and ignored gaze, while Knoeferle and Kreysa 
(2012) found that when processing difficult sentences, participants ignored supportive 
gaze cues. Both studies suggest a preference for language cues over gaze cues, 
however it is arguable that in both paradigms the cues were not given equal 
prominence; in Macdonald and Tatler (2013) gaze cues had to be actively sought out, 
while verbal instructions were directed toward the participant and in Knoeferle and 
Kreysa (2012) language comprehension was central to the task and gaze cues were 
only supportive. In the present study, however, the paradigm gave equal prominence 
to language and gaze cues, both explicitly (by telling participants that verbal and non-
verbal cues were there to help them) and implicitly (by making the reliability of both 
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cues 80%). Language cues have therefore been shown to be preferred over gaze cues 
when both cues provide the same quality of information.  
It is worth considering whether this preference for language may be peculiar to this 
paradigm rather than generalisable to real world interactions. In one way, the 
preference for language over gaze seems intuitive, as language is our primary mode of 
communication. Anecdotally, however, it is easy to think of a situation in which 
someone says “left” when they actually mean “right”. It is harder to think of a 
situation where someone accidentally looks in the opposite direction to where they 
intended to cue another’s attention. In this case, it seems intuitive that gaze cues 
should be trusted over language when there is any incongruity between the two cues. 
It may be the case that gaze cues are indeed favoured over language in certain natural 
situations, but that the nature of the cue stimuli in this study biased participants to 
language cues. The language cues in this paradigm were intentionally embedded 
within natural instructional sentences in order to keep the cues as natural as possible 
and maximise similarity with the language cues used in Study 2. It could be argued 
that this design may have had the side effect of leading to a preference for language 
cues, as the sentences explicitly directed participants to a target, whereas the gaze 
cues required participants to make an inference about where the cueing person was 
attending. However, the informativeness of gaze cues could be learned very quickly 
in this paradigm and so these cues essentially became explicit in their meaning. For 
this reason, it is unlikely that the preference for language when both cues were equal 
was just due to the explicit nature of the instructional sentences.  
Despite reference type having no significant effect on the main dependent variables in 
the analysis of all sessions, there was an approaching significant effect of reference 
type on cue preference when cues were equally reliable. In the session with 80% gaze 
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and language reliabilities, when there was an incongruity between gaze and language, 
participants were more likely to choose language over gaze for both spatial and 
featural instructions. However, the proportion of trials in which the language cue was 
followed was higher for trials with featural instructions compared to spatial 
instructions. This shows that the preference for language cues was decreased when 
these cues were spatial in nature. It is not entirely clear why there is this difference. 
To speculate, the direct incongruity of spatial information provided by language and 
gaze may have slightly decreased the tendency for participants to follow language 
when cues were incongruent. It may be that a spatial gaze cue interferes more strongly 
with a conflicting spatial language cue than a conflicting featural language cue 
because the spatial language provides the same form of information as the gaze cue. 
Following the featural cue may have merely required selecting a colour stimulus upon 
hearing the name of a colour, which may have been less susceptible to distraction 
from a conflicting visual-spatial cue.  
When the language cues were 100% reliable and gaze cues less reliable, there was an 
interaction between congruity and gaze cue reliability. Although performance was 
very good in all conditions in these sessions, incongruent gaze cues were more 
detrimental to accuracy when gaze was 80% reliable compared to when it was 50% 
reliable. To discount the possibility that this effect was driven by the lower number of 
incongruent trials in the 80% gaze reliability session pulling down the overall 
proportion, this analysis was repeated on the first and final five blocks of the 80% 
gaze reliability session and the first and final two blocks of the 50% gaze reliability 
session. The same pattern of results was shown in these comparisons, discounting the 
possibility that the interaction was caused by the difference in overall number of 
incongruent trials between gaze reliability conditions. These results suggest the 
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participants were more likely to follow the gaze cue stimuli when they were more 
reliable, even though the optimal strategy was to ignore gaze cues and follow 
language cues. The results from the accuracy analysis were supported by the finding 
that gaze stimuli had a larger facilitative effect (when congruent) and detrimental 
effect (when incongruent) on the time to first fixate the target and response time when 
they were 80% reliable compared to 50% reliable. Additionally, although there was 
no difference in the beneficial effect of congruent gaze cues between gaze cue 
reliability conditions in the correct initial saccade measure, there was an increased 
detrimental effect of incongruent cues when gaze cue reliability was 80% compared 
to 50%. Combined, these findings suggest that 1) gaze cues are not completely 
ignored, even when language is 100% accurate and 2) the extent to which gaze cues 
are ignored is inversely related to their perceived reliability. This shows, like the 
accuracy analysis, that the gaze cues had more influence when they were more 
reliable; reliable cues slowed down performance when incongruent with language and 
sped up performance when congruent with language.  
Overall, the distracting gaze cue results are in line with the hypothesis that the gaze 
cueing effect would be persistent, but influenced by reliability. When language was 
100% accurate, gaze need not (and should not) have been used, however the gaze 
cues still slowed down and disrupted performance. These results are typical of a gaze 
cueing paradigm study (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998). However, gaze cues have also 
been found to have less influence when they are less reliable, supporting previous 
findings that the attentional effects of gaze cues are affected by reliability (Hill et al, 
2010). Using a real world interaction, in Chapter 3 evidence was reported showing 
that gaze cues were sought out less when accompanied by language that provided 
overlapping semantic (spatial) information. This is because in cases where language 
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did not provide overlapping semantic information (featural condition), the gaze cues 
were more exclusively informative. However, in the present study we have seen that 
when gaze cues were centrally presented on a screen (i.e. gaze seeking is out of the 
participant’s control), gaze following was not inhibited completely by more 
informative language, but instead gaze following was modulated by the reliability of 
the cues. This is likely due to the centrally presented gaze cue stimuli in the present 
study; the selective gaze utilisation behaviour found in Study 2 may have been 
manifest in the gaze seeking stage of gaze utilisation, a stage that is not present in this 
lab-based paradigm.  
The same effects were not found when language reliability varied alongside 100% 
reliable gaze cues. The time to first fixate the target was significantly slower when 
language reliability was 50% compared to 80%. Furthermore, participants were 
significantly slower to launch their first saccade in the 50% language reliability 
sessions compared to the 80% reliability sessions. One possibility for these findings is 
that they are due to the high rate of incorrect language cues interfering with 
participants’ performance in the task. If this was the case, then this finding that 
unreliable language caused an overall detriment to performance, whereas unreliable 
gaze did not, suggests that gaze cues may be easier to ignore than language cues, or at 
least that the distracting effect of unhelpful language cues lasted longer. This may be 
indicative of the relative importance of language compared to gaze in natural 
communication. These findings, combined with the preference shown for language 
cues when presented alongside equally reliable gaze cues, supports the hypothesis that 
language is the dominant cue. However, as with the language preference found in the 
80% gaze and language reliability condition, it is possible that this finding is peculiar 
	   144	  
to this paradigm, as the language cues are more explicitly instructional than the gaze 
cues. 
There was no overall effect of language congruity for the time to first fixate the target 
or response time, suggesting that participants followed the more reliable gaze cues 
and were uninfluenced by instances of incongruent language. It is surprising to find 
that the congruity of a less reliable gaze cue effects performance, but that the same 
effects are not found with language cues, particularly given the evidence shown that 
language is the preferred cue. The lack of a congruity effect is likely due to the gaze 
cues being responded to faster than language cues and so when the former were 
entirely reliable, the latter had less time to disrupt processing (response times were 
faster for 100% gaze reliability conditions than 100% language reliability conditions). 
The main contributing factor to the increased time to respond to language was the 
time of cue disambiguation. Language cues did not disambiguate the target until the 
final word was heard, whereas it is arguable that the gaze cue was unambiguous as 
soon as the head began to turn. This explanation is supported by the accuracy results 
for these sessions, which show a clear congruity effect, despite the lack of an effect on 
the time measures. The response time measure necessarily only includes correct trials 
and time to first fixate the target measure only includes trials in which the target was 
looked at. The congruity effect for accuracy is likely due to the incongruent trials in 
which participants made a selection after hearing and processing the language cue. 
These slow trials were more likely not to be included in the time to first fixate the 
target and response analysis as they either didn’t include a fixation on the target or 
were incorrect.  
This experiment investigated the effect of varying gaze and language cue reliability 
on attention. Participants strategically made use of the most reliable cue to complete 
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the task and favoured language when reliabilities were equal. The results show that 
changing the reliability of language affects attention differently than changing the 
reliability of gaze. Language appears to be the favoured cue and causes overall 
disruption when unreliable, whereas gaze is disruptive when incongruent to more 
informative language, but more so when gaze is more reliable than chance. 
Although the relative timings of the gaze and language cues matched those used in 
Study 2, as well as matching the way the cues have been shown to correspond in 
natural language production (Hanna & Brennan, 2007), these timings were 
problematic for two reasons. Firstly, embedding the language cues within natural and 
explicit instructional sentences may have led to an artificial preference for these cues 
over the gaze cues. Secondly, the naturalistic approach that was used moved the onset 
of the disambiguating language cue to after the onset of the gaze cue, so the 
seemingly distinct effects of distracting language and gaze cues may be the result of 
the onset times of these cues, rather than the inherent properties of these particular 
cues. The next study in this thesis sacrifices the naturalistic sentences in order to make 
the gaze and language cues as equivalent as possible. Additionally, the timings of the 
onset of both of the cues are synchronised in order to reduce the possibility of one cue 
being processed before the other.  
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Chapter 5:  
Varying the reliability of gaze and 
language (ii) – Studies 4 and 5 
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Introduction 
 
Study 2 provided evidence showing that the type of verbal reference used in an 
instruction can affect the extent to which listeners use supportive gaze cues; verbal 
references that increased the relative informativeness of the gaze cues resulted in 
increased gaze utilisation. Study 3 investigated the relationship between the 
informativeness of gaze and language in a more controlled environment and found 
that altering the reliability of a gaze cue affected how distracted participants were 
from a concurrent language cue. The same pattern was not found when altering the 
reliability of language cues alongside a concurrent gaze cue. These results suggest 
that altering the reliability of a gaze cue has a distinct effect from altering the 
reliability of a language cue. However, it is possible that some of these differences 
have arisen from the nature of the paradigm used. Firstly, the language cues used in 
Study 3 were embedded within natural and explicit instructional sentences, which 
may have led to participants favouring them over the gaze cue stimuli. Secondly, the 
onset of the crucial word in the language cues used in Study 3 always occurred after 
the onset of the gaze cue, so it may be the case that the language cues simply did not 
have enough time to affect performance. 
The studies outlined in the present chapter aim to further investigate the effects of 
altering concurrent gaze and language cues, as well as assessing these stimuli by 
comparing them in isolation, by simplifying the language cueing stimuli of Study 3. 
In Study 4, the language cues were simplified to cueing words, rather than explicit 
instructional statements in order to increase the equivalence of the gaze and language 
stimuli. This simplification of the language stimuli also allowed for the onset time of 
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the gaze cue and the onset time of the cueing word to be identical in Study 4, thus 
reducing the chance that any effects were driven by the timings of the cues. 
With the removal of the natural instructional context of the language cues and the 
synchronisation of the cue onset times, the equivalence of the gaze and language cues 
can be tested. If participants treated these cues equivalently, then subordinate gaze 
cue effects should match those found in Study 3, but congruity effects should also be 
found with subordinate language cues as, in contrast to Study 3, the onset time of the 
language cues was identical to the gaze cues. Any differences found between the 
effects of subordinate gaze cues and subordinate language cues may indicate a 
preference for one of the cues over the other. 
 
Study 4 
 
Method 
 
Participants. Ten students from the University of Dundee took part in four one-hour 
sessions over a five-day period. They each received £10 for their participation.  
 
Materials and eye movement recording. Language cues were made up of a two-
second initial audio clip (“Select”), one of two two-second spatial-determiner audio 
clips (“Left” or “Right”) or one of twelve two-second featural-determiner audio clips 
(“[Name of colour]”). The end of “Select” in the initial audio clip occurred 1,700 ms 
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into the clip and was followed by 300 ms of silence. Each of these initial audio clips 
began with 1,170 ms of silence, until the onset of the word “Select”. The determiner 
audio clips began immediately with the onset of the object name and the remainder of 
the two-second clips was filled with silence. The exact duration of these silent 
sections varied depending on the duration of the particular descriptor word. Picture 
stimuli, gaze cue stimuli and all other materials and eye-tracking equipment were 
identical to those used in Study 3. The mean calibration error was .416° (SD = .128°) 
of visual angle. As with Study 3, at the beginning of each trial participants fixated a 
marker in the middle of the screen. The average error for the experiment was .530° 
(SD = .295°) of visual angle. 
 
Design. The present experiment used a within-subjects design. Between sessions 
there were two independent variables: The probability that the gaze cue was correct 
(50%, 80%, 100%) and the probability that the language cue was correct (50%, 80%, 
100%). In each of the four sessions, one of the cues was always 100% reliable and the 
other was either 80% or 50% reliable. As with Study 3, these four sessions were used 
to investigate whether there was a detrimental effect of incongruent gaze and 
language cues and identify whether these effects were mediated by subordinate cue 
reliability. Within each session, there were 16 blocks of trials and in each of these the 
proportion of correct cues matched the proportion for the whole session. Within each 
block whether or not each cue was correct was varied (except when the cue was 100% 
reliable). Half of the language cues in each block used spatial references (left or right) 
and the other half used featural references (colour). 
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Procedure. The procedure for this experiment (Figure 5.1) differed from that of 
Study 3 in only two ways. Firstly, each participant carried out only four sessions 
instead of nine. These were the four sessions in which one cue was 100% reliable and 
the other cue less reliable.  Secondly, instead of embedding the language cues in full 
sentences, simple one word audio files were used (See Materials and eye movement 
recording section). The initial audio file ended at the two-second point in the video, 
which is when the determiner audio file began playing. 
 
Figure 5.1. Outline of a trial. After the central fixation point was fixated, a video 
began showing a face looking at the participant, with pictures of objects on either side 
that differed only in colour. While this video played, the word “select” could be 
heard. After two seconds the head began to turn towards one of the targets while the 
determiner word was heard. After making a decision the participant received 
immediate feedback 
“Select…'
“…le/”'
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Analysis. The same five main dependent variables used in Study 3 were used here: 
two performance measures (accuracy and response time) and three eye movement 
measures (first saccade direction, first saccade latency and time to first fixate the 
target). In the present study, rather than all nine possible sessions, participants only 
took part in sessions in which one cue was 100% reliable and the other cue less 
reliable. These sessions were analysed as outlined in the Analysis section of the Study 
3 Method.  
 
Results and Discussion 
How participants behaved when faced with two opposing cues was central to the 
analyses in this study. Specifically, the focus was on whether the reliability of a less-
reliable cue affected participant responses, even though the other cue was completely 
reliable. In the four sessions used in this study, as with Study 3, there were two levels 
of congruity: 1) cues congruent with each other and correct and 2) cues incongruent 
with each other, with the less reliable cue incorrect. In Study 3, the effects of less 
reliable gaze cues on accuracy, first saccade direction and latency, time to first fixate 
the target and response time were different from the effects of less reliable language 
cues. It is possible that these differences found in Study 3 were the result of the 
difference in onset times of the cue stimuli. Alternatively, these differences may have 
arisen as a result of the language cues being more explicitly informative, as they 
instructed participants how to respond using natural spoken sentences. In this study, 
the language cues were simplified and gaze and language onset times were identical. 
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Accuracy. Figures 5.2a and 5.2b show the accuracy results for both congruent and 
incongruent trials in all four sessions. An LMM (Model 5.1) of accuracy (using 
congruity and gaze reliability as fixed factors and subject and item as random factors) 
for trials where language reliability was 100% (Figure 5.2a) showed that participants 
were significantly more accurate in congruent trials, β = 2.352, SE = .350, z = 6.721, p 
< .001. There was no significant interaction between congruity and gaze reliability, β 
= .782, SE = .528, z = 1.480, p = .139, nor was there any overall effect of gaze 
reliability, β = -.297, SE = .428, z = -.692, p = .489, on accuracy.  
The significant congruity effect and the lack of an overall gaze reliability effect are in 
line with the findings from Study 3. However, the interaction between congruity and 
gaze reliability found in Study 3 (Chapter 4, Figure 4.10a) was not found here. This 
interaction was not significant because, in contrast to the findings of Study 3, a Tukey 
test revealed a significant difference between accuracy in congruent and incongruent 
trials in the session with 50% gaze reliability (p < .001). Although, this difference was 
not significant in Study 3, the difference was in the same direction, so it is possible 
that with five participants the experiment lacked the power to produce a significant 
result. Alternatively, it may be that the language cues in Study 3 were less susceptible 
to distraction from unreliable gaze cues as they were embedded in a naturalistic 
instruction sentence, whereas in the present study the language cues were less natural 
and more simplistic. Regardless of the reason, the performance in incongruent trials 
was still significantly worse in the 80% gaze reliability session compared to the 50% 
reliability session (p < .001). This result supports the findings from Study 3 and 
provides further evidence that subordinate gaze cues are followed more as their 
reliability increases.  
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Figure 5.2. The mean accuracy (proportion) for participants in congruent and 
incongruent cue trials for a) sessions with 100% language reliability and 50% and 
80% gaze reliabilities and b) sessions with 100% gaze reliability and 50% and 80% 
language reliabilities. 
 
An LMM (Model 5.2) (using congruity and gaze reliability as fixed factors and 
subject and item as random factors) of accuracy for trials in which gaze reliability was 
100% (Figure 5.2b) showed that participants were significantly more accurate in 
congruent trials than incongruent trials, β = 3.305, SE = .470, z = 7.032, p < .001. 
Language reliability did not have an overall effect, β = -.326, SE = .653, z = -.500, p = 
.617, nor was there a significant interaction between the two factors, β = .176, SE 
=.905 z = .194, p = .846. 
The results from the LMM above show the same significant effect of congruity that 
was found in Study 3 (Chapter 4, Figure 4.10b). This finding supports the findings in 
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Study 3 that showed that incongruent language was detrimental to accuracy when 
gaze was 100% reliable whether the reliability of language was 50% or 80%.  
 
First saccade direction. The proportion of first saccades after the onset of the cues 
that were in the direction of the target is shown in Figures 5.3a and 5.3b. For the two 
sessions with 100% reliable language cues and less reliable gaze cues, an LMM 
(Model 5.3) (using congruity and gaze reliability as fixed factors and subject and item 
as random factors) showed no significant effect of gaze reliability, β = .059, SE = 
.108, z = .550, p = .583, but a significant effect of congruity, β = 2.318, SE = .454, z = 
5.105, p = 001, and a significant interaction, β = .935, SE = .116, z = 8.067, p < 001 
(Figure 5.3a). Pairwise comparisons showed that the proportion of initial saccades in 
the correct direction for congruent trials was significantly higher when gaze cue 
reliability was 80% compared to 50% (p < .001), but there was a significantly higher 
proportion of correct first saccades in the 50% gaze reliability condition when gaze 
cues were incongruent (p < .001). 
These results are broadly supportive of the first saccade direction results of Study 3 
(Chapter 4, Figure 4.12a). One difference, however, was that in the present study, 
there was a significant difference between congruent trials between 50% and 80% 
gaze reliabilities, which was not present in Study 3. It is worth noting however, that 
there was a non-significant difference in the same direction in Study 3, and the 
difference between the 50% and 80% gaze reliability trials in the incongruent 
condition was larger than the difference in congruent trials in the present study and 
Study 3. It may be that the statistical power of the present study allowed for this 
difference to reach significance.  
	   155	  
 
 
Figure 5.3. The proportion of first saccades launched in the correct direction after the 
onset of the cues for participants in congruent and incongruent cue trials for a) 
sessions with 100% language reliability and 50% and 80% gaze reliabilities and b) 
sessions with 100% gaze reliability and 50% and 80% language reliabilities 
 
An LMM (Model 5.4) of proportion of correct first saccades for trials in which gaze 
reliability was 100% (Figure 5.3b) showed no overall difference between the 
proportion of initial saccades launched in the correct direction in congruent and 
incongruent trials, β = .017, SE = .135, z= .126, p = .899. Likewise, there was no 
significant difference between sessions in which language reliability was 80% 
compared to 50%, β = .146, SE = .349, z = .418, p = .676, nor was there any 
interaction between these two factors, β = -.230, SE = .231, z = -.996, p = .319. These 
findings were in line with the equivalent findings from Study 3 (Chapter 4, Figure 
4.12b), showing the language reliability had no effect on first saccade direction when 
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gaze was 100% accurate, even when the onset time of both of these cues was 
identical. 
 
First saccade latency. LMMs of first saccade latency were carried out for all sessions 
(Figures 5.4a and 5.4b). An LMM (Model 5.5) of saccade latency (using congruity 
and gaze reliability as fixed factors and subject and item as random factors) for trials 
in which language reliability was 100% (Figure 5.4a) showed no overall difference 
between the mean saccade latency in congruent and incongruent trials, β = -4.832, SE 
= 3.616, t= -1.336, p = .178, nor a significant difference between sessions in which 
gaze reliability was 80% compared to 50%, β = -6.842, SE = 10.277, t = -.666, p = 
.487. No interaction was found between these two factors, β = 6.815, SE = 4.855, t = -
1.404, p = .163. These results were in line with the equivalent findings of Study 3 
(Chapter 4, Figure 4.13a) that showed no effect of either gaze reliability or congruity 
on first saccade latency when language cues were 100% reliable.  
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Figure 5.4. The mean first saccade latency (ms) for participants in congruent and 
incongruent cue trials for a) sessions with 100% language reliability and 50% and 
80% gaze reliabilities and b) sessions with 100% gaze reliability and 50% and 80% 
language reliability 
 
An LMM (Model 5.6) of first saccade latency for trials in which gaze reliability was 
100% (Figure 5.4b) showed no overall difference between the mean saccade latency 
in congruent and incongruent trials, β = 1.378, SE = 2.245, t = -.614, p = .539, nor 
was there an effect of language reliability, β = 2.147, SE = 8.676, t = .247, p = .794. 
There was also no significant interaction between these two factors, β =  -7.135, SE = 
4.769, t = .-1.496, p = .133.  
The present results differ from those of Study 3 (Chapter 4, Figure 4.13b). In Study 3, 
first saccade latency time was significantly longer for the 50% language reliability 
session regardless of congruity. This supported the time to first fixate target and 
response time results in Study 3 (Chapter 4, Figures 4.14b and 4.15b respectively) 
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that showed time to first fixate the target and response times were slower when 
language was 50% reliable. In the present study, as with time to first fixate target and 
response time, there was no significant effect of gaze reliability on first saccade 
latency. This results provides further support that the overall detrimental effect found 
in Study 3 for unreliable language was not present in this study, where the language 
cues were presented outwith the context of a natural instructional sentence.  
 
Time to first fixate the target (FT). Figures 5.5a and 5.5b show the time to first 
fixate the target for congruent and incongruent trials in the four sessions. An LMM 
(Model 5.7) of FT (using congruity and gaze reliability as fixed factors and subject 
and item as random factors) for trials where language reliability was 100% (Figure 
5.5a) showed participants to be significantly quicker to fixate the target in congruent 
trials, β = -142.05, SE = 22.93, t = -6.195, p < 001, as well as a significant interaction 
between congruity and gaze reliability, β = 45.35, SE = 16.987, t = -2.670, p = .015. 
There was no overall effect of gaze reliability, β = -6.767, SE = 10.634, t = -.636, p = 
.511. Post-hoc Tukey tests showed significant differences in time to first fixate the 
target between the gaze cue reliability conditions for both congruent and incongruent 
cues. However, the time to first fixate the target was shorter in the 80% reliable 
condition, relative to the 50% reliable condition, for congruent cues, p < .001, but 
longer for incongruent cues, p < .001. 
The LMM results above are in line with those found in Study 3 (Chapter 4, Figure 
4.14a). Participants took significantly longer to fixate the target when gaze cues were 
incongruent to 100% reliable language cues, but this distracting effect was greater 
when gaze cues were 80% reliable compared to 50% reliable. Furthermore, when 
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gaze cues were congruent, participants were quicker to hit the target when gaze cues 
were 80% reliable compared to 50% reliable. These results support Study 3 and 
provide further evidence that gaze cues had more influence on performance when 
they were more reliable, even when accompanied by perfectly reliable language cues.  
 
 
Figure 5.5. The mean time to fixate target (ms) for participants in congruent and 
incongruent cue trials for a) sessions with 100% language reliability and 50% and 
80% gaze reliabilities and b) sessions with 100% gaze reliability and 50% and 80% 
language reliabilities 
 
An LMM (Model 5.8) of time to first fixate the target for trials in which gaze 
reliability was 100% (Figure 5.5b) showed no overall difference between the time to 
first fixate the target in congruent and incongruent trials, β = -.820, SE = 3.216, t = -
.255, p = .784, no effect of language reliability, β = -5.078, SE = 12.213, t = -.416, p = 
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.666, nor any interaction between these two factors, β = -1.283, SE = 6.728, t = -.191, 
p = .838.  
The above results differed from those found in Study 3 (Chapter 4, Figure 4.14b), but 
not as anticipated. It was hypothesised that if language and gaze cues were treated 
equivalently by participants, a congruity effect, similar to that shown in Figure 5.5a 
would be found, as in each trial the onset time of the language cue was identical to the 
onset time of the gaze cue.  However, no congruity effect was found. One reason for 
this may be that participants were more resistant to distracting verbal cues than 
distracting gaze cues, therefore the incorrect language cues had no effect on the time 
taken to fixate the target cued correctly by gaze. However, a more likely explanation, 
particularly given that participants were quicker to fixate the correct target in the 
100% gaze reliability sessions overall, is that the processing time of the audio 
linguistic cue in this paradigm was longer than the processing time for the visual gaze 
cue. This increased time would mean that participants might not have been distracted 
by incongruent language cues until after they had already planned a saccade to the 
gaze cued-at location. The difference found between the results in the present study 
and Study 3, was that there was no overall difference between performance in the 
50% language reliability session and the 80% language reliability session. In Chapter 
4, it was argued that hearing regular incorrect sentences in the 50% reliable language 
condition led to a slow down in overall performance. This explanation is challenged 
by the lack of a language reliability effect in the present experiment. It is possible, 
however, that the language cues in the present study had no overall effect because 
they were not embedded within a natural sentence. It may be that hearing incorrect 
instructional cues in the context of natural sentences provides a distracting effect that 
is not shared with isolated cueing words.  
	   161	  
 
Response Time (RT). An LMM (Model 5.9) of RT (using congruity and gaze 
reliability as fixed factors and subject and item as random factors) for trials in which 
language cues were 100% reliable (Figure 5.6a) showed congruent trials to have 
significantly quicker response times, β = -60.785, SE = 14.000, t = -4.342, p < .001, 
and a significant interaction was found between congruity and gaze reliability, β = -
43.329, SE = 15.390, t = -2.815, p = .008. There was no overall effect of gaze 
reliability, β = 2.294, SE = 26.722, t = .086, p = .928. Post-hoc Tukey tests showed 
that that incongruent trials had a significantly slower RT when gaze cue reliability 
was 80% compared to 50%, p < .001, and that congruent trials had a significantly 
slower RT when gaze cue reliability was 50% compared to 80% p = .001. 
As with the time to first fixate the target results for these sessions, the LMM results 
for response time are in line with those found in Study 3 (Chapter 4, Figure 4.15a). 
When 80% reliable, gaze cues were found to have a larger detrimental effect when 
incongruent and a larger beneficial effect when congruent relative to when gaze was 
50% reliable.  This provides more evidence that gaze cues are used more and affect 
task performance more when they are perceived to be more reliable. 
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Figure 5.6. The mean response time (ms) for participants in congruent and 
incongruent cue trials for a) sessions with 100% language reliability and 50% and 
80% gaze reliabilities and b) sessions with 100% gaze reliability and 50% and 80% 
language 
 
When gaze reliability was 100% (Figure 5.6b) there was a significant congruity effect 
(Model 5.10), β = -20.470, SE = 9.515, t = -2.151, p = .042. There was no significant 
effect of language reliability, β = 63.169, SE = 42.807, t = 1.476, p = .141, nor any 
interaction between language reliability and congruity, β = -12.040, SE = 11.408, t = -
1.055, p = .294.  
These results were very different from the equivalent findings in Study 3 (Chapter 4, 
Figure 4.15b). The present results showed a clear congruity effect, with participants 
slower to respond when the language cues were incongruent with the correct gaze 
cues. This effect may have been present because the language and gaze cues shared an 
onset time, whereas there was a delay in onset of the crucial word in Study 3. 
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However, this congruity effect was only present in the response time results but not 
the results for time to first fixate the target. It appears that in the time taken for 
participants to respond to a 100% reliable gaze cue by planning a saccade in the cued 
direction, incongruent language cues did not cause disruption, however by the time 
participants made a decision as to which trigger to pull, incongruent language cues 
did cause disruption, suggesting that although the cues were presented at the same 
time, the gaze cues were processed earlier. This argument is supported by the overall 
shorter time to first hit the target and response time in the 100% gaze reliability 
sessions compared to the 100% language reliability sessions.  
Taking all of the findings of the present study together leads to the suggestion that the 
gaze stimuli were processed earlier than the language stimuli, despite the 
synchronisation of cue onset times. Specifically, it was found that subordinate 
incongruent language cues had no effect on the early trial measures (first saccade 
latency, first saccade direction and time to fixate target), but a clear detrimental effect 
on the late trial measure of response time, whereas subordinate incongruent gaze cues 
had a detrimental effect on all measures.  To further investigate the potential 
difference in processing time between the gaze and language cues, the five dependent 
variables used in the present study were measured for each cue in isolation in Study 5.  
In Study 2, evidence was found suggesting that incongruent gaze cues were more 
distracting to accompanying spatial language cues than featural language cues. No 
such effect was found in Study 3. It is possible that the difference in processing time 
for the language and gaze cues in Study 3 and 4 led to there being no effect; the gaze 
cues may have been used before the linguistic reference type had been determined. By 
isolating gaze and language cues in Study 5, it was possible to observe switching 
effects. Task switching effects are a common tool used in cognitive science to 
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investigate executive function (Kiesel et al., 2010). The costs of switching have been 
found to be largely influenced by the tasks that are being switched between (Kiesel et 
al., 2010; Koch, Gade, Schuch & Philipp, 2010). Switching from a spatial gaze cue to 
a spatial language cue may cause less disruption than switching to a featural language 
cue, as the reference type of the cue changes. Alternatively, switching to the same 
type of reference in a different form may cause disruption analogous to the findings in 
Study 2, with inherently spatial gaze cues causing disruption to the interpretation of 
spatial language cues.  
 
 
Study 5 
 
Method 
 
Participants. Thirteen undergraduate students from the University of Dundee took 
part in one hour-long session. They all received course credit for their participation 
 
Materials and eye movement recording. Materials and eye movement recording 
procedures were identical to those used in Study 4, except for the addition of 16 extra 
four-second videos. These videos were composed of the first two-seconds of the 
videos used in Studies 3 and 4, played normally and then in reverse, to make four-
second videos of a face staring forward. The mean calibration error was .393° (SD = 
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.109°) of visual angle. The average error of pre-trial marker fixations was .456° (SD = 
.285°) of visual angle. 
 
Design. The present experiment used a within-subjects design. Unlike Studies 3 and 4 
there was only one session, and all cues were always reliable. Within this session 
there were again 480 trials in 16 blocks. Within each block the type of cue used varied 
(gaze or language). Half of the trials featured a language cue and the other half 
featured a gaze cue. There was only one cue per trial. 
 
Procedure. In contrast to Studies 3 and 4, the present experiment involved only one 
hour-long session. In this session all of the cues were 100% reliable and the 
participants were informed that they would need to follow these cues to complete the 
task. However, each trial only contained one cue: half of the trials had a language cue 
and the other half had a gaze cue. Trials were mixed, rather than blocked by cueing 
condition. This allowed for the investigation of switching effects. In the language cue 
trials, participants were presented with the same audio stimuli used in Study 4 but 
different visual stimuli. Instead of a head turning after 2-seconds, they were shown a 
video of a face staring forward for the duration of the trial (Figure 5.7a). In the gaze 
cue trials participants saw the head-turning stimuli, but were provided with no audio 
stimuli (Figure 5.7b). 
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Figure 5.7. Examples of a) language and b) gaze condition trials. In the language 
condition, a video began showing a face looking at the participant, with pictures on 
either side that differed in colour. While this video played the word “select” could be 
heard. After two seconds the determiner word was heard, while the face continued to 
look at the participant. In the gaze condition, no words were heard, but after two 
seconds the head turned to the left or right. After making a decision the participant 
received immediate feedback 
 
Analysis. The same five main dependent variables used in Study 3 and 4 were used 
here: two performance measures (accuracy and response time) and three eye 
movement measures (first saccade direction, first saccade latency and time to first 
fixate the target). As well as comparing different cue types, different reference types 
were compared within the language cues. In Study 2, a clear effect of reference type 
was found in the gaze seeking and following measures, however no effect of 
reference type was found in Study 3 when the gaze seeking stage of gaze utilisation 
“Select…'
“…le/”'
“…'
“…”'
a)'Language'condi6on' b)'Gaze'condi6on'
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was removed. In the present study, the processing time of featural and spatial cues 
were compared, as well as the effects of switching to either type of language cue from 
a gaze cue. It is possible that switching from a spatial gaze cue to a spatial language 
cue caused less disruption than switching to a featural language cue, as the reference 
type as well as the form of the cue changed. The difference in the dependent variables 
between language and gaze trials was investigated using linear mixed effects models 
(LMMs), which were carried out as outlined in previous chapters.  
 
Results and Discussion 
There is evidence from Study 4 that although gaze and language cues were used 
concurrently, gaze cues were responded to earlier. To investigate this, the gaze and 
language cues were used in isolation and accuracy, first saccade direction, first 
saccade latency, time to first fixate the target (FT) and response time (RT) were 
measured.  
 
Accuracy. The proportion of correct trials is shown in Figure 5.8a. Although 
accuracy was very high in both conditions, an LMM (Model 5.11), using type of cue 
as a fixed factor and object and subject as random factors, showed a significant 
difference across cue condition, β = -3.328, SE = 1.216, z = -2.736, p < .006. This 
difference may be due to participants mishearing the language cueing word on some 
trials.  
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Figure 5.8. Proportion of correct trials a) in the language and gaze cue conditions and 
b) in the language cue condition, split by the type of language cue and whether or not 
the trial was a switch trial. 
 
It is possible that participants’ accuracy in the language condition was skewed by 
performance in either the featural or spatial condition. If a reference type effect was 
present, this may have been affected by whether or not the trial was a switch trial 
(Figure 5.8b). Specifically, switching from a spatial gaze cue to a spatial language cue 
may have resulted in different costs than switching from a spatial gaze cue to a 
featural language cue.  
An LMM (Model 5.13), with reference type and presence of a switch as fixed factors 
and subject and item as random factors, showed no effect of reference type, β = -.574, 
SE =.639, z = -.899, p = .369, switch trial, β = -.436, SE = .431, z = -1.012, p = .311, 
nor any interaction, β = .303, SE = .732, z = .413, p = .679. Since there was no 
evidence that reference type or switching affected accuracy, it is likely that the 
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slightly weaker performance in the language cue condition was indeed due to 
participants mishearing a small number of language cues, which they were equally 
likely to do regardless of switch or reference condition. 
 
First saccade direction. The proportion of trials with initial saccades in the correct 
direction is shown in Figure 5.9a. An LMM (Model 5.13), using type of cue as a fixed 
factor and object and subject as random factors, showed a significant difference 
across cue condition, β = -2.572, SE = .308, z = -8.351, p < .001. This difference, like 
the accuracy difference, may be due to participants mishearing the language cueing 
word on some trials. Additionally, it may be due to a higher number of trials in which 
the participant launched a saccade before interpreting the cue. If language cues did 
take longer to process than gaze cues, then more of these mistakes would be expected 
in the language cue condition, resulting in a lower proportion of initial saccades in the 
correct direction.  
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Figure 5.9. Proportion of trials with initial saccades in the correct direction a) in the 
language and gaze cue conditions and b) in the language cue condition, split by the 
type of language cue and whether or not the trial was a switch trial. 
 
Figure 5.9b shows the proportion of trials in which the initial saccade was in the 
correct direction for spatial and featural language cues in switch and non-switch trials. 
An LMM (Model 5.14), with reference type and presence of a switch as fixed factors 
and subject and item as random factors, showed a significant effect of reference type, 
β = -.482, SE =.114, z = -4.228, p < .001, but not switch trial, β = -.080, SE = .093, z = 
-.864, p = .387, nor any interaction, β = .038, SE = .176, z = .472, p < .637. The 
increased number of correct first saccades in the featural language condition 
compared to the spatial language condition may have been due to the increased time 
taken to process spatial cues. In order to respond to a spatial language cue, the 
participants were required to process the word (“left” or “right”), then select a frame 
of reference (in this case, left or right of the central face stimulus from the 
participants’ perspective), whereas in the featural language condition, participants 
only needed to interpret the word (a colour), then identify the visual stimulus that 
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matched the words meaning, irrespective of any frames of reference. Alternatively, 
this difference may have been due to more trials in which participants mixed-up left 
and right, than trials in which participants mixed-up two distinct colours.  
 
First saccade latency. In the language condition, first saccade latency was longer 
than first saccade latency in the gaze condition (Figure 5.10a). An LMM (Model 
5.15), using cue type as a fixed factor and subject and item as random factors, 
confirmed the difference as significant, β = 132.81, SE = 24.43, t = 5.437, p < .001. 
These findings provide more evidence that participants responded faster to the gaze 
cue stimuli than the language cue stimuli. 
 
 
Figure 5.10. Mean first saccade latency in a) the language and gaze cue conditions 
and b) the language cue condition, split by the type of language cue and whether or 
not the trial was a switch trial. 
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An LMM (Model 5.16), with reference type and presence of a switch as fixed factors 
and subject and item as random factors, showed no effect of reference type, β = 6.301, 
SE = 13.184, z = .478, p = .619, switch trial, β = 3.062, SE = 7.810, z = .392, p = .683, 
nor any interaction, β = -7.020, SE = 15.808, z = -.444, p = .648. These results show 
that neither the type of linguistic reference used nor the presence or absence of a 
switch in the trial had any significant effect on the time to launch the first saccade. 
 
Time to first fixate the target (FT). Figure 5.11a shows that participants took longer 
to first fixate the target in the language condition compared to the gaze condition. An 
LMM (Model 5.17), using cue type as a fixed factor and subject and item as random 
factors, confirmed the difference as significant, β = 211.75, SE = 29.220, t = 7.248, p 
< .001. This result is clear evidence that gaze cues directed participants to the target 
more quickly than language cues. These findings are crucial for the interpretation of 
the results from Studies 3 and 4 outlined in the General Discussion.  
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Figure 5.11. Mean time to first fixate the target (FT) in a) the language and gaze cue 
conditions and b) the language cue condition, split by the type of language cue and 
whether or not the trial was a switch trial. 
 
It is clear from Figure 5.11b that neither featural nor spatial language cues were 
responded to as quickly as gaze cues, however responses appear to be slower for 
spatial language trials compared to featural language trials. An LMM (Model 5.18), 
using reference type and presence of a switch as fixed factors and subject and item as 
random factors, found significant effects of reference type, β = 76.011, SE = 13.264, t 
= 5.731, p < .001, the presence of a switch, β = 21.853, SE = 6.087, t = 3.590, p < 
.001, but no interaction between these factors, β = 14.521, SE = 13.397, t = 1.084, p = 
.280. 
The results from the LMM confirm the significance of the difference between spatial 
and featural language trials seen in Figure 5.11b, and also show that participants were 
slower to fixate the target in switch trials. However, there was no difference in the 
	   174	  
switching costs between featural and spatial language cue conditions. It appears from 
these results that participants found switching from a gaze cue to a featural language 
cue no more difficult than switching to a spatial language cue. However, participants 
fixated the target more quickly overall following a featural language cue compared to 
a spatial language cue. As discussed in Chapter 4, in this lab-based paradigm 
participants may have been able to identify an item by its colour using peripheral 
vision, meaning that participants did not need to move their eyes to find the target. 
Spatial language cues did not require visual search either, but these cues did require 
participants to select a frame of reference from which to move left or right, whereas 
featural language cues only required participants to match a visual stimulus to a 
colour word. The frame of reference selection may explain why participants were 
slower with spatial language cues. 
 
Response time (RT). Like the time to first fixate the target, response time was slower 
in the language condition compared to the gaze condition (Figure 5.12a). An LMM 
(Model 5.19), using cue type as a fixed factor and subject and item as random factors, 
confirmed the difference as significant, β = 187.86, SE = 29.260, t = 6.420, p < .001. 
This provides further evidence that gaze cues directed participants to the target more 
quickly than language cues and that this led to quicker responses. As with the time to 
first fixate the target results, these findings are important for the interpretation of the 
results in Studies 3 and 4 because it is clear that the difference in time to process the 
gaze and language cues influenced the behaviour of participants in these previous 
studies. 
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Figure 5.12. Mean response time (RT) in a) the language and gaze cue conditions and 
b) the language cue condition, split by the type of language cue and whether or not the 
trial was a switch trial. 
 
Figure 5.12b shows that neither language reference type led to response times as short 
as the mean response for gaze cues, but like the time to first fixate the target, RT was 
slower for spatial language trials compared to featural language trials. An LMM 
(Model 5.20), using reference type and presence of a switch as fixed factors and 
subject and item as random factors, found significant effects of reference type, β = 
77.042, SE = 25.939, t = 2.970, p = .006, and an approaching significant effect of the 
presence of a switch, β = 13.204, SE = 6.953, t = 1.899, p = .064. No interaction was 
found between these factors, β = 11.352, SE = 15.143, t = .750, p = .454. 
The switch effect found in the time to first fixate the target analysis was only 
approaching significance for response time. This could possibly be due to the 
detrimental effect of switching diminishing over time in each trial. Therefore, the 
effect is less prominent for response time, a later measure than time to first fixate the 
	   176	  
target. Both the time to first fixate the target and response time results show that 
participants are slower in language cue trials with spatial references compared to 
those with featural references. The reason could lie in the particular words used; It 
may be easier for participants to mix up “left” and “right” than “blue” and “red”. 
Additionally, even though participants were told that the cues would be from their 
perspective, there may have been some disruption from participants simulating the 
perspective of the face on the screen. Although there was no significant effect of 
reference in experiments 3 and 4 on overall performance, featural trials were slightly 
slower, so it is interesting that the opposite effect was found here. To speculate, it 
may be that the centrally fixating face cued visual spatial attention to the centre of the 
screen, which caused disruption alongside spatial verbal cues, but did not disrupt 
verbal featural cues.  
Overall, Study 5 has shown that participants were quicker to respond to the visual 
gaze cues used in Study 4 than the language cues used. These findings are key to our 
interpretation of the results from the previous two studies in this thesis.  
 
General Discussion 
 
Studies 4 and 5 were designed to further investigate the effects found in Study 3. 
Combined, these three studies explored the effects of varying the reliabilities of 
concurrent language and gaze in an instructional task. In Study 3, participants were 
found to favour language cues over gaze cues when reliabilities were equal, despite 
gaze cues being responded to more quickly. Study 4 supported findings from Study 3, 
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by showing that when gaze cues were subordinate to perfectly accurate language cues, 
the extent to which the gaze cues influenced responses depended on their reliability. 
The same effect was not found for subordinate language cues, however the difference 
in processing time between gaze and language cues may account for this. In Study 3 
subordinate language did provide a unique finding: participants were slower when 
language cues were less reliable, regardless of congruity. This finding was not 
replicated in Study 4, possibly due to the language cues being used out of the context 
of a natural instructional sentence. Despite the issues with onset times, these studies 
showed distinct effects of varying gaze and language cue reliabilities.  
The first finding reported from Study 3 was that participants based their responses on 
the most reliable cue available to them. When gaze and language reliabilities were 
equal and more reliable than chance, participants showed a preference for following 
the language cue. This finding is particularly interesting in light of the results of Study 
5. Participants were found to respond to isolated gaze cues on average about 200 ms 
quicker than they responded to isolated spoken language cues, showing that following 
gaze cues would be an optimal strategy if reliabilities were equal. Furthermore, the 
results of Study 5 were found using the stimuli from Study 4, where the onset times of 
the gaze cues and verbal cues were identical, whereas in Study 3 (in which the 
language preference was found) the onset of the language cue was after the onset of 
the gaze cue, therefore the potential advantage (in terms of allowing an earlier 
response) of using a gaze cue over a language cue was even greater than that found in 
Study 5. It could be argued that Study 3 artificially encouraged a preference for the 
language cue, as the language used took the form of a direct and explicit instructional 
command, whereas the gaze cues were subtler. However, this difference between the 
gaze stimuli and language stimuli is reflective of the use of these cues in natural 
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interactions, with language communicating potentially very detailed and specific 
information and gaze cues indicating the location the speaker’s focus of attention.  
When focussing specifically on the sessions in which language was 100% reliable and 
the gaze cues less reliable, both Studies 3 and 4 found that participants performed 
slightly, but significantly, worse in trials with incongruent gaze cues when these cues 
were 80% reliable compared to 50% reliable. These findings suggest that the 
reliability of the gaze cues change the extent to which these cues are followed, even 
though language cues are more reliable (and completely reliable). These findings 
seem at the odds with the results of the real world experiment in Macdonald and 
Tatler (2013), which found that gaze cues were ignored when language provided 
enough information for successful task completion. However, a key difference in the 
present paradigm is that the gaze stimuli were presented centrally, with no need for 
the participant to seek out the cues. It may be that the highly flexible effects found in 
Macdonald and Tatler (2013) were predominantly driven by the gaze seeking stage of 
gaze utilisation, which was not present in lab-based Studies 3, 4 and 5. Alternatively, 
it is possible that the larger gaze stimuli (in terms of the proportion of the visual field 
that the gaze cue stimuli occupy) in studies 3, 4 and 5 may have been harder for the 
participants to actively ignore.  
The effects of incongruent gaze cues in these sessions were not, of course, entirely 
automatic, as the reliability affected the extent to which the gaze cues were followed. 
Given the preference shown for language in Study 3 when gaze and language cues 
were equally reliable, it is surprising that an incongruent gaze cue would affect 
accuracy at all when language was more reliable. However, it should be noted, when 
cues were incongruent to each other, participants selected the target cued by 100% 
reliable language over 90% of the time when gaze was 80% reliable in Studies 3 and 
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4. This is higher than when the cues were both 80% reliable in Study 3 (around 75%). 
The additional detrimental effect of incongruent gaze cues when they were more 
reliable is in line with findings from gaze-cueing paradigm studies that have 
manipulated cue reliability. Hill et al (2010) and Kuhn and Kingstone (2009) found 
that after 500 ms and 900 ms respectively, participants would be influenced by the 
perceived reliability of a gaze cue. In the current paradigm, the response times show 
that there was typically enough time for top down influence of perceived reliability to 
affect the utilisation of the gaze cues and consequently accuracy. The difference in 
time to process and respond to the different cues may also have contributed to the 
increased detrimental effect of 80% reliable incongruent gaze cues; the gaze cues 
were interpreted earlier than the language cues (as shown in Study 5), so participants 
may have been more likely to respond to the gaze cue before processing the language 
cue when the gaze cues were 80% reliable compared to when they were 50% reliable.  
The results of our first saccade direction measure, the time to first fixate the target and 
response time were all very similar in Studies 3 and 4 for the sessions with 100% 
reliable language and less reliable gaze cues. Both studies found that when gaze cues 
were more reliable they benefitted performance when congruent and hindered 
performance when incongruent, again providing evidence that the gaze cues were 
utilised more when they were more reliable and showing that the findings in Study 3 
were not driven by a misalignment of cue onset times. 
The first saccade latency and the time to first fixate the target differed between 
Studies 3 and 4 for sessions with 100% gaze reliability and less reliable language 
cues, but not in the way that was anticipated. The lack of an effect of incongruity 
between the cues in Study 3 was interpreted as being due to the later onset of the 
language cue resulting in the incongruent language cues not having enough time to 
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negatively affect performance. It was hypothesised that in Study 4, with the onset 
times of the two cues synchronised, a congruity effect would be found. This, however, 
was not the case. There was no effect of congruity, suggesting that participants were 
still able to process and respond to the gaze cues more quickly than the language cues, 
which was confirmed with the results of Study 5. The difference found between 
Studies 3 and 4 was that in Study 3 there was an overall detrimental effect of 50% 
reliable language compared to 80% reliable language, whereas no such effect was 
found in Study 4. It is possible that with the low number of participants (five) in 
Study 3, the detrimental effect was peculiar to these particular participants and that 
the more reliable results of Study 4 (with ten participants) show the true effect. 
Alternatively, it may be that the difference in the context of the critical cueing word 
caused the differing results. In Study 3 the critical (disambiguating) word was 
presented in a full natural instructional sentence, whereas in Study 4 the critical word 
was presented in isolation after the word “Select”. It is possible that hearing incorrect 
full instructional sentences repeatedly, but not incorrect words in isolation, slows 
down performance. 
The response times also differed between Studies 3 and 4 for sessions with 100% 
gaze reliability and less reliable language cues. In Study 4 there was a significant 
effect of congruity on response time, with incongruent language cues slowing down 
responses even though the gaze cues were always correct. This finding supported the 
hypothesis that a congruity effect would be found when the cue onset times were 
synchronised. However, the lack of a congruity effect for language in the time to first 
fixate the target suggests that gaze cues were still responded to more quickly, as 
saccades to the gazed-at locations appear to have been initiated before incongruent 
language cues were interpreted. This difference in processing time was confirmed by 
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the results of Study 5. The congruity effect shows that like gaze cues, language cues 
can be distracting even if another cue is more reliable. In Study 4, there is no evidence 
that the distracting effect of incongruent language cues was mediated by their 
reliability, but this possibility cannot be discounted due to the extra time required to 
process and respond to language cues compared to gaze cues.  
The extra time taken to respond to language cues was likely due to the additional 
processing required with a language cue compared to a visual spatial cue like gaze. 
Firstly, linguistic cues must initially be processed and interpreted. Secondly, there is 
the issue of perspective. Gibson and Kingstone (2006) carried out a series of 
experiments comparing a number of visual cues, including gaze cues and written 
spatial language cues. Although the language cues were visual rather than auditory, 
the comparisons made by Gibson and Kingstone remain relevant to the present 
findings. The authors proposed a new way of categorising visual spatial cues: 
“projective” cues and “deictic” cues. Projective cues, such as the words “left” or 
“right” require participants to select a frame of reference for the cue in order to 
determine the direction being cued. Gibson and Kingstone argue that deictic cues, 
such as arrows and gaze, specify a target directly with regard to the viewer, with no 
need for the participant to select a reference frame. The auditory spatial language cues 
in the current paradigm are analogous to the projective spatial cues discussed by 
Gibson and Kingstone. It is therefore possible that the lexical processing of the words 
“left” or “right”, combined with the selection of a reference frame made responses to 
language slower than responses to gaze.  
The distinction between projective and deictic cues, although proposed with regard to 
visual spatial cues, may also provide insight into why participants were quicker to 
respond to featural language cues in isolation compared to spatial language cues. Like 
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the spatial language cues, featural language cues required lexical processing in order 
to identify the colour of the target item. However, unlike spatial language cues, there 
was no need for participants to select a frame of reference to find the target; a cue to a 
target of a particular colour would always be interpreted as the same target, regardless 
of the perspective taken. The absence of the perspective selection stage could account 
for the quicker responses to featural language cues compared to spatial language cues. 
This may initially seem at odds with the design of Study 2, in which featural 
references were considered “harder” than spatial references (in that gaze cues were of 
more use in the featural reference trials than the spatial reference trials). However, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, in the present lab-based paradigm, the target could have 
potentially been identified using peripheral vision after a featural cue as there were 
only two targets taking up a large proportion of the participants’ visual field. In Study 
2, there were 60 items, several of which shared colours, so participants had to visually 
search in order to identify the correct item. The featural language cues therefore 
played different roles in the naturalistic Study 2 compared to the lab-based Studies 3, 
4 and 5. In the former, the featural language cues supplied reliable information 
distinct from spatial gaze cues, thus making these references more useful than the 
spatial language cues that supplied overlapping information with the gaze cues. In the 
latter studies, featural cues provided information that did not require the participants 
to establish external frames of reference, unlike the spatial language cues.   
The two studies presented in this chapter used controlled, simple gaze and language 
stimuli to extend the investigation into the effects of varying the reliability of 
concurrent gaze and language cues. The real world studies used in this thesis have 
found an interaction between gaze and language; with gaze being used more when it 
provides more uniquely useful information. In these lab-based studies, the reliabilities 
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of language and gaze have been varied in a controlled and systematic way to provide 
a more detailed picture of how language and gaze cue reliabilities affect each other. In 
terms of accuracy, participants strategically used the most informative cue available 
to them. When cues were equally informative participants showed a bias for language, 
despite the extra time required to process these cues. Gaze cue effects were, however, 
still persistent. When gaze cues were subordinate to completely reliable language cues 
they caused distraction, and the degree of this distraction was mediated by the gaze 
cue reliability. Language cues appear to take longer to process, limiting the 
interpretation of their distracting effects in this paradigm. However, for language cues 
embedded in a natural instruction sentence, an overall distracting effect was found 
from unreliable language when gaze was 100% reliable regardless of the cue 
congruity in any particular trial. No such effect was found with gaze cues. Combined, 
these studies show some clear differences between these two cues. Gaze cues affect 
attention relatively quickly, but the extent of their attentional effects can also be 
quickly mediated by their perceived reliability, whereas language cues appear to be 
preferred, despite taking longer to process. Furthermore, low language reliability was 
found to disrupt overall performance, but only when the cues were embedded in a 
natural instructional sentence.  
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Chapter 6:  
Discussion  
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The five studies that make up this thesis investigated the relationship between gaze 
cues and language in natural communication. In the present chapter, the results of all 
of these studies are summarised. The effects of language on gaze seeking and gaze 
following are discussed in relation to these experimental results, focusing specifically 
on the novel theoretical contributions of these findings. It is argued that the utilisation 
of gaze cues in natural communication is largely influenced by concurrent spoken 
language.  
 
Summary of experimental results  
 
In Study 1 the presence of social roles was manipulated in a collaborative task while 
eye movements were measured. In pairs, participants worked together to make a cake. 
Half of the pairs were given roles (“Chef” or “Gatherer”) and the other half were not. 
Contrary to the results of static image experiments, participants spent very little time 
looking at each other, challenging the generalisability of the conclusions from lab-
based paradigms and extending the previous findings that social presence affects the 
extent to which we look at others (Laidlaw et al., 2011; Gallup, Hale et al., 2012) to 
real interactions, showing that this behaviour is not simply a way to prevent an 
interaction occurring with a stranger. Participants were found to instead spend much 
more time looking at the same items (shared gaze).  When given spoken instructions, 
listeners in the roles condition looked at the speaker significantly more than listeners 
in the no roles condition. These findings suggest that our tendency to seek the gaze 
cues of collaborators is affected either by our social perceptions or our perception of 
the reliability of the collaborator. Furthermore, the analysis of these interactions found 
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participants used a mixture of spatial and non-spatial verbal references, which 
influenced gaze behaviour.  
Study 2 used a controlled real-world paradigm to investigate the effect of the type of 
verbal reference used in an instruction on gaze behaviour. Specifically, whether the 
use of featural or spatial disambiguating determiner words affected the extent to 
which participants used inherently spatial gaze cues. Each participant followed 
instructions to complete a real-world search task, while wearing a portable eye-
tracker. The instructor varied the determiner used (featural or spatial) and the 
presence of gaze cues (absent, congruent or incongruent). Fixations to the objects and 
instructor were recorded. Congruent gaze cues were used and followed more when 
they were provided alongside featural references. Incongruent gaze cues were not 
initially followed any more than chance. However, unlike participants in the no-gaze 
condition, participants in the incongruent condition did not benefit from the use of 
spatial instructions over featural instructions. These findings suggest that although 
participants selectively used informative gaze cues and inhibited gaze following when 
cues were unreliable, visual search was nevertheless disrupted when inherently spatial 
gaze cues were accompanied by contradictory verbal spatial instructions. 
The final three studies in this thesis used a lab-based paradigm to further investigate 
the effects of varying the reliabilities of concurrent language and gaze cues. The 
reliabilities of language and gaze were varied in a controlled way to provide a more 
detailed picture of how language and gaze cue reliabilities affected each other. 
Participants were found to strategically use the most reliable cue available to them 
and when these cues were equally reliable participants showed a bias for language, 
despite the extra time required to process these cues, suggesting the language cues 
were the dominant cue. More evidence for the dominance of language was provided 
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by results showing that when language cues were embedded in a natural instruction 
sentence, an overall distracting effect was found from unreliable language when gaze 
was 100% reliable regardless of the cue congruity in any particular trial. No such 
effect was found with gaze cues. Gaze cue effects were, however, still present and 
persistent at low reliabilities. When gaze cues were subordinate to completely reliable 
language cues they were still initially followed. However, the extent to which 
subordinate gaze cues were followed was mediated by their reliability; when these 
cues were 80% reliable they were followed more than when they were 50% reliable. 
Combined, these three studies show some clear differences between these two cues. 
Gaze cues affected attention relatively quickly, but the extent of their attentional 
effects were also quickly mediated by their perceived reliability, whereas language 
cues appeared to be preferred, despite taking longer to process. Furthermore, low 
language reliability was found to disrupt overall performance, but only when the cues 
were embedded in a natural instructional sentence. 
 
The interaction between spoken language and gaze cues 
 
The combined results of all five studies in this thesis contribute to our overall 
understanding of how gaze cues and language interact in natural communication. To 
discuss these contributions, the present section outlines the two key stages involved in 
a gaze cueing event chronologically and explores the factors that influence behaviour 
in each of these stages, with specific focus on the novel theoretical contributions of 
findings in this thesis.  
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Looking at the eyes of another 
As discussed in depth in Chapter One, there has long been eye-tracking evidence 
showing that people have a tendency to look at the eyes of another in paintings 
(Buswell, 1935) and photographs (Yarbus, 1967). This preference has been shown to 
persist when accounting for central fixation biases (Bindemann et al., 2009) and 
biases for fixating the centre of a face (Levy et al., 2013), suggesting that the 
tendency to fixate on the eyes of another is not simply a result of face recognition 
processes. Studies using more complex static stimuli, with multiple people in a single 
image, have shown that participants are more likely to fixate the eyes of people than 
non-biological social cues, such as arrows (Birmingham et al., 2009) and that 
participants are more likely to look at eyes when the people in the image are 
interacting with one another (Birmingham et al., 2007). The results of the former 
study provides evidence that eye gaze is a more attractive social stimulus than arrows, 
and the results of the latter study suggest that eyes are looked at more when they 
potentially have communicative value. All of these experiments however, lacked 
social presence; the gaze cues were provided by still images of people, rather than a 
present human being. In the real world, gaze-orienting behaviour is markedly 
different than it is in still image studies, limiting the usefulness of static image 
paradigms in this research area. Study 1 in this thesis showed this difference clearly; 
the overall time participants spent looking at each other was between 2-4% of task 
time.  
Laidlaw et al (2011) compared looks to another between a present person in a waiting 
room and a person on a monitor. Participants were found to look significantly more at 
	   189	  
the person on the monitor, suggesting that social presence decreases the extent to 
which we look at another. Furthermore, there was a positive correlation between the 
social skills of the participants (as assessed with the Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) autism 
quotient questionnaire) and the extent to which participants looked at the present 
confederate, suggesting that those with better social skills may be more comfortable 
looking at another. It is important to note however, that in this situation the other 
person was a stranger, whereas in natural communication, which is present in Study 1, 
the other person is necessarily involved in a social interaction with the viewer. 
Therefore, although the influence of social effects in the waiting-room paradigm 
informs us about social influences on how we look at others, the results are not 
directly comparable to the findings of the present thesis, which explored the 
interaction between gaze and language in communicative interactions.   
This thesis is certainly not the first to consider natural gaze behaviour during 
interactions, as a great deal of work was published by social psychologists throughout 
the nineteen-sixties and –seventies. Argyle and Dean (1965) found that the extent to 
which we are comfortable looking at a person is influenced by our proximity to that 
person, with people more resistant to eye contact at close distances. These results 
demonstrate a clear social effect on how we look at others during interactions. The 
aforementioned small proportion of time spend on partner gaze in Study 1 suggests 
that similar social effects were affecting behaviour while people baked together. The 
participants, who had mostly never met before, were perhaps following social norms 
and avoiding looking directly at each other. Despite the pairs spending very little time 
looking at each other, there was still evidence of partner gaze when using spoken 
language, which was affected by the roles of the individuals. During instructions, 
listeners in the roles condition were more likely to look at the speaker than listeners in 
	   190	  
the no roles condition or the speakers in both roles and no roles conditions. This 
suggests that the extent to which we look at a speaker during communication is 
influenced by our social perceptions of that person; if they are perceived to be of 
higher social status, we will look more. Although not a direct measure of gaze 
seeking, the finding that social perceptions affect the extent to which we look at 
another during an interaction has clear implications for our ability to use and 
following gaze cues. The more we look at another, the more likely we are to identify 
their non-verbal cues, including gaze cues.  
Study 2 showed that the tendency to avoid looking directly at someone with whom 
one is interacting could vary from situation to situation. In Study 1 participants were 
moving about a kitchen working on several different worktops and collecting items 
from around the whole room. In Study 2 participants stood facing an instructor at the 
onset of each instruction. In this more controlled real-world study, participants almost 
always began a trial by looking at the instructor. The only exception was when 
participants anticipated an unhelpful gaze cue, but even then in over 70% of trials 
participants were looking at the instructor at the onset of the trial. Due to the 
participant and instructor facing each other, if the participant wished to look away 
from the instructor they were required to actively move their eyes. This may account 
for the high proportion of looks to the instructor in Study 2. Participants appear to 
have only actively looked away from the instructor when they anticipated that an 
unhelpful cue was about to be given. Later in the sentence, at the point of the gaze 
cue, there was more evidence of selective gaze seeking, with participants looking 
more often at a cue they anticipated to be helpful and less often at the cue they 
anticipated to be unhelpful. These findings support lab-based studies that have found 
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that people look more at gaze cues they anticipate to be useful (Itier & Villate, 2007) 
and extend these findings to real-world tasks. 
Like some previous research, Study 2 showed evidence of spoken language affecting 
the extent to which people orient towards gaze cues. Macdonald and Tatler (2013) 
used a paradigm in which gaze cues were sometimes required to complete the task, as 
language was ambiguous. In these cases gaze cues were sought out often, but they 
were rarely sought out when language provided the necessary information to complete 
the task. Study 2 extends our understanding of the reflexive relationship between gaze 
cue utilisation and language by showing that the type of language used, rather than the 
specificity of that language, also affects the use of gaze cues. Participants were found 
to seek out gaze cues more when these cues were provided alongside featural 
language cues rather than spatial language cues. Gaze cues are inherently spatial 
rather than featural; gaze can direct an observer to a location in space but it cannot 
direct an observer to a colour. Therefore, there was no overlap between the 
information provided by the spatial gaze cue and the featural language cue, whereas 
there was an overlap with the spatial language cue. Participants were found to 
selectively seek out gaze more when gaze cues provided more exclusively useful 
information. There was no difference in gaze seeking behaviour found between the no 
gaze and incongruent gaze condition, suggesting that participants simply ignored cues 
they anticipated to be unhelpful. This finding is particularly interesting given the 
wealth of evidence showing distracting effects of gaze cues when they cue locations 
incongruent with a target (e.g., Ricciardelli et al., 2002; Ristic & Kingstone, 2005; 
Galfano et al., 2012). It is possible that these well-established reflexive effects are 
unique to the gaze following stage of gaze utilisation, as this is the stage most 
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previous experiments have explored. From the findings of the present thesis, gaze 
seeking appears to be a largely flexible process. 
Study 2 also found evidence that the social skills of participants affected gaze-
orienting behaviour and interacted with the type of linguistic reference used. More 
specifically, the effect of reference type on the time participants spent looking at the 
instructor was different for the two Autism Quotient (AQ) groups. The high-AQ 
group did not significantly differ in the extent to which they looked at the instructor 
between spatial and featural reference trials, whereas the low-AQ group spent 
significantly longer looking at the instructor when featural references were used 
compared to spatial references. In Chapter 3 it was speculated that this might have 
been due to the low AQ group being more sensitive to social norms that discourage 
looking directly at another when not necessary, thus there was a difference between 
when the cues were more and less relatively useful. The high AQ group, however, 
being less sensitive to these social norms, sought out the gaze cue regardless of how 
useful they were relative to language. Although this is speculative, it is in line with an 
account provided for results of a previous study showing that low AQ individuals 
would look at a face of a speaking person on a monitor and the face of a present 
individual to the same extent, whereas higher AQ individuals were more likely to 
look at a present person than a person on a monitor (Freeth et al., 2013). 
The studies outlined above illustrate that our social perceptions and the language that 
we use influence the extent to which we look at another and when we look at that 
other during an interaction. The studies in the present thesis have added to our 
understanding of the interplay between gaze and language during gaze seeking by 
showing that people are more likely to look at a speaker when they are of higher 
social status. This is not only an important finding in itself, but also shows the 
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importance of investigating social attention in real social interactions, as standard 
gaze cueing paradigm experiments would not be able to identify this effect. 
Furthermore, these studies have shown that gaze seeking is a highly flexible process, 
with participants using inherently spatial gaze cues more when the information is 
more helpful in the task relative to accompanying language.  
 
Following the gaze of another 
The gaze following stage is the most well researched stage of gaze utilisation. As, 
outlined in Chapter 1, much of this research has been conducted using variants of 
Friesen and Kingstone’s (1998) Posner-type (1980) gaze-cueing paradigm. With this 
highly controlled simple paradigm a great deal of data has been collected that can 
help us to understand the attentional processes that occur upon seeing a gaze cue. 
While there have been a number of varied and potentially contradictory findings and 
conclusions from these numerous studies, there are a few fundamental findings 
consistent between most gaze cueing paradigm experiments. The studies in the 
present thesis offer insights into the effects of language on these gaze following 
behaviours.  
The principle finding of Friesen and Kingstone’s study (1998) was that unreliable 
gaze cues benefited performance in a target selection task when the cue was 
congruent to the target location, even though participants understood these cues to be 
non-predictive. This finding has been replicated numerous times (e.g., Driver et al, 
1999; Langton & Bruce, 1999) and has been extended to show a reciprocal 
detrimental incongruent gaze cueing effect (e.g., Ricciardelli et al., 2002; Kuhn & 
Benson, 2007). Eye tracking studies have also shown eye movements to be affected 
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by incongruent gaze cues, in the form of increased saccade errors (Ricciardelli et al., 
2002; Galfano et al, 2012). These findings together show that viewing a gaze cue 
leads to a reflexive shift in attention. In Studies 3 and 4, in which a novel version of 
the gaze cueing paradigm was used, participants were distracted by subordinate 
incongruent gaze cues when language was 100% reliable, supporting the view that 
gaze cues cause an automatic shift in a viewer’s attention. As has been noted 
previously in this thesis, findings from these simple paradigms may not extend to real 
world interactions. However, Study 2 also found evidence for an automatic gaze 
cueing effect in a complex real world environment; participants were found to 
identify targets faster when provided with a spatial language cue compared to a 
featural language cue when no gaze cues were provided, however when a gaze cue 
that participants’ knew to be cueing the incorrect location was provided alongside 
spoken language, there was no longer a benefit to using spatial language cues. This 
finding suggests that gaze cues disrupted participants’ processing of spatial language 
cues, even though participants knew the gaze cues were incorrect.  
The issues raised by, amongst others, Ricciardelli et al. (2002) and Tipples (2002) 
regarding the uniqueness of gaze cue stimuli in Posner-type (1980) tasks are arguably 
also relevant for the real-world and video tasks used in this thesis. As with the stimuli 
in the typical gaze-cueing paradigm (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998), some of the 
seemingly reflexive early responses of the gaze and head cues used in this thesis 
could arguably have been caused by the visual motion of the head, rather than any 
unique social relevance of the eyes. In addition, the conventional gaze cueing 
paradigms explicitly employ gaze cues only, without any potentially confounding 
head movements. Gaze cues were combined with head movements in this thesis 
primarily for the sake of ecological validity, however this decision can also be 
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supported by the theoretical insights and findings of Lozincz, Baker and Perrett 
(1999). Lozincz et al. found that rhesus monkeys will follow the gaze cue of other 
monkeys when the cues are incongruent to the head, but that they would follow the 
head direction when incongruent to body posture if eye direction were not clearly 
visible. From these findings they theorised that there is a hierarchy of cue following, 
with eye-gaze overriding head direction and head-direction overriding body-position. 
While it is not clear from the results of Studies 2-5 whether participants explicitly 
followed eye-gaze-direction, head direction or both, the work of Lozincz et al. (1999) 
would suggest that this distinction may not be important for the questions being asked 
in this thesis; head direction and gaze direction both cued the location of the looker’s 
focus of visual attention.  
Although there is the above evidence for reflexive gaze following, it is clear from 
previous literature as well as many of the findings in the present thesis that other 
factors also influence the extent to which we follow gaze cues during communication. 
One of these factors is the perceived reliability of a gaze cue. A number of studies 
have shown that when decreasing the reliability of gaze cue stimuli from 50% (thus 
making it more likely that a cue will be incorrect than correct) the typical gaze cueing 
effect persists, but only at small SOAs (Kuhn and Kingstone, 2009; Hill et al., 2010). 
At longer SOAs, however, these effects were not found, showing that knowledge of 
the reliability of a cue can override the short-lived attentional shift.  
Given that gaze following responses have been shown to be time sensitive, it is worth 
considering the time course of the gaze following measures used in this thesis for the 
various paradigms. In Study 2, participants were free to search for the target before 
and after the gaze cue was given, definitely providing the opportunity for low-level 
reflexive response to occur. This opportunity was also available in Studies 3, 4 and 5, 
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as participants were free to select a target as soon as the gaze cue was initiated. More 
important for the present thesis are the cue onset times in relation to the onset of 
disambiguating phrases. In Studies 2 and 3, gaze cues were provided (on average) 96 
ms and 172 ms before the disambiguating language phrase respectively and in Study 
4, language and gaze cue onsets were concurrent. Whereas, there was little 
comparability between gaze seeking measures in Study 2 and Studies 3-5, in terms of 
gaze following, all of the studies in this thesis using concurrent language and gaze 
presented language cues within 200 ms of gaze cue onset, allowing for potential 
reflexive shifts in attention at the time of hearing the disambiguating words (Kuhn & 
Kingstone, 2009; Hill et al., 2010). 
As well as changing the absolute reliability of a gaze cue to investigate gaze 
following, it is also possible to vary the communicative information provided around 
the cue. In real interactions the primary communicative tool accompanying a gaze cue 
is typically spoken language and many researchers have investigated the interaction 
between language and gaze. Knoeferle & Kreysa (2012) found evidence that the level 
of difficulty of processing language affected how gaze cues were used; supportive 
gaze cues were used when concurrent language used a common grammatical structure 
(in German), but not when language used an uncommon (but grammatically legal) 
structure. This appears to show that gaze following was influenced by the difficulty in 
processing language; when language was easy to process, cognitive resources were 
free to exploit supportive gazes cues, however when language was more difficult to 
process, these cognitive resources were not available to make use of supportive cues. 
Macdonald and Tatler (2013) later found that when cues were supportive in a task, but 
not essential for task completion, they were rarely followed. Gaze cues were followed 
significantly more when gaze provided essential information, again showing evidence 
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for selective gaze following, based on the informativeness of the gaze cue relative to 
language. Study 2 of the present thesis provided evidence that gaze following is not 
only affected by the relative informativeness of language but also the type of language 
used; when language provided spatial information (which overlapped with the spatial 
information provided by gaze) participants followed gaze less than when language 
provided featural information (which did not overlap with information provided by 
gaze). This is arguably the same effect that was found by Macdonald & Tatler (2013), 
with gaze cues being followed more when they were more useful relative to language, 
however there was a key difference between these studies: in Study 2 all sentences 
were unambiguous. In Macdonald & Tatler (2013) it is possible that the increased 
gaze following when language was ambiguous was due to participants seeking out 
supporting information simply because of confusion at the ambiguous instructions, 
however the present thesis has shown that this flexible behaviour was actually related 
to the information gaze cues provided, rather than the lack of information provided by 
language.  
Many of the findings in this thesis show that the context around a gaze cue, and more 
specifically the language around a gaze cue affects how these cues are utilised. While 
these contributions are novel, other researchers have previously theorised on the 
importance of communicative intent on gaze following. Senju & Csibra (2008) found 
that infants were more likely to follow the gaze cue of an adult if the cue was 
preceded by another communicative cue, such as direct eye contact or speech. Senju 
& Csibra (2008) theorised that the early development of gaze following behaviour is 
supported and perhaps even reliant on other communicative tools. The results of the 
present thesis show the language used around a gaze cue does more than shape the 
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development of a gaze following mechanism in infancy, but is rather key to the way 
adults utilise the gaze of another in a natural interaction.  
The findings outlined above suggest that although gaze cues lead to immediate shifts 
in attention, in natural interactions gaze following is heavily influenced by the content 
of concurrent language. The extent to which we follow gaze cues appears to be 
influenced by the form and content of our primary communicative tool: spoken 
language. However, it is important to consider that the paradigms that report these 
findings have perhaps set gaze cues up to be supportive cues. In Knoeferle and Kreysa 
(2012), Macdonald and Tatler (2013) and Study 2 of this thesis participants were not 
told of the presence of gaze cues prior to the experiment, but they were informed that 
they would hear spoken sentences, and in the case of Macdonald and Tatler (2013) 
and Study 2 participants were explicitly told to follow spoken instructions. In Study 3, 
a paradigm was used to make language and gaze cues equivalent, except in terms of 
reliability, which was manipulated in a controlled manner. When language and gaze 
cues we equally reliable, more reliable than chance and incongruent to each other, 
participants selected the target cued by language in most trials even though following 
the gaze cue would have been quicker. This provides support to the idea that language 
cues are favoured over gaze cues, which provide a supportive role to language. 
It is clear that when viewing a gaze cue there is a tendency to attend to the gazed-at-
location. While evidence that this effect is unique to gaze cueing stimuli (Ricciardelli 
et al, 2002, Ristic & Kingstone, 2005) may be outweighed by evidence that this effect 
is shared by a number of visual spatial cues (Tipple, 2002; Galfano et al., 2012), there 
are a number of studies showing that the gaze cueing effect is stronger than the 
similar effect of other visual-spatial cues (Quadflieg, Mason & Macrae, 2004; 
Downing et al., 2004; Kuhn & Benson, 2007). Regardless of whether this effect is 
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unique to gaze or not, Studies 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis have found evidence to support 
the presence of the automatic gaze cueing effect. However, the present thesis has also 
found evidence showing the flexible nature of gaze following, and specifically the 
influence of language. Participants were found to follow gaze cues more when these 
cues were more informative relative to concurrent language, showing a top down 
strategic use of gaze cues. Taken together, the gaze following results from the present 
thesis show that although the immediate attentional effects of a gaze cue are present 
in real interactions, our responses to gaze cues are largely driven by our perception of 
the reliability of these cues, which can be modulated by concurrent spoken language. 
 
Future directions for gaze cueing and language research 
 
The findings of this present thesis raise a number of interesting questions about the 
flexible interaction between language and gaze cues. As a direct follow-up to the 
latter three studies of this thesis, an experiment could be carried out using the basic 
framework of Studies 3 and 4, but offsetting the cue onsets in order to align 
processing completion times. To do this, an experiment using one cue at a time (as in 
Study 5) could be carried out and the mean time difference between gaze and 
language responses could be calculated. This mean time difference could be used to 
offset the onset times of gaze and language cues to increase the likelihood that both 
cues are interpreted at the same time. This paradigm would allow insight into the 
extent to which the distinct effects of subordinate language and gaze cues in Studies 3 
and 4 were due to the processing times of the respective cues.  
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Another line of future research would be to explore whether the relationship between 
gaze and spoken language is unique to these two factors, or whether gaze cue 
utilization is similarly flexible with other concurrent cues. Likewise, are there cues 
other than gaze cues that are used in the same way to support ambiguous language? It 
may be that language is a prevalent naturally occurring modulator of gaze cue 
reliability/informativeness, or it may be that there is a unique relationship between 
these two communicative cues that has developed to aid communication. There are 
other non-verbal cues that have been investigated within the fields of social attention 
and natural communication, such as pointing (Daum, Ulber, & Gredebäck, 2013) or 
hand gestures (Yu & Smith, 2013). There is scope for comparative research between 
gaze cues and these other social cues to investigate whether the communicative gaze 
of another really does have a unique relationship with spoken language. 
The effects of social roles on gaze orienting found in Study 1 lead to interesting 
questions about the underlying cause: Did listeners look more at speakers who were 
Chefs because of the perceived social status of their partner or their perceived 
informativeness? Future experiments could dissociate between the social status and 
informativeness of a collaborator. For example, in a 2×2 design, participants could 
collaborate on a task with a partner (a confederate) who would either be introduced as 
high or low social status (e.g., a lecturer or fellow student) and the participant would 
be informed of the confederate’s expertise in the task (e.g., a novice or an expert). 
Dependent variables would be eye movement measures including number of looks to 
the confederate (and total looking time). 
While the highly naturalistic Study 1 provided data relating to the extent to which we 
look at others during real interactions, it did not directly measure how people follow 
gaze cues. Future studies could investigate how our social perceptions of another 
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affect not only how we look to that person, but the extent to which we follow their 
cues and remember where they look. This could be achieved by using paradigms 
similar to the real world task in Study 2, but with the inclusion of manipulations of 
social perceptions. 
 
Summary 
 
The present thesis explored the relationship between language and gaze cues in 
communication. Much of the previous literature on gaze cue utilisation used artificial 
stimuli that arguably reduced gaze cues to simple visual spatial cues that lacked key 
characteristics of natural gaze. For this reason, the present thesis began with a largely 
observational study, allowing for spontaneous natural language and gaze. Participants 
were found to rarely look at their partners, but to do so strategically, with listeners 
looking more at speakers when the latter were of higher social status. Eye movement 
behaviour also varied with the type of language used in instructions, so Study 2 used a 
more controlled, but still real-world paradigm to investigate the effect of language 
type on gaze utilisation. Participants used gaze cues flexibly, by seeking and 
following gaze cues more when they were accompanied by distinct featural verbal 
information compared to overlapping spatial verbal information, showing that gaze 
cue utilisation is related to the information gaze cues provided, rather than the lack of 
information provided by language. The final studies reduced gaze and language cues 
to equivalent stimuli and varied the reliability of each. Even in this artificial 
paradigm, language was preferred when cues were equally reliable, supporting the 
idea that gaze cues are supportive to language. Typical gaze cueing effects were still 
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found, however the size of these effects was modulated by gaze cue reliability. 
Combined, the studies in this thesis show that although gaze cues may automatically 
and quickly affect attention, their use in natural communication is mediated by the 
form and content of concurrent spoken language. 
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Appendix 1: Simplifying LMMs 
Following the guidance of Barr, Levy, Scheepers and Tily (2013), the linear mixed 
effects models in this thesis use the maximal (most complex) random effects 
structure. These random slope and intercept models consider the different effects that 
the fixed factors have on different subjects. However, these maximal models can 
often fail to converge if there are not enough observations in the data and this was 
often the case in the present thesis. When maximal models failed to converge, simpler 
models were attempted. Models were simplified, when necessary, by first removing 
correlations between random-slopes and intercepts. After this, the slope of any 
interaction from the random factor was removed. If the model still failed to converge, 
the intercept was removed, followed by a fixed factor slope. The most complex model 
that successfully converged was always used.  
This appendix provides a comprehensive outline of how models were simplified 
throughout this thesis for models with one or two fixed factors and one or two random 
factors. 
 
Simplifying models with one fixed and one random factor 
These models are the easiest to simplify, as they contain only one fixed and random 
factor, meaning that there is no need for a predetermined hierarchy of factors. Below 
are all possible model structures of measure x for fixed factor a and random factor 
Subject (S) in order of desirability. If the first structure did not convert, the next would 
be attempted until a model that did not fail to converge was found. The “1” in a 
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random effects structure represents the intercept and the use of “||” represents the 
absence of correlation parameters between random intercepts and slopes being used in 
the model. 
 
1)  x ~ a +   (1 + a|S) 2)  x ~ a +   (1 +a||S) 
3)  x ~ a +   (0 + a|S) 4)  x ~ a +   (1|S) 
 
Simplifying models with one fixed and two random factors 
In all models with two random factors the Item factor was the first to have its 
structure simplified. Below are all possible model structures of measure x for fixed 
factor a and random factors Subject (S) and Item (I) in order of desirability. If the first 
structure did not convert, the next would be attempted until a model that did not fail to 
converge was found.  
 
1)  x ~ a + (1 + a|S) + (1 + a|I) 2)  x ~ a + (1 + a|S) + (1 + a||I) 
3)  x ~ a + (1 + a|S) + (0 + a|I) 4)  x ~ a + (1 + a|S) + (1|I) 
5)  x ~ a + (1 + a||S) + (1 + a|I) 6)  x ~ a + (1 + a||S) + (1 + a||I) 
7)  x ~ a + (1 + a||S) + (0 + a|I) 8)  x ~ a + (1 + a||S) + (1|I) 
9)  x ~ a + (0 + a|S) + (1 + a|I) 10)  x ~ a + (0 + a|S) + (1 + a||I) 
11)  x ~ a + (0 + a|S) + (0 + a|I) 12)  x ~ a + (0 + a|S) + (1|I) 
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13)  x ~ a + (1|S) + (1 + a|I) 14)  x ~ a + (1|S) + (1 + a||I) 
15)  x ~ a + (1|S) + (0 + a|I) 16)  x ~ a + (1|S) + (1|I) 
 
Simplifying models with two fixed factor and one random factor 
In all models with two fixed factors one of the fixed-factor slopes (b) was removed 
first. Below are all possible model structures of measure x for fixed factors a and b 
and random factor Subject (S). If the first structure did not converge, the next would 
be attempted until a model that did not fail to converge was found.  
 
1)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b|S)  2)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b||S) 3)  x ~ a*b + (1+a+b||S) 
4)  x ~ a*b + (0+a+b||S) 5)  x ~ a*b + (1+a||S) 6)  x ~ a*b + (0+a|S) 
7)  x ~ a*b + (1+b||S) 8)  x ~ a*b + (0+b|S) 9)  x ~ a*b + (1|S) 
 
Simplifying models with two fixed factor and two random factors 
In these types of model there are a number of different ways to simplify the random 
effects structure. In this thesis, Item was simplified first and in both random effects 
structures, one of the fixed-factor slopes (b) was consistently removed first. Below are 
all possible model structures of measure x for fixed factors a and b and random 
factors Subject (S) and Item (I). If the first structure did not converge, the next would 
be attempted until a model that did not fail to converge was found.  
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1)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b|S) + (1+a*b|I)  2)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b|S) + (1+a*b||I) 3)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b|S) + (1+a+b|I) 
4)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b|S) + (0+a+b||I) 5)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b|S) + (1+a||I) 6)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b|S) + (0+a|I) 
7)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b|S) + (1+b||I) 8)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b|S) + (0+b|I) 9)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b|S) + (1|I) 
10)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b||S) + (1+a*b|I)  11)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b||S) + (1+a*b||I) 12)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b||S) + (1+a+b||I) 
13)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b||S) + (0+a+b||I) 14)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b||S) + (1+a||I) 15)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b||S) + (0+a|I) 
16)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b||S) + (1+b||I) 17)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b||S) + (0+b|I) 18)  x ~ a*b + (1+a*b||S) + (1|I) 
19)  x ~ a*b + (1+a+b||S) + (1+a*b|I)  20)  x ~ a*b + (1+a+b||S) + (1+a*b||I) 21)  x ~ a*b + (1+a+b||S) + (1+a+b||I) 
22)  x ~ a*b + (1+a+b||S) + (0+a+b||I) 23)  x ~ a*b + (1+a+b||S) + (1+a||I) 24)  x ~ a*b + (1+a+b||S) + (0+a|I) 
25)  x ~ a*b + (1+a+b||S) + (1+b||I) 26)  x ~ a*b + (1+a+b||S) + (0+b|I) 27)  x ~ a*b + (1+a+b||S) + (1|I) 
28)  x ~ a*b + (0+a+b||S) + (1+a*b|I)  29)  x ~ a*b + (0+a+b||S) + (1+a*b||I) 30)  x ~ a*b + (0+a+b||S) + (1+a+b||I) 
31)  x ~ a*b + (0+a+b||S) + (0+a+b||I) 32)  x ~ a*b + (0+a+b||S) + (1+a||I) 33)  x ~ a*b + (0+a+b||S) + (0+a|I) 
34)  x ~ a*b + (0+a+b||S) + (1+b||I) 35)  x ~ a*b + (0+a+b||S) + (0+b|I) 36)  x ~ a*b + (0+a+b||S) + (1|I) 
37)  x ~ a*b + (1+a||S) + (1+a*b|I)  38)  x ~ a*b + (1+a||S) + (1+a*b||I) 39)  x ~ a*b + (1+a||S) + (1+a+b|I) 
40)  x ~ a*b + (1+a||S) + (0+a+b||I) 41)  x ~ a*b + (1+a||S) + (1+a||I) 42)  x ~ a*b + (1+a||S) + (0+a|I) 
43)  x ~ a*b + (1+a||S) + (1+b||I) 44)  x ~ a*b + (1+a||S) + (0+b|I) 45)  x ~ a*b + (1+a||S) + (1|I) 
46)  x ~ a*b + (0+a|S) + (1+a*b|I)  47)  x ~ a*b + (0+a|S) + (1+a*b||I) 48)  x ~ a*b + (0+a|S) + (1+a+b||I) 
49)  x ~ a*b + (0+a|S) + (0+a+b||I) 50)  x ~ a*b + (0+a|S) + (1+a||I) 51)  x ~ a*b + (0+a|S) + (0+a|I) 
52)  x ~ a*b + (0+a|S) + (1+b||I) 53)  x ~ a*b + (0+a|S) + (0+b|I) 54)  x ~ a*b + (0+a|S) + (1|I) 
55)  x ~ a*b + (1+b||S) + (1+a*b|I)  56)  x ~ a*b + (1+b||S) + (1+a*b||I) 57)  x ~ a*b + (1+b||S) + (1+a+b||I) 
58)  x ~ a*b + (1+b||S) + (0+a+b||I) 59)  x ~ a*b + (1+b||S) + (1+a||I) 60)  x ~ a*b + (1+b||S) + (0+a|I) 
61)  x ~ a*b + (1+b||S) + (1+b||I) 62)  x ~ a*b + (1+b||S) + (0+b|I) 63)  x ~ a*b + (1+b||S) + (1|I) 
64)  x ~ a*b + (0+b|S) + (1+a*b|I)  65)  x ~ a*b + (0+b|S) + (1+a*b||I) 66)  x ~ a*b + (0+b|S) + (1+a+b||I) 
67)  x ~ a*b + (0+b|S) + (0+a+b||I) 68)  x ~ a*b + (0+b|S) + (1+a||I) 69)  x ~ a*b + (0+b|S) + (0+a|I) 
70)  x ~ a*b + (0+b|S) + (1+b||I) 71)  x ~ a*b + (0+b|S) + (0+b|I) 72)  x ~ a*b + (0+b|S) + (1|I) 
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73)  x ~ a*b + (1|S) + (1+a*b|I)  74)  x ~ a*b + (1|S) + (1+a*b||I) 75)  x ~ a*b + (1|S) + (1+a+b|I) 
76)  x ~ a*b + (1|S) + (0+a+b||I) 77)  x ~ a*b + (1|S) + (1+a||I) 78)  x ~ a*b + (1|S) + (0+a|I) 
79)  x ~ a*b + (1|S) + (1+b||I) 80)  x ~ a*b + (1|S) + (0+b|I) 81)  x ~ a*b + (1|S) + (1|I) 
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Appendix 2: R-script for Linear 
Mixed Effects Models used in thesis 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 
2.1) 
#sum coding 
data_shared$roles.roles <- ifelse(data_shared$roles == "roles", 1, 0) 
meanroles <- mean(data_shared$roles.roles) 
data_shared$roles.sum <- data_shared$roles.roles-meanroles 
 
#model 
model <- glmer(initiator3 ~ roles.sum + (roles.sum||video), family = binomial, data = 
data_shared) 
 
2.2) 
#sum coding 
data_shared3$roles.roles <- ifelse(data_shared3$roles == "roles", 1, 0) 
meanroles <- mean(data_shared3$roles.roles) 
data_shared3$roles.sum <- data_shared3$roles.roles-meanroles 
 
data_shared3$initiatorA <- ifelse(data_shared3$initiator == "a", 1, 0) 
meaninitiator <- mean(data_shared3$initiatorA) 
data_shared3$initiator.sum <- data_shared3$initiatorA-meaninitiator 
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#model 
model <- lmer(gap.log ~ roles.sum*initiator.sum + (roles.sum*initiator.sum||video),  
data = data_shared3) 
 
2.3) 
#sum coding 
data_mutual2$roles.roles <- ifelse(data_mutual2$roles == "roles", 1, 0) 
meanroles <- mean(data_mutual2$roles.roles) 
data_mutual2$roles.sum <- data_mutual2$roles.roles-meanroles 
 
data_mutual2$person.person <- ifelse(data_mutual2$person == "a", 1, 0) 
meanperson <- mean(data_mutual2$person.person) 
data_mutual2$person.sum <- data_mutual2$person.person-meanperson 
 
#model 
model <- lmer(time.log ~ roles.sum*person.sum + (roles.sum*person.sum||video), 
data = data_mutual2) 
 
2.4) 
#sum coding 
data_instruction$roles.roles <- ifelse(data_instruction$roles == "roles", 1, 0) 
meanroles <- mean(data_instruction$roles.roles) 
data_instruction$roles.sum <- data_instruction$roles.roles-meanroles 
 
#model 
model <- glmer(look ~ roles.sum + (roles.sum|video), family = binomial, data= 
data_instruction) 
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2.5) 
#sum coding 
data.instructions.look$roles.roles <- ifelse(data.instructions.look$roles == "roles", 1, 
0) 
meanroles <- mean(data.instructions.look$roles.roles) 
data.instructions.look$roles.sum <- data.instructions.look$roles.roles-meanroles 
 
model <- glmer(who ~ roles.sum + (roles.sum|video), family = binomial, data= 
data.instructions.look) 
2.6) 
#sum coding 
data_reference_object5$roles.roles <- ifelse(data_reference_object5$roles == "roles", 
1, ifelse(data_reference_object5$roles == "no roles", 0, NA)) 
meanroles <- mean(data_reference_object5$roles.roles, na.rm = TRUE) 
data_reference_object5$roles.sum <- data_reference_object5$roles.roles-meanroles 
 
data_reference_object5$person.person <- ifelse(data_reference_object5$person == 
"a", 1, 0) 
meanperson <- mean(data_reference_object5$person.person, na.rm = TRUE) 
data_reference_object5$person.sum <- data_reference_object5$person.person-
meanperson 
 
# model 
 
model <- lmer(look.minus.start.log ~ roles.sum*person.sum + 
(roles.sum*person.sum||video),  data = data_reference_object5) 
 
2.7) 
#Sum coding 
meannoun <- mean(data_reference3$proper.noun, na.rm = TRUE) 
data_reference3$noun.sum <- data_reference3$proper.noun-meannoun 
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data_reference3$roles.roles <- ifelse(data_reference3$roles == "roles", 1, 
ifelse(data_reference3$roles == "no roles", 0, NA)) 
meanroles <- mean(data_reference3$roles.roles, na.rm = TRUE) 
data_reference3$roles.sum <- data_reference3$roles.roles-meanroles 
 
#model 
model <- lmer(alook.minus.start.log ~ roles.sum*noun.sum + 
(roles.sum*noun.sum||video), data = data_reference3) 
2.8) 
#sum coding 
meannoun <- mean(data_reference3$proper.noun, na.rm = TRUE) 
data_reference3$noun.sum <- data_reference3$proper.noun-meannoun 
 
data_reference3$roles.roles <- ifelse(data_reference3$roles == "roles", 1, 
ifelse(data_reference3$roles == "no roles", 0, NA)) 
meanroles <- mean(data_reference3$roles.roles, na.rm = TRUE) 
data_reference3$roles.sum <- data_reference3$roles.roles-meanroles 
 
#model 
model <- lmer(blook.minus.start.log ~ roles.sum*noun.sum + 
(roles.sum*noun.sum||video), data = data_reference3) 
 
2.9) 
#Sum coding 
meanspatial <- mean(data_reference3$spatial, na.rm = TRUE) 
data_reference3$spatial.sum <- data_reference3$spatial-meanspatial 
 
data_reference3$roles.roles <- ifelse(data_reference3$roles == "roles", 1, 
ifelse(data_reference3$roles == "no roles", 0, NA)) 
meanroles <- mean(data_reference3$roles.roles, na.rm = TRUE) 
data_reference3$roles.sum <- data_reference3$roles.roles-meanroles 
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#model 
model <- lmer(alook.minus.start.log ~ roles.sum*spatial.sum + 
(roles.sum*spatial.sum||video), data = data_reference3) 
 
2.10) 
#sum coding 
meanspatial <- mean(data_reference3$spatial, na.rm = TRUE) 
data_reference3$spatial.sum <- data_reference3$spatial-meanspatial 
 
data_reference3$roles.roles <- ifelse(data_reference3$roles == "roles", 1, 
ifelse(data_reference3$roles == "no roles", 0, NA)) 
meanroles <- mean(data_reference3$roles.roles, na.rm = TRUE) 
data_reference3$roles.sum <- data_reference3$roles.roles-meanroles 
 
#model 
model <- lmer(blook.minus.start.log ~ roles.sum*spatial.sum + 
(roles.sum*spatial.sum||video), data = data_reference3) 
 
2.11) 
#sum coding 
meannoun <- mean(data_reference_last$proper.noun, na.rm = TRUE) 
data_reference_last$noun.sum <- data_reference_last$proper.noun-meannoun 
 
data_reference_last$roles.roles <- ifelse(data_reference_last$roles == "roles", 1, 
ifelse(data_reference_last$roles == "no roles", 0, NA)) 
meanroles <- mean(data_reference_last$roles.roles, na.rm = TRUE) 
data_reference_last$roles.sum <- data_reference_last$roles.roles-meanroles 
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#model 
model <- glmer(spatial ~ noun.sum + (noun.sum||video), family = binomial, data = 
data_reference_last) 
 
	  
	  
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
3.1) 
 
#model 
model.output3 = glmer(start.with.look.to.me. ~ gaze.condition +  (1|ParticipantF), 
family="binomial", data = dataready)                
 
3.2) 
 
#sum coding 
 
dataready3$AQgroupEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "1", 0, 
ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "2", 1, NA)) 
mean.group <- mean(dataready3$AQgroupEFF, na.rm = T) 
 
dataready3$AQ.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "1", 0-mean.group, 
ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "2", 1-mean.group, NA)) 
 
#model 
 
model.output = glmer(start.with.look.to.me. ~ AQ.sum +  (1|ParticipantF), family = 
binomial, data = dataready3) 
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3.3) 
 
#model 
model.output3 = glmer(look.at.point.of.gaze ~ gaze.condition +  (1|ParticipantF)+  
(1|object), family="binomial", data = dataready)                
 
3.4, 3.5, 3.6) 
 
#sum coding 
 
dataready3$AQgroupEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "1", 0, 
ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "2", 1, NA)) 
mean.group <- mean(dataready3$AQgroupEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$AQ.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "1", 0-mean.group, 
ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "2", 1-mean.group, NA)) 
 
#model 
model.output = glmer(look.at.point.of.gaze ~ AQ.sum +  (1|ParticipantF) + 
(AQ.sum|object), family = binomial, data = dataready3) 
summary(model.output) 
 
3.7) 
 
#sum coding 
 
dataready3 <- dataready3[!(dataready3$gaze.condition == "AG"),] 
 
dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 0, 
ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "G", 1, NA)) 
mean.gaze.GNG <- mean(dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$gaze.condition.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 0-
mean.gaze.GNG, ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "G", 1-mean.gaze.GNG, NA)) 
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dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1, NA)) 
mean.lang <- mean(dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$featural.or.spatial.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0-mean.lang, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1-
mean.lang, NA)) 
 
#Model 
 
model.output = lmer(prop.time.looking ~ gaze.condition.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum+ 
(featural.or.spatial.sum|ParticipantF) + 
(gaze.condition.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum|object), data = dataready3) 
 
3.8) 
 
#sum coding 
 
dataready3 <- dataready3[!(dataready3$gaze.condition == "G"),] 
 
dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 0, 
ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "AG", 1, NA)) 
mean.gaze.GNG <- mean(dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$gaze.condition.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 0-
mean.gaze.GNG, ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "AG", 1-mean.gaze.GNG, 
NA)) 
 
dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1, NA)) 
mean.lang <- mean(dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$featural.or.spatial.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0-mean.lang, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1-
mean.lang, NA)) 
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#Model 
 
model.output = lmer(prop.time.looking ~ gaze.condition.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum+ 
(featural.or.spatial.sum|ParticipantF) + 
(gaze.condition.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum|object), data = dataready3) 
 
3.9) 
 
#sum coding 
dataready3 <- dataready3[dataready3$gaze.condition == "G",] 
 
 
dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1, NA)) 
mean.lang <- mean(dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$featural.or.spatial.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0-mean.lang, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1-
mean.lang, NA)) 
 
dataready3$AQgroupEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "1", 0, 
ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "2", 1, NA)) 
mean.group <- mean(dataready3$AQgroupEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$AQ.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "1", 0-mean.group, 
ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "2", 1-mean.group, NA)) 
 
#model 
model.output = lmer(prop.time.looking ~ featural.or.spatial.sum*AQ.sum +  
(featural.or.spatial.sum|ParticipantF) + ( featural.or.spatial.sum*AQ.sum|object), data 
= dataready3) 
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3.10) 
 
#sum coding 
dataready3 <- dataready3[dataready3$gaze.condition != "G",] 
 
dataready3$AQgroupEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "1", 0, 
ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "2", 1, NA)) 
mean.group <- mean(dataready3$AQgroupEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$AQ.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "1", 0-mean.group, 
ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "2", 1-mean.group, NA)) 
 
#model 
model.output = lmer(prop.time.looking ~ AQ.sum +  (1|ParticipantF) + 
(AQ.sum|object), data = dataready3) 
 
3.11) 
 
#sum coding 
dataready3 <- dataready[!(dataready$gaze.condition == "AG"),] 
 
dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 0, 
ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "G", 1, NA)) 
mean.gaze.GNG <- mean(dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$gaze.condition.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 0-
mean.gaze.GNG, ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "G", 1-mean.gaze.GNG, NA)) 
 
dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1, NA)) 
mean.lang <- mean(dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$featural.or.spatial.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0-mean.lang, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1-
mean.lang, NA)) 
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#Model 
model.output3 = glmer(correct.direction ~ gaze.condition.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum 
+  (featural.or.spatial.sum|ParticipantF) + (0+featural.or.spatial.sum|object), 
family="binomial", data = dataready3)                
 
3.12) 
 
#sum coding 
dataready3 <- dataready[!(dataready$gaze.condition == "G"),] 
 
dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 0, 
ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "AG", 1, NA)) 
mean.gaze.GNG <- mean(dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$gaze.condition.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 0-
mean.gaze.GNG, ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "AG", 1-mean.gaze.GNG, 
NA)) 
 
dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1, NA)) 
mean.lang <- mean(dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$featural.or.spatial.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0-mean.lang, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1-
mean.lang, NA)) 
 
#Model 
model.output3 = glmer(correct.direction ~ gaze.condition.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum 
+  (gaze.condition.sum|ParticipantF) + (0+ gaze.condition.sum 
+featural.or.spatial.sum|object), family="binomial", data = dataready3) 
 
3.13) 
 
#sum coding 
dataready2 <- dataready[dataready$look.at.point.of.gaze == "1", ] 
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dataready3 <- dataready2[!(dataready2$gaze.condition == "AG"),] 
 
dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 0, 
ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "G", 1, NA)) 
mean.gaze.GNG <- mean(dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$gaze.condition.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 0-
mean.gaze.GNG, ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "G", 1-mean.gaze.GNG, NA)) 
 
dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1, NA)) 
mean.lang <- mean(dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$featural.or.spatial.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0-mean.lang, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1-
mean.lang, NA)) 
 
#model 
model.output3 = glmer(correct.direction ~ gaze.condition.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum 
+  (featural.or.spatial.sum|ParticipantF) + 
(0+featural.or.spatial.sum+gaze.condition.sum||object), family="binomial", data = 
dataready3)                
 
3.14) 
 
#sum coding 
dataready2 <- dataready[dataready$look.at.point.of.gaze == "1", ] 
 
dataready3 <- dataready2[!(dataready2$gaze.condition == "G"),] 
 
dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 0, 
ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "AG", 1, NA)) 
mean.gaze.GNG <- mean(dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF, na.rm = T) 
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dataready3$gaze.condition.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 0-
mean.gaze.GNG, ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "AG", 1-mean.gaze.GNG, 
NA)) 
 
dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1, NA)) 
mean.lang <- mean(dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$featural.or.spatial.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0-mean.lang, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1-
mean.lang, NA)) 
 
#model 
model.output3 = glmer(correct.direction ~ gaze.condition.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum 
+  (featural.or.spatial.sum|ParticipantF) + 
(featural.or.spatial.sum+gaze.condition.sum||object), family="binomial", data = 
dataready3)                
 
3.15) 
#sum coding 
dataready3 <- dataready[dataready$gaze.condition == "AG", ] 
 
dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1, NA)) 
mean.lang <- mean(dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$featural.or.spatial.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0-mean.lang, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1-
mean.lang, NA)) 
 
dataready3$look.at.point.of.gazeEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$look.at.point.of.gaze== 0, 
0, ifelse(dataready3$look.at.point.of.gaze== 1, 1, NA)) 
mean.look <- mean(dataready3$look.at.point.of.gaze, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$look.at.point.of.gaze.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$look.at.point.of.gaze== 0, 
0-mean.look, ifelse(dataready3$look.at.point.of.gaze== 1, 1-mean.look, NA)) 
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#model 
model.output3 = glmer(correct.direction ~ 
look.at.point.of.gaze.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum +  
(featural.or.spatial.sum|ParticipantF) + 
(0+look.at.point.of.gaze.sum+featural.or.spatial.sum||object) , family="binomial", 
data = dataready3)                
 
3.16) 
#sum coding 
dataready3 <- dataready[dataready$gaze.condition == "G",] 
 
 
dataready3$AQgroupEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "1", 0, 
ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "2", 1, NA)) 
mean.group <- mean(dataready3$AQgroupEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$AQ.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "1", 0-mean.group, 
ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "2", 1-mean.group, NA)) 
 
#model 
model.output = glmer(correct.direction ~ AQ.sum +  (1|ParticipantF) + 
(AQ.sum|object), family = binomial, data = dataready3) 
 
3.17) 
#sum coding 
dataready3 <- dataready[!dataready$gaze.condition == "G",] 
 
 
dataready3$AQgroupEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "1", 0, 
ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "2", 1, NA)) 
mean.group <- mean(dataready3$AQgroupEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$AQ.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "1", 0-mean.group, 
ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "2", 1-mean.group, NA)) 
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#model 
model.output = glmer(correct.direction ~ AQ.sum +  (1|ParticipantF) + 
(AQ.sum|object), family = binomial, data = dataready3) 
 
3.18) 
#sum coding 
 
dataready3 <- dataready3[!(dataready3$gaze.condition == "AG"),] 
 
dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 1, 
ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "G", 0, NA)) 
mean.gaze.GNG <- mean(dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$gaze.condition.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 1-
mean.gaze.GNG, ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "G", 0-mean.gaze.GNG, NA)) 
 
dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1, NA)) 
mean.lang <- mean(dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$featural.or.spatial.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0-mean.lang, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1-
mean.lang, NA)) 
 
#model 
 
model.output = lmer(first.look.sentence ~ gaze.condition.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum 
+  (featural.or.spatial.sum|ParticipantF) + 
(gaze.condition.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum|object), data = dataready3) 
 
3.19) 
#sum coding 
 
dataready3 <- dataready3[!(dataready3$gaze.condition == "G"),] 
 
	   239	  
dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 1, 
ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "AG", 0, NA)) 
mean.gaze.GNG <- mean(dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$gaze.condition.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 1-
mean.gaze.GNG, ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "AG", 0-mean.gaze.GNG, 
NA)) 
 
dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1, NA)) 
mean.lang <- mean(dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$featural.or.spatial.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0-mean.lang, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1-
mean.lang, NA)) 
 
#model 
 
model.output = lmer(first.look.sentence ~ gaze.condition.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum 
+  (featural.or.spatial.sum|ParticipantF) + 
(gaze.condition.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum|object), data = dataready3) 
 
 
3.20) 
#sum coding 
dataready3 <- dataready3[!(dataready3$gaze.condition == "AG"),] 
 
dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 0, 
ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "G", 1, NA)) 
mean.gaze.GNG <- mean(dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$gaze.condition.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 0-
mean.gaze.GNG, ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "G", 1-mean.gaze.GNG, NA)) 
 
dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1, NA)) 
mean.lang <- mean(dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF, na.rm = T) 
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dataready3$featural.or.spatial.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0-mean.lang, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1-
mean.lang, NA)) 
 
 
#model 
 
model.output = lmer(first.look.sentence ~ gaze.condition.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum 
+  (featural.or.spatial.sum|ParticipantF) + 
(gaze.condition.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum|object), data = dataready3) 
 
3.21) 
#sum coding 
dataready3 <- dataready3[!(dataready3$gaze.condition == "G"),] 
 
dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 0, 
ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "AG", 1, NA)) 
mean.gaze.GNG <- mean(dataready3$gaze.conditionEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$gaze.condition.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "NG", 0-
mean.gaze.GNG, ifelse(dataready3$gaze.condition == "AG", 1-mean.gaze.GNG, 
NA)) 
 
dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1, NA)) 
mean.lang <- mean(dataready3$featural.or.spatialEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$featural.or.spatial.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0-mean.lang, ifelse(dataready3$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1-
mean.lang, NA)) 
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#model 
 
model.output = lmer(first.look.sentence ~ gaze.condition.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum 
+  (featural.or.spatial.sum|ParticipantF) + 
(gaze.condition.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum|object), data = dataready3) 
 
3.22) 
 
#sum coding 
dataready5 <- dataready3[dataready3$gaze.condition == "AG", ] 
 
dataready5$featural.or.spatialEFF <- ifelse(dataready5$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0, ifelse(dataready5$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1, NA)) 
mean.lang <- mean(dataready5$featural.or.spatialEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready5$featural.or.spatial.sum <- ifelse(dataready5$featural.or.spatial== 
"featural", 0-mean.lang, ifelse(dataready5$featural.or.spatial== "spatial", 1-
mean.lang, NA)) 
 
dataready5$look.at.point.of.gazeEFF <- ifelse(dataready5$look.at.point.of.gaze== 0, 
0, ifelse(dataready5$look.at.point.of.gaze== 1, 1, NA)) 
mean.look <- mean(dataready5$look.at.point.of.gaze, na.rm = T) 
dataready5$look.at.point.of.gaze.sum <- ifelse(dataready5$look.at.point.of.gaze== 0, 
0-mean.look, ifelse(dataready5$look.at.point.of.gaze== 1, 1-mean.look, NA)) 
 
#model 
model.output3 = lmer(first.look.sentence ~ 
look.at.point.of.gaze.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum +  
(look.at.point.of.gaze.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum|ParticipantF) + 
(look.at.point.of.gaze.sum*featural.or.spatial.sum|object) ,  data = dataready5)                
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3.23, 3.24, 3.25) 
 
#sum coding 
dataready3$AQgroupEFF <- ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "1", 0, 
ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "2", 1, NA)) 
mean.group <- mean(dataready3$AQgroupEFF, na.rm = T) 
dataready3$AQ.sum <- ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "1", 0-mean.group, 
ifelse(dataready3$groupalt== "2", 1-mean.group, NA)) 
 
#model 
model.output = lmer(first.look.sentence ~ AQ.sum +  (1|ParticipantF) + ( 
AQ.sum|object), data = dataready3) 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
4.1) 
#Sum coding 
 
data9_incon$referenceN <- ifelse(data9_incon$reference == 1, 0, 
ifelse(data9_incon$reference == 2, 1, 0)) 
reference_mean <- mean(data9_incon$referenceN) 
data9_incon$reference.sum <- ifelse(data9_incon$referenceN == "1", 1-
reference_mean, ifelse(data9_incon$referenceN == "0", 0-reference_mean, NA)) 
 
#model 
model.output1 = glmer(followN ~ reference.sum + (reference.sum|subjF) + 
(reference.sum|objectF), family = "binomial", data = data9_incon) 
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4.2) 
#Sum coding 
 
data5_incon$referenceN <- ifelse(data5_incon$reference == 1, 0, 
ifelse(data5_incon$reference == 2, 1, 0)) 
reference_mean <- mean(data5_incon$referenceN) 
data5_incon$reference.sum <- ifelse(data5_incon$referenceN == "1", 1-
reference_mean, ifelse(data5_incon$referenceN == "0", 0-reference_mean, NA)) 
 
#model 
model.output1 = glmer(followN ~ reference.sum + (reference.sum|subjF) + 
(reference.sum|objectF), family = "binomial", data = data5_incon) 
 
4.3) 
#Sum coding 
gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean <- mean(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF) 
data_2_3$gaze_likelihood.sum <- ifelse(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF == "1", 1-
gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean, ifelse(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF == "0", 0-
gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean, NA)) 
 
congruentEEF_mean <- mean(data_2_3$congruentEEF) 
data_2_3$congruentEEF.sum <- ifelse(data_2_3$congruentEEF == "1", 1-
congruentEEF_mean, ifelse(data_2_3$congruentEEF == "0", 0-congruentEEF_mean, 
NA)) 
 
#model 
 
model.output1 = glmer(correct ~ gaze_likelihood.sum*congruentEEF.sum +  
(gaze_likelihood.sum*congruentEEF.sum||subjF) + (0+gaze_likelihood.sum|objectF), 
family = "binomial", data = data_2_3) 
summary(model.output1)  
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4.4) 
#sum coding 
language_likelihoodEFF_mean <- mean(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF) 
data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF.sum <- ifelse(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF 
== "1", 1-language_likelihoodEFF_mean, ifelse(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF 
== "0", 0-language_likelihoodEFF_mean, NA)) 
 
congruentEEF_mean <- mean(data_4_7$congruentEEF) 
data_4_7$congruentEEF.sum <- ifelse(data_4_7$congruentEEF == "1", 1-
congruentEEF_mean, ifelse(data_4_7$congruentEEF == "0", 0-congruentEEF_mean, 
NA)) 
 
#model 
 
model.output1 = glmer(correct ~ language_likelihoodEFF*congruentEEF +  
(language_likelihoodEFF.sum * congruentEEF.sum||subjF) + 
(language_likelihoodEFF.sum * congruentEEF.sum||objectF), family = "binomial", 
data = data_4_7) 
 
4.5) 
#sum coding 
data_partial$congruentEEF <- ifelse(data_partial$gaze_valid == 
data_partial$language_valid, 1, 0 ) 
data_partial$congruent <- ifelse(data_partial$congruentEEF == 1, "Congruent", 
ifelse(data_partial$congruentEEF == 0, "Incongruent", NA)) 
 
gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean <- mean(data_partial$gaze_likelihoodEFF) 
data_partial$gaze_likelihood.sum <- ifelse(data_partial$gaze_likelihoodEFF == "1", 
1-gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean, ifelse(data_partial$gaze_likelihoodEFF == "0", 0-
gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean, NA)) 
 
congruentEEF_mean <- mean(data_partial$congruentEEF) 
data_partial$congruentEEF.sum <- ifelse(data_partial$congruentEEF == "1", 1-
congruentEEF_mean, ifelse(data_partial$congruentEEF == "0", 0-
congruentEEF_mean, NA)) 
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#model 
 
model.output1 = glmer(correct ~ gaze_likelihood.sum*congruentEEF.sum +  
(gaze_likelihood.sum*congruentEEF.sum||subjF) + (0+gaze_likelihood.sum|objectF), 
family = "binomial", data = data_partial) 
 
4.6) 
#sum coding 
data_partial$congruentEEF <- ifelse(data_partial$gaze_valid == 
data_partial$language_valid, 1, 0 ) 
data_partial$congruent <- ifelse(data_partial$congruentEEF == 1, "Congruent", 
ifelse(data_partial$congruentEEF == 0, "Incongruent", NA)) 
 
gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean <- mean(data_partial$gaze_likelihoodEFF) 
data_partial$gaze_likelihood.sum <- ifelse(data_partial$gaze_likelihoodEFF == "1", 
1-gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean, ifelse(data_partial$gaze_likelihoodEFF == "0", 0-
gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean, NA)) 
 
congruentEEF_mean <- mean(data_partial$congruentEEF) 
data_partial$congruentEEF.sum <- ifelse(data_partial$congruentEEF == "1", 1-
congruentEEF_mean, ifelse(data_partial$congruentEEF == "0", 0-
congruentEEF_mean, NA)) 
 
#model 
 
model.output1 = glmer(correct ~ gaze_likelihood.sum*congruentEEF.sum +  
(gaze_likelihood.sum*congruentEEF.sum||subjF) + (congruentEEF.sum||objectF), 
family = "binomial", data = data_partial) 
 
4.7) 
#sum coding 
data$gaze_likelihoodEFF <- ifelse(data$session == "2", 1, ifelse(data$session == "3", 
0, 9)) 
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data_2_3 <- data[data$gaze_likelihoodEFF != "9",] 
data_2_3$congruentEEF <- ifelse(data_2_3$gaze_valid == data_2_3$language_valid, 
1, 0 ) 
data_2_3$congruent <- ifelse(data_2_3$congruentEEF == 1, "Congruent", 
ifelse(data_2_3$congruentEEF == 0, "Incongruent", NA)) 
 
gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean <- mean(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF) 
data_2_3$gaze_likelihood.sum <- ifelse(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF == "1", 1-
gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean, ifelse(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF == "0", 0-
gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean, NA)) 
 
congruentEEF_mean <- mean(data_2_3$congruentEEF) 
data_2_3$congruentEEF.sum <- ifelse(data_2_3$congruentEEF == "1", 1-
congruentEEF_mean, ifelse(data_2_3$congruentEEF == "0", 0-congruentEEF_mean, 
NA)) 
 
#model 
 
model.output1 = glmer(first_direction_correct ~ 
gaze_likelihood.sum*congruentEEF.sum +  (gaze_likelihood.sum* 
congruentEEF.sum||subjF) + (0+congruentEEF.sum||objectF), family = "binomial", 
data = data_2_3) 
 
4.8) 
#sum coding 
data$language_likelihoodEFF <- ifelse(data$session == "4", 1, ifelse(data$session == 
"7", 0, 9))  
data_4_7 <- data[data$language_likelihoodEFF != "9",]  
data_4_7$congruentEEF <- ifelse(data_4_7$gaze_valid == data_4_7$language_valid, 
1, 0 ) 
data_4_7$congruent <- ifelse(data_4_7$congruentEEF == 1, "Congruent", 
ifelse(data_4_7$congruentEEF == 0, "Incongruent", NA)) 
 
language_likelihoodEFF_mean <- mean(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF) 
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data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF.sum <- ifelse(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF 
== "1", 1-language_likelihoodEFF_mean, ifelse(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF 
== "0", 0-language_likelihoodEFF_mean, NA)) 
 
congruentEEF_mean <- mean(data_4_7$congruentEEF) 
data_4_7$congruentEEF.sum <- ifelse(data_4_7$congruentEEF == "1", 1-
congruentEEF_mean, ifelse(data_4_7$congruentEEF == "0", 0-congruentEEF_mean, 
NA)) 
 
#model 
model.output1 = glmer(first_direction_correct ~ 
language_likelihoodEFF*congruentEEF +  (language_likelihoodEFF.sum * 
congruentEEF.sum||subjF) + (language_likelihoodEFF.sum * 
congruentEEF.sum||objectF), family = "binomial", data = data_4_7) 
 
4.9) 
 
#sum coding 
 
data2$gaze_likelihoodEFF <- ifelse(data2$session == "2", 1, ifelse(data2$session == 
"3", 0, 9)) 
data_2_3 <- data2[data2$gaze_likelihoodEFF != "9",] 
data_2_3$congruentEEF <- ifelse(data_2_3$gaze_valid == data_2_3$language_valid, 
1, 0 ) 
data_2_3$congruent <- ifelse(data_2_3$congruentEEF == 1, "Congruent", 
ifelse(data_2_3$congruentEEF == 0, "Incongruent", NA)) 
 
gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean <- mean(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF) 
data_2_3$gaze_likelihood.sum <- ifelse(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF == "1", 1-
gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean, ifelse(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF == "0", 0-
gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean, NA)) 
 
congruentEEF_mean <- mean(data_2_3$congruentEEF) 
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data_2_3$congruentEEF.sum <- ifelse(data_2_3$congruentEEF == "1", 1-
congruentEEF_mean, ifelse(data_2_3$congruentEEF == "0", 0-congruentEEF_mean, 
NA)) 
 
#model 
model.output2 = lmer(first_latency ~ gaze_likelihood.sum*congruentEEF.sum +  
(gaze_likelihood.sum*congruentEEF.sum|subjF)+(gaze_likelihood.sum*congruentEE
F.sum|objectF), data = data_2_3) 
 
4.10) 
#sum coding 
data2$language_likelihoodEFF <- ifelse(data2$session == "4", 1, ifelse(data2$session 
== "7", 0, 9)) 
data_4_7 <- data2[data2$language_likelihoodEFF != "9",] 
data_4_7$congruentEEF <- ifelse(data_4_7$gaze_valid == data_4_7$language_valid, 
1, 0 ) 
data_4_7$congruent <- ifelse(data_4_7$congruentEEF == 1, "Congruent", 
ifelse(data_4_7$congruentEEF == 0, "Incongruent", NA)) 
 
language_likelihoodEFF_mean <- mean(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF) 
data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF.sum <- ifelse(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF 
== "1", 1-language_likelihoodEFF_mean, ifelse(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF 
== "0", 0-language_likelihoodEFF_mean, NA)) 
 
congruentEEF_mean <- mean(data_4_7$congruentEEF) 
data_4_7$congruentEEF.sum <- ifelse(data_4_7$congruentEEF == "1", 1-
congruentEEF_mean, ifelse(data_4_7$congruentEEF == "0", 0-congruentEEF_mean, 
NA)) 
#model 
model.output2 = lmer(first_latency ~ 
language_likelihoodEFF.sum*congruentEEF.sum +  
(language_likelihoodEFF.sum*congruentEEF.sum|subjF) +  
(language_likelihoodEFF.sum*congruentEEF.sum||objectF), data = data_4_7) 
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4.11) 
#sum coding 
data2$gaze_likelihoodEFF <- ifelse(data2$session == "2", 1, ifelse(data2$session == 
"3", 0, 9)) 
data_2_3 <- data2[data2$gaze_likelihoodEFF != "9",] 
data_2_3$congruentEEF <- ifelse(data_2_3$gaze_valid == data_2_3$language_valid, 
1, 0 ) 
data_2_3$congruent <- ifelse(data_2_3$congruentEEF == 1, "Congruent", 
ifelse(data_2_3$congruentEEF == 0, "Incongruent", NA)) 
 
gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean <- mean(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF) 
data_2_3$gaze_likelihood.sum <- ifelse(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF == "1", 1-
gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean, ifelse(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF == "0", 0-
gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean, NA)) 
 
congruentEEF_mean <- mean(data_2_3$congruentEEF) 
data_2_3$congruentEEF.sum <- ifelse(data_2_3$congruentEEF == "1", 1-
congruentEEF_mean, ifelse(data_2_3$congruentEEF == "0", 0-congruentEEF_mean, 
NA)) 
 
#model 
model.output2 = lmer(time_to_hit_target ~ gaze_likelihood.sum*congruentEEF.sum 
+  
(gaze_likelihood.sum*congruentEEF.sum|subjF)+(gaze_likelihood.sum*congruentEE
F.sum|objectF), data = data_2_3) 
 
4.12) 
sum coding 
data2$language_likelihoodEFF <- ifelse(data2$session == "4", 1, ifelse(data2$session 
== "7", 0, 9)) 
data_4_7 <- data2[data2$language_likelihoodEFF != "9",] 
data_4_7$congruentEEF <- ifelse(data_4_7$gaze_valid == data_4_7$language_valid, 
1, 0 ) 
data_4_7$congruent <- ifelse(data_4_7$congruentEEF == 1, "Congruent", 
ifelse(data_4_7$congruentEEF == 0, "Incongruent", NA)) 
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language_likelihoodEFF_mean <- mean(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF) 
data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF.sum <- ifelse(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF 
== "1", 1-language_likelihoodEFF_mean, ifelse(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF 
== "0", 0-language_likelihoodEFF_mean, NA)) 
 
congruentEEF_mean <- mean(data_4_7$congruentEEF) 
data_4_7$congruentEEF.sum <- ifelse(data_4_7$congruentEEF == "1", 1-
congruentEEF_mean, ifelse(data_4_7$congruentEEF == "0", 0-congruentEEF_mean, 
NA)) 
 
#model 
model.output2 = lmer(time_to_hit_target ~ 
language_likelihoodEFF.sum*congruentEEF.sum +  
(language_likelihoodEFF.sum*congruentEEF.sum|subjF) +  
(language_likelihoodEFF.sum*congruentEEF.sum||objectF), data = data_4_7) 
 
4.13) 
#sum coding 
data2$gaze_likelihoodEFF <- ifelse(data2$session == "2", 1, ifelse(data2$session == 
"3", 0, 9)) 
data_2_3 <- data2[data2$gaze_likelihoodEFF != "9",] 
data_2_3$congruentEEF <- ifelse(data_2_3$gaze_valid == data_2_3$language_valid, 
1, 0 ) 
data_2_3$congruent <- ifelse(data_2_3$congruentEEF == 1, "Congruent", 
ifelse(data_2_3$congruentEEF == 0, "Incongruent", NA)) 
 
gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean <- mean(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF) 
data_2_3$gaze_likelihood.sum <- ifelse(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF == "1", 1-
gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean, ifelse(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF == "0", 0-
gaze_likelihoodEFF_mean, NA)) 
 
congruentEEF_mean <- mean(data_2_3$congruentEEF) 
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data_2_3$congruentEEF.sum <- ifelse(data_2_3$congruentEEF == "1", 1-
congruentEEF_mean, ifelse(data_2_3$congruentEEF == "0", 0-congruentEEF_mean, 
NA)) 
 
#model 
model.output2 = lmer(RT ~ gaze_likelihood.sum*congruentEEF.sum + 
(gaze_likelihood.sum*congruentEEF.sum|subjF) 
+(gaze_likelihood.sum*congruentEEF.sum||objectF), data = data_2_3) 
 
4.14) 
#sum coding 
data2$language_likelihoodEFF <- ifelse(data2$session == "4", 0, ifelse(data2$session 
== "7", 1, 9)) 
data_4_7 <- data2[data2$language_likelihoodEFF != "9",] 
data_4_7$congruentEEF <- ifelse(data_4_7$gaze_valid == data_4_7$language_valid, 
1, 0 ) 
data_4_7$congruent <- ifelse(data_4_7$congruentEEF == 1, "Congruent", 
ifelse(data_4_7$congruentEEF == 0, "Incongruent", NA)) 
 
language_likelihoodEFF_mean <- mean(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF) 
data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF.sum <- ifelse(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF 
== "1", 1-language_likelihoodEFF_mean, ifelse(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF 
== "0", 0-language_likelihoodEFF_mean, NA)) 
 
congruentEEF_mean <- mean(data_4_7$congruentEEF) 
data_4_7$congruentEEF.sum <- ifelse(data_4_7$congruentEEF == "1", 1-
congruentEEF_mean, ifelse(data_4_7$congruentEEF == "0", 0-congruentEEF_mean, 
NA)) 
 
#model 
model.output2 = lmer(RT ~ language_likelihoodEFF.sum*congruentEEF.sum + 
(language_likelihoodEFF.sum*congruentEEF.sum|subjF) 
+(language_likelihoodEFF.sum*congruentEEF.sum||objectF), data = data_4_7) 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
5.1) 
#sum coding 
 
meangaze <- mean(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF) 
data_2_3$gaze_likelihood.sum <- data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF-meangaze 
 
meancong <- mean(data_2_3$congruentEEF) 
data_2_3$congruent.sum <- data_2_3$congruentEEF-meancong 
 
#model 
model.output1 = glmer(correct ~ gaze_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum +  
(gaze_likelihood.sum + congruent.sum||subjF)+(gaze_likelihood.sum||objectF),family 
= "binomial", data = data_2_3) 
 
5.2) 
#sum coding 
 
meanlang <- mean(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF) 
data_4_7$lang_likelihood.sum <- data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF-meanlang 
 
meancong <- mean(data_4_7$congruentEEF) 
data_4_7$congruent.sum <- data_4_7$congruentEEF-meancong 
 
#model 
model.output1 = glmer(correct ~ lang_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum +  
(lang_likelihood.sum + congruent.sum||subjF)+ (lang_likelihood.sum||objectF), 
family = "binomial", data = data_4_7) 
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5.3) 
#sum coding 
 
meangaze <- mean(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF) 
data_2_3$gaze_likelihood.sum <- data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF-meangaze 
 
meancong <- mean(data_2_3$congruentEEF) 
data_2_3$congruent.sum <- data_2_3$congruentEEF-meancong 
 
#model 
model.output1 = glmer(first_direction_correct ~ gaze_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum 
+  (gaze_likelihood.sum + congruent.sum||subjF)+(gaze_likelihood.sum * 
congruent.sum||objectF),family = "binomial", data = data_2_3) 
 
5.4) 
#sum coding 
 
meanlang <- mean(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF) 
data_4_7$lang_likelihood.sum <- data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF-meanlang 
 
meancong <- mean(data_4_7$congruentEEF) 
data_4_7$congruent.sum <- data_4_7$congruentEEF-meancong 
 
#model 
model.output1 = glmer(first_direction_correct ~ lang_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum 
+  (lang_likelihood.sum + congruent.sum||subjF)+ (0+lang_likelihood.sum|objectF), 
family = "binomial", data = data_4_7) 
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5.5) 
#sum coding 
 
meangaze <- mean(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF) 
data_2_3$gaze_likelihood.sum <- data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF-meangaze 
 
meancong <- mean(data_2_3$congruentEEF) 
data_2_3$congruent.sum <- data_2_3$congruentEEF-meancong 
 
#model 
model.output2 = lmer(first_latency ~ gaze_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum +  
(gaze_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum|subjF) + 
(gaze_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum|objectF), data = data_2_3) 
summary(model.output2) 
 
5.6) 
#sum coding  
meanlang <- mean(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF) 
data_4_7$lang_likelihood.sum <- data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF-meanlang 
 
meancong <- mean(data_4_7$congruentEEF) 
data_4_7$congruent.sum <- data_4_7$congruentEEF-meancong 
 
#model 
model.output2 = lmer(first_latency ~ lang_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum +  
(lang_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum|subjF) + 
(lang_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum||objectF), data = data_4_7) 
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5.7) 
#sum coding 
 
meangaze <- mean(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF) 
data_2_3$gaze_likelihood.sum <- data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF-meangaze 
 
meancong <- mean(data_2_3$congruentEEF) 
data_2_3$congruent.sum <- data_2_3$congruentEEF-meancong 
 
#model 
model.output2 = lmer(time_to_hit_target ~ gaze_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum +  
(gaze_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum|subjF) + 
(gaze_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum||objectF), data = data_2_3) 
 
5.8) 
#sum coding 
meanlang <- mean(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF) 
data_4_7$lang_likelihood.sum <- data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF-meanlang 
 
meancong <- mean(data_4_7$congruentEEF) 
data_4_7$congruent.sum <- data_4_7$congruentEEF-meancong 
 
#model 
model.output2 = lmer(time_to_hit_target ~ lang_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum +  
(lang_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum|subjF) + 
(lang_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum|objectF), data = data_4_7) 
 
5.9) 
#sum coding 
meangaze <- mean(data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF) 
data_2_3$gaze_likelihood.sum <- data_2_3$gaze_likelihoodEFF-meangaze 
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meancong <- mean(data_2_3$congruentEEF) 
data_2_3$congruent.sum <- data_2_3$congruentEEF-meancong 
 
#model 
model.output2 = lmer(RT ~ gaze_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum +  
(gaze_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum|subjF) + 
(gaze_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum|objectF), data = data_2_3) 
 
5.10) 
#sum coding 
meanlang <- mean(data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF) 
data_4_7$lang_likelihood.sum <- data_4_7$language_likelihoodEFF-meanlang 
 
meancong <- mean(data_4_7$congruentEEF) 
data_4_7$congruent.sum <- data_4_7$congruentEEF-meancong 
 
#model 
model.output2 = lmer(RT ~ lang_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum +  
(lang_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum|subjF) + 
(lang_likelihood.sum*congruent.sum|objectF), data = data_4_7) 
 
5.11) 
#sum coding 
meancue <- mean(data$cue_condition-1) 
data$cue_condition.sum <-data$cue_condition-1-meancue 
 
#model 
model.output1 <- glmer(correct ~ cue_condition.sum + (cue_condition.sum|subjF) + 
(cue_condition.sum||objectF), family = binomial, data = data) 
summary(model.output1) 
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5.12) 
#sum coding 
meanswitch <- mean(data5$switch_code) 
data5$switch.sum <-data5$switch_code-meanswitch 
 
meanref <- mean(data5$reference-1) 
data5$reference.sum <- data5$reference -1- meanref 
 
#model 
model.output1 <- glmer(correct ~ reference.sum*switch.sum + 
(reference.sum+switch.sum||subjF) + (0+reference.sum||objectF), family = binomial, 
data = data5) 
 
5.13) 
#sum coding 
meancue <- mean(data$cue_condition-1) 
data$cue_condition.sum <-data$cue_condition-1-meancue 
 
#model 
model.output1 <- glmer(first_direction_correct ~ cue_condition.sum + 
(cue_condition.sum|subjF) + (cue_condition.sum||objectF), family = binomial, data = 
data) 
 
5.14) 
#sum coding 
meanswitch <- mean(data5$switch_code) 
data5$switch.sum <-data5$switch_code-meanswitch 
 
meanref <- mean(data5$reference-1) 
data5$reference.sum <- data5$reference -1- meanref 
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#model 
model.output1 <- glmer(first_direction_correct ~ reference.sum*switch.sum + 
(reference.sum+switch.sum||subjF) + (1|objectF), family = binomial, data = data5) 
 
5.15) 
#sum coding 
meancue <- mean(data4$cue_condition-1) 
data4$cue_condition.sum <-data4$cue_condition-1-meancue 
 
#model 
model.output1 <- lmer(first_latency ~ cue_condition.sum + 
(cue_condition.sum|subjF) + (cue_condition.sum|objectF), data = data4) 
 
5.16) 
#sum coding 
meanswitch <- mean(data5$switch_code) 
data5$switch.sum <-data5$switch_code-meanswitch 
 
meanref <- mean(data5$reference-1) 
data5$reference.sum <- data5$reference -1- meanref 
 
#model 
model.output1 <- lmer(first_latency ~ reference.sum*switch.sum + 
(reference.sum*switch.sum|subjF) + (reference.sum*switch.sum|objectF), data = 
data5) 
 
5.17) 
#sum coding 
meancue <- mean(data4$cue_condition-1) 
data4$cue_condition.sum <-data4$cue_condition-1-meancue 
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#model 
model.output1 <- lmer(time_to_hit_target ~ cue_condition.sum + 
(cue_condition.sum|subjF) + (cue_condition.sum|objectF), data = data4) 
 
5.18) 
#sum coding 
meanswitch <- mean(data5$switch_code) 
data5$switch.sum <-data5$switch_code-meanswitch 
 
meanref <- mean(data5$reference-1) 
data5$reference.sum <- data5$reference -1- meanref 
 
#model 
model.output1 <- lmer(time_to_hit_target ~ reference.sum*switch.sum + 
(reference.sum*switch.sum|subjF) + (reference.sum*switch.sum|objectF), data = 
data5) 
 
5.19) 
#sum coding 
meancue <- mean(data4$cue_condition-1) 
data4$cue_condition.sum <-data4$cue_condition-1-meancue 
 
#model 
model.output1 <- lmer(RT ~ cue_condition.sum + (cue_condition.sum|subjF) + 
(cue_condition.sum|objectF), data = data4) 
 
5.20) 
#sum coding 
meanswitch <- mean(data5$switch_code) 
data5$switch.sum <-data5$switch_code-meanswitch 
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meanref <- mean(data5$reference-1) 
data5$reference.sum <- data5$reference -1- meanref 
 
#model 
model.output1 <- lmer(RT ~ reference.sum*switch.sum + 
(reference.sum*switch.sum|subjF) + (reference.sum*switch.sum|objectF), data = 
data5) 
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Appendix 3: Victoria Sponge recipe 
	  
Recipe	  Procedure	  
1) Gather	  the	  large	  bowl	  and	  small	  bowl	  2) Gather	  50g	  of	  butter	  3) Put	  butter	  in	  the	  small	  bowl	  4) Put	  the	  small	  bowl	  in	  the	  microwave	  for	  15	  seconds	  on	  high	  5) Add	  butter	  to	  large	  bowl	  6) Gather	  100g	  of	  sugar	  7) Add	  sugar	  to	  large	  bowl	  8) Get	  whisk	  9) Whisk	  butter	  and	  sugar	  until	  light	  and	  fluffy	  10) Gather	  2	  eggs	  11) Add	  the	  eggs	  to	  large	  bowl	  and	  begin	  to	  whisk	  12) Gather	  the	  sieve	  WHILST	  continuing	  to	  whisk	  13) Gather	  100g	  of	  flour	  WHILST	  continuing	  to	  whisk	  14) Sieve	  the	  flour	  a	  little	  bit	  at	  a	  time	  WHILST	  continuing	  to	  whisk	  15) Gather	  milk	  WHILST	  continuing	  to	  whisk	  16) Add	  a	  small	  amount	  of	  milk	  to	  bowl	  WHILST	  continuing	  to	  whisk	  17) Once	  everything	  is	  evenly	  mixed,	  stop	  whisking.	  18) Gather	  the	  square	  tin	  19) Add	  mixture	  to	  square	  tin	  20) Spread	  the	  mixture	  evenly	  21) Put	  the	  square	  tin	  in	  oven	  THE	  RECIPE	  IS	  NOW	  COMPLETE 	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Appendix 4: Chef guidelines 
 
	  
You	  are	  the	  chef.	  	  Your	  fellow	  participant	  is	  the	  gatherer.	  As	  chef,	  you	  will	  ultimately	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  preparing	  the	  recipe.	  The	  gatherer	  is	  present	  to	  assist	  you.	  	  You	  are	  expected	  to	  mix	  and	  prepare	  the	  ingredients,	  as	  outlined	  in	  the	  recipe.	  You	  are	  not	  expected	  to	  gather	  together	  the	  ingredients/items/appliances	  that	  you	  need.	  However,	  as	  you	  are	  in	  charge,	  you	  are	  expected	  to	  delegate	  this	  responsibility	  to	  the	  gatherer.	  You	  will	  be	  given	  a	  recipe	  to	  follow	  for	  Victoria	  Sponge.	  You	  cannot	  show	  the	  recipe	  to	  the	  gatherer,	  but	  you	  are	  free	  to	  share	  any	  of	  the	  information	  it	  contains.	  You	  will	  be	  familiarised	  with	  the	  kitchen	  before	  the	  procedure	  begins,	  without	  the	  gatherer.	  	  If	  there	  is	  any	  stage	  of	  the	  mixing/preparation	  that	  you	  feel	  could	  be	  carried	  out	  more	  easily	  with	  two	  people,	  you	  can	  get	  the	  gatherer	  to	  assist	  you.	  However,	  as	  you	  are	  in	  charge	  you	  will	  be	  responsible	  for	  explicitly	  guiding	  the	  gatherer	  through	  these	  stages.	  If	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  about	  your	  responsibilities	  as	  the	  chef,	  feel	  free	  to	  ask	  the	  experimenter	  at	  this	  point.	  Once	  you	  and	  the	  gatherer	  are	  happy	  that	  you	  understand	  your	  individual	  roles,	  the	  experimenter	  will	  give	  you	  the	  recipe	  and	  you	  may	  begin	  the	  procedure.	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Appendix 5: Gatherer guidelines 
 
	  
You	  are	  the	  gatherer.	  Your	  fellow	  participant	  is	  the	  chef.	  The	  chef	  is	  ultimately	  in	  charge	  of	  preparing	  the	  recipe.	  You	  are	  present	  to	  assist	  the	  chef.	  	  You	  will	  not	  be	  expected	  to	  make	  any	  decisions	  regarding	  the	  preparation.	  Your	  primary	  responsibility	  will	  be	  to	  collect	  ingredients/items/appliances	  that	  the	  chef	  requires	  to	  prepare	  the	  recipe.	  The	  chef	  will	  be	  given	  a	  recipe	  for	  Victoria	  Sponge.	  You	  must	  not	  read	  this.	  Instead,	  you	  will	  get	  information	  directly	  from	  the	  chef.	  If	  the	  chef	  asks	  you	  to	  assist	  in	  the	  mixing/preparation	  of	  the	  ingredients	  you	  should	  do	  so.	  However,	  you	  must	  remember	  to	  closely	  follow	  the	  instructions	  of	  the	  chef.	  	  If	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  about	  your	  responsibilities	  as	  the	  gatherer,	  feel	  free	  to	  ask	  the	  experimenter	  at	  this	  point.	  Once	  you	  and	  the	  chef	  are	  happy	  that	  you	  understand	  your	  individual	  roles,	  the	  experimenter	  will	  give	  the	  recipe	  to	  the	  chef	  and	  you	  both	  may	  begin	  the	  procedure.	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Appendix 6: Autism Quotient 
Questionnaire 
 
This questionnaire was based on the Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ) questionnaire 
from the appendix of Baron-Cohen et al. (2001). The differences between this 
Questionnaire and the questionnaire used by Baron-Cohen et al (2001) are all 
superficial – The exact same question statements are used. Participants were scored 
out of fifty for autistic traits, with each question getting a score of 1 or 0. Responses 
of “Definitely agree” and “Slightly agree” scored 1 for questions 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 
13, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 33, 35, 39, 41, 42, 43, 45 and 46. Responses of 
“Definitely disagree” and “Slightly disagree” scored 1 for questions 3, 8, 10, 11, 14, 
15, 17, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 44, 47, 48, 49 and 50. The 
higher the score, the higher the participant’s autistic traits. 
 
The five pages of the Autism Quotient Questionnaire are shown below: 
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Appendix 7 – Picture Stimuli for 
Studies 3, 4 and 5 	  
 
Green air 
freshener 
 
 
Red air freshener 
 
Blue boomerang 
 
Green boomerang 
 
Blue brush 
 
Yellow brush 
 
Red calculator 
 
Yellow calculator 
 
Orange candle 
holder 
 
 
Yellow candle 
holder 
 
Brown cat 
 
White cat 
 
Green clothes-
hanger 
 
Yellow clothes-
hanger 
 
 
Blue cowboy boot 
 
Red cowboy boot 
 
Black diary 
 
Brown diary 
 
Blue fork 
 
Orange fork 
 
 
Green frisbee 
 
Yellow frisbee 
 
Blue hat 
 
Pink hat 
 
Orange 
highlighter 
 
Yellow 
highlighter 
 
 
Beige jug 
 
Brown jug 
 
Blue knife 
 
Orange knife 
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Blue lantern 
 
Yellow lantern 
 
 
 
Blue mat 
 
Green mat 
 
Blue pencil holder 
 
Pink pencil holder 
 
Green pencil 
sharpener 
 
Pink pencil 
sharpener 
 
 
Pink purse 
 
White purse 
 
Blue bow 
 
White bow 
 
Blue snowman 
 
 
 
Pink snowman 
 
Blue spoon 
 
Orange spoon 
 
Blue watch 
 
Red watch 
 
Black spray can 
 
Pink spray can 
 
Black sunglasses 
 
White sunglasses 
 
Blue toothpick 
holder 
 
 
Green toothpick 
holder 
 
Blue washing line 
 
Red washing line 
 
Green wine glass 
 
Red wine glass 
 
Black wool 
 
 
 
Brown wool 
 
 
